Wetlands Can Be Infrastructure, Too

Clean Growth in Nova Scotia

SUMMARY

A September 2020 report from the Canadian Climate Institute identified 11 new indicators to define and measure Canada’s progress on climate change and clean growth. Drawing on a broad range of publicly available data, the report presents a vision of how Canada can prosper while addressing climate change. The 11 indicators offer data-driven insights on where Canada is making progress—and where more work needs to be done.

This case study focuses on a single province, Nova Scotia, to provide a tangible example of what clean growth means in practice, and how to measure it. Nova Scotia has significantly reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2005, while maintaining steady economic growth through a combination of policy and market- driven shifts in economic structure. Yet it faces considerable challenges in making future progress. The province has set some of the most ambitious climate targets in the country, but also has one of Canada’s most emissions-intensive economies. At the same time, the province is grappling with high unemployment rates, high energy costs, and poor air quality in some areas.

This case study draws on a sub-set of the 11 indicators, focusing on the best available data—areas where it is clear that Nova Scotia has made progress and areas where more effort is needed. See the full report for more details on each of the 11 indicators.

INGREDIENTS OF CLEAN GROWTH IN NOVA SCOTIA

A fundamental objective of clean growth is separating—or decoupling—economic growth (measured by gross domestic product, or GDP) from GHG emissions. Figure 1 shows an index of Nova Scotia’s GDP, GHG emissions, and employment between 2005 and 2018.

Overall, Nova Scotia has made substantial progress on decoupling economic growth and jobs from emissions trends. Of all provinces and territories, Nova Scotia achieved the second-biggest reduction in GHG emissions between 2005 and 2018, a drop of 26 per cent (New Brunswick reduced emissions by 34 per cent). Meanwhile, provincial GDP (adjusted for inflation) increased by 14 per cent, while job growth increased by three per cent. And while these growth rates are lower than national averages (24 per cent growth in GDP and 14 per cent growth in jobs), Nova Scotia’s job growth remained consistent with population growth, and its overall unemployment levels remained stable (Statistics Canada, 2020b).

Figure 1: GDP, Employment, and GHG emissions, Nova Scotia, 2005-2018

Sources: ECCC (2020); Statistics Canada (2020a); Statistics Canada (2019).

Wages and salaries in Nova Scotia have also increased: median employment income (adjusted for inflation) rose by 22 per cent between 2005 and 2018—which represents the fourth-largest jump among provinces (Statistics Canada, 2020c).

Five drivers underpin Nova Scotia’s progress on decoupling its GHG emissions from its economy: 1) fuel switching in the electricity sector; 2) energy efficiency gains; 3) clean tech sector growth; 4) climate-related infrastructure investment; and, 5) a gradual shift toward a services-based economy and away from producing emissions-intensive goods.

1. Fuel switching in the electricity sector

In 2007, Nova Scotia generated 89 per cent of its electricity from burning fossil fuels— namely coal and oil. By 2018, the share of fossil fuels in its electricity mix fell to 65 per cent (NSP, 2020a). In particular, coal use fell from 76% of the electricity mix in 2007 to 52% in 2018, while natural gas and oil stayed stable at 13% over the period. Meanwhile, renewable electricity production grew rapidly: wind power, for example, generated 12 per cent of Nova Scotia’s electricity in 2018, up from one per cent in 2007 (NSP, 2020a). In total, the emissions intensity of Nova Scotia’s electricity grid fell from 880 grams of GHGs per kilowatt hour (kWh) in 2005 to 720 in 2018 (ECCC, 2020).

Government policy has been instrumental in this fuel switching. Nova Scotia capped the total allowable emissions from the electricity sector and implemented a renewable portfolio standard in 2010, requiring Nova Scotia Power (the single, regulated utility in the province) to increase the share of renewable power to 25 per cent by 2015 and 40 per cent by 2020. This policy was accompanied by a community feed-in tariff program, which provided subsidies for renewable power generators from 2011 to 2016. Together these policies reduced electricity emissions by 35 per cent between 2005 and 2018 (ECCC, 2020).

2. Energy efficiency gains

Continual improvement in energy efficiency is the second big reason for Nova Scotia’s success in decarbonizing its economy. Energy-saving measures cumulatively reduce about 1 million tonnes (Mt) of GHG emissions each year, equivalent to about six per cent of the province’s total 2018 emissions (ECCC, 2020; Municipality of Digby, 2020). In 2017, for example, Nova Scotia had the 10th lowest electricity consumption per capita and consumed 24 per cent less electricity per person than the national average (CER, 2020). Electricity demand has fallen seven per cent since 2005, amounting to over $180 million in energy cost savings for Nova Scotians (Efficiency One, 2019).

Here too, policy has been essential. The province established Canada’s first independent energy efficiency utility in 2009, which has spearheaded numerous initiatives. Nova Scotia became the first province, for example, to require LED bulbs in all streetlights, saving an estimated $18 million in operating and maintenance costs and 30,000 tons of GHGs per year (Government of Nova Scotia, 2012). Initiatives have also helped households adopt more efficient space-heating technologies, such as electric heat pumps; Nova Scotia now ranks third in the country for the number of heat pump installations per capita (CER, 2019). Due to these different policies, Nova Scotia now has the highest concentration of energy efficiency managers and advisors in the country (i.e., number of managers per large business) (Efficiency Canada, 2019).

Many of these initiatives have targeted Nova Scotia’s most financially vulnerable households. Nova Scotia is the third-largest spender per household on reducing energy poverty (Efficiency Canada, 2019), helping reduce heating bills by 35 per cent for participating households (Efficiency One, 2018). One program is specifically targeted at improving energy efficiency in Mi’kmaq communities and is helping improve insulation, mitigate moisture, enhance ventilation, and support heat pump installations (Efficiency One, 2020). Although the program is still relatively new, it will cover 2,400 on-reserve homes in 13 Mi’kmaq communities.

3. Clean tech sector growth

Although it currently represents just two per cent of provincial GDP, Nova Scotia’s environmental and clean technology (ECT) sector is an important source of new growth in the province. In terms of GDP, the ECT sector grew by 31 per cent between 2012 and 2018, compared to 19 per cent nationally, driven primarily by growth in clean electricity, waste management, and environment-related construction. Over this same period, jobs in the ECT sector grew by 27 per cent compared to 17 per cent nationally (Statistics Canada, 2020d).

Nova Scotia has also become a leader in exporting ECT goods and services. Between 2012 and 2018, exports in Nova Scotia’s ECT sector grew by 67 per cent, compared to 23 per cent nationally. While imports of ECT fell during this period (by 33 per cent), exports provide new opportunities for employment and economic development. Nearly one-third of Nova Scotia’s ECT exports were in complex manufactured goods (Statistics Canada, 2020e). CarbonCure, for example is a Nova Scotia-based company that manufactures a technology that introduces recycled CO2 into fresh concrete to reduce its carbon footprint. The business was recently named North America’s clean tech company of the year and is well poised to capture these growing export opportunities (Cleantech Group, 2020).

The province’s mature ecosystem of research and development has provided the foundation for its growing clean technology sector. Nova Scotia outperforms all other provinces—and many international peers—when it comes to public spending on research and development, measured as a percentage of provincial GDP (Conference Board of Canada, 2020). Its high concentration of universities also provides a reliable source of new and innovative research. Researchers at Dalhousie University, for example, have teamed up with Tesla and other industrial partners to improve lithium-ion battery storage (Jarratt, 2020). Acadia University established the Tidal Energy Institute, which is helping advance tidal energy in the Bay of Fundy. Lastly, the Verschuren Centre at the University of Cape Breton partners with industry to develop and deploy technological solutions in renewable energy, among other research areas (Verschuren Centre, 2020).

Some provincial energy policies are aimed at tapping directly into this pool of expertise. In 2015, for example, the provincial government implemented a community feed-in tariff program to help develop and commercialize tidal power technologies, contributing $420–$530/MWh for new tidal projects (Government of Nova Scotia, 2020). The provincial utility is also ramping up adoption of key technologies, such as smart meters for households, which will allow it to better integrated small-scale renewables and time-of-use pricing into the electricity system (Lau, 2020; NSP, 2020b).

Investments in climate-related infrastructure are another important factor in Nova Scotia’s success on low-carbon growth. Figure 2 shows investment flows for select infrastructure categories between 2009 and 2019. Overall, the figure shows two large injections of capital in the provincial economy, one in 2010 and the other in 2017. These bulky investments were targeted primarily at expanding and maintaining the province’s transmission and distribution infrastructure.

Nova Scotia also saw a burst of investment in renewable power generation between 2013 and 2015, driven by the province’s community feed-in-tariff program (which ended in 2016) and expansion of commercial wind turbines. Meanwhile, investments in residential solar have accelerated rapidly (not included in the figure). Installed solar capacity grew from virtually nothing in 2015 to 5.4 MW by 2018. Financial rebates through Efficiency Nova Scotia’s Solar Homes Program have helped spur this new investment, along with Property Assessed Clean Energy programs that provide households with accessible financing options for energy efficiency upgrades and solar installations (Nova Scotia PACE, 2020).

Figure 2: Investment Flows for Select Infrastructure Categories (2009-2019)

As the provincial electricity grid continues to get cleaner, this infrastructure could play a key role in decarbonizing other sectors, such as transportation (e.g., electric vehicles) and buildings (e.g., heat pumps). Nova Scotia Power, for example, is installing a fast charger network for electric vehicles from Yarmouth to Sydney, which will help facilitate trips from the south of the province to its north (NS Government, 2019). Metro Transit (the regional public transit authority for Halifax) has committed to electrifying half of its bus fleet by 2028 and plans to introduce the first electric buses by 2022–23 (Halifax Regional Council, 2020).

Improving how governments measure the value of these infrastructure investments will be critical in the future. A lack of data and analysis currently prevents us from evaluating the full range of costs and benefits associated big infrastructure investments. Yet this type of data and analysis is essential to ensure that public dollars are channeled toward investments that achieve Nova Scotia’s long-term climate and economic objectives and generate the highest possible societal return. Better historical data can also help inform current gaps and future investment needs.

5. A gradual shift from emissions-intensive goods toward services

Finally, the changing structure of Nova Scotia’s economy has helped facilitate the province’s drop in emissions. Figure 3 shows changes in GDP and employment in several key sectors in Nova Scotia from 2005 to 2018 and illustrates that most of the province’s growth in GDP and jobs was in the services sector, which is generally less emissions intensive. At the same time, the province’s goods-producing sectors have steadily contracted: between 2005 and 2018, GDP from the oil and gas sector fell by 87 per cent, coal mining by 84 per cent, and forestry and logging by 42 per cent.

Figure 3: Changes in GDP and Employment across Select Sectors in Nova Scotia (2005–2018)

Sources: Statistics Canada (2020b); Statistics Canada (2020g).

The figure also shows that some of the strongest growth in both jobs and GDP was in professional, scientific, and technical services, followed by the health care and social assistance sector. Jobs in the utility sector also saw significant growth over the period, which may be due in part to the increase in activity in energy efficiency programming. Based on GDP, services now represent 81 per cent of Nova Scotia’s entire economy, up from 74 per cent in 2005.

Most of these structural changes have come from shifts in global market dynamics (e.g., decreased demand for coal, or steel manufacturing moving to lower-cost countries) and were not the result of domestic policy choices. Nevertheless, the gradual shift to a service-based economy has undoubtedly played a key role in the decoupling of emissions from sources of growth in Nova Scotia’s economy.

CHALLENGES IN MAKING FUTURE PROGRESS

Next, we look at four challenges Nova Scotia faces as it approaches the next stage of clean growth. The province has set ambitious climate targets. Achieving them—while creating new employment opportunities, keeping energy affordable for households, and reducing air pollution—will take concerted effort.

1. Declining goods-production and high unemployment in small, rural communities

The same shift in market dynamics that helped reduce Nova Scotia’s emissions is creating big challenges for small and rural communities where industrial activities have historically provided a key source of income and jobs. As noted above, most goods-producing sectors have shrunk in Nova Scotia.

Competitiveness pressures have played a big role in the closure of several big facilities and projects in Nova Scotia, such as the Irving refinery in Dartmouth, the Sable Island offshore gas project, and pulp and paper mills in Liverpool and Pictou. In many cases—especially where a single facility provided the bulk of employment opportunities in a region—closures have resulted in high regional unemployment rates, declining tax bases, poverty, and health issues (Lionais et al., 2019).

These economic losses highlight the uneven—and often precarious—employment situation in small Nova Scotia communities with few major employers. Figure 4 shows Nova Scotia’s population centres with the highest unemployment rates from 2016, along with the average unemployment rates in Nova Scotia and Canada. Nearly half of all population centres with unemployment rates above the provincial average are in Cape Breton—a region that has struggled since the decline of its steel and coal industries in the mid 20th century (see Box 1). Many of these other communities have also faced a gradual decline in key industries, such as fishing, pulp and paper, and iron and steel, with few new sources of growth.

Figure 4: Unemployment Rate by Population Centre (2016)

Unemployment rates are particularly high in Indigenous communities. The Eskasoni First Nation in Cape Breton, the world’s largest Mi’kmaq community, had the highest unemployment rate in Nova Scotia in 2016, at 26 per cent. In the Atlantic Region as a whole, over 18 per cent of Indigenous peoples were unemployed in 2016, compared to 15 per cent nationally (ACOA, 2020).

Addressing this deep-seated problem with structural unemployment will not be easy. In many cases, dedicated retraining and education programs could help. However, retraining only helps if the jobs are there when training is complete. Determining where Nova Scotia has a competitive edge in a low-carbon economy is critical as its economy continues to transition.

Ensuring that existing sources of employment remain competitive is also important to future employment prospects. The paper mill in Port Hawkesbury, for example, located in southern Cape Breton, employs 300 workers—equivalent to about 20 per cent of the town’s labour force—and is the region’s largest source of private investment (King, 2019; Townfolio, 2020). The plant also consumes about 10 per cent of Nova Scotia’s total electricity use (Torrie, 2019). In 2019, the pulp mill signed a memorandum of understanding with the Canada Infrastructure Bank to develop a 112 MW wind farm to generate clean, renewable power (PPC, 2019). Ensuring that Nova Scotia’s remaining goods-producing industries are competitive in a low- carbon economy could be a key part of their future success.

BOX 1: Mobile workers in Cape Breton

Limited job prospects locally have pushed many Nova Scotians to find work in other provinces while still living on the east coast (known as “mobile work”). In particular, Western Canada’s oil and gas industry has helped absorb a substantial portion of Atlantic Canada’s weak labour market, especially for Cape Breton. In 2008, for example, over six percent of Cape Breton’s entire labour force worked in Alberta.

Although mobile work has become an important source of employment income for East Coast communities, it has proven highly unstable. When oil prices plunged from $US 80 per barrel in 2008 to $50 per barrel in 2009, the number of Cape Bretoners employed in Alberta fell by one quarter. The most recent drop in oil prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic will likely have a similar impact.

The longer-term prospects for Atlantic Canadians working in Western Canada’s oil and gas sector are even less certain as global markets shift away from carbon-intensive energy. Without a plan to transition its workforce, regions like Cape Breton could again be hit hard by changes in global demand.

Sources: Lionais et al. (2019); Campbell (2019).

2. Reducing economy-wide emissions and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050

Nova Scotia has set some of the most ambitious climate targets in the country. The recently proposed Sustainable Development Goals Act would commit the province to reducing emissions by 53 per cent from 2005 levels by 2030 and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.

Achieving these longer-term targets, however, requires a big lift. As of 2018, Nova Scotia reduced emissions by 26 per cent from 2005 levels, putting the province halfway to reaching its 2030 target. Its heavy reliance on coal-fired electricity made initial reductions relatively easy and cost-effective. Making additional gains will be harder.

The electricity sector, for example, is still the largest source of emissions. With less than three per cent of Canada’s population, emissions from Nova Scotia’s coal-fired units accounted for seven per cent of all GHG emissions from electricity generation in 2015 (ECCC, 2018a). Imports of clean electricity from the Muskrat Falls hydro dam in Newfoundland and Labrador will help Nova Scotia further reduce emissions from its electricity grid. But even if it imports the maximum amount of available energy from Muskrat Falls, more than half of Nova Scotia’s electricity could still come from fossil fuels (Torrie, 2019; NSURB, 2019). Based on an equivalency agreement with the Federal Government, coal and other fossil fuels are expected to play a central part of the Nova Scotia grid for the foreseeable future (EAC, 2020; ECCC. 2018).

Reducing emissions from the transportation sector has also proven difficult. Transport emissions fell between 2005 and 2014 but have risen since; sector emissions in 2018 were the same as they were in 2005. On a per capita basis, consumption of refined petroleum products in Nova Scotia was 12 per cent above the national average in 2018 and many areas still rely on heating oil. (CER, 2020). Nova Scotia implemented a cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions in 2018, but the policy is not expected to have a substantial impact on transportation emissions. The government estimates the program will decrease annual emissions by less than two per cent by 2022 (Government of Nova Scotia, 2019). Currently, EVs sales account for just 0.03 per cent of total annual vehicle sales in Nova Scotia, compared to 3.5 per cent of sales nationally (EAC, 2020); it also ranks poorly on EV charging infrastructure relative to other provinces (Efficiency Canada, 2019).

Nova Scotia also has room to improve when it comes to the total amount of GHGs associated with the goods and services consumed in the economy. Nova Scotia had the third-highest consumption emissions in Canada in 2011 (excluding the territories); only Alberta and Saskatchewan ranked higher (Dobson & Fellows, 2017). While consumption-based measures are typically not considered in how countries and provinces report their emissions internationally, they are important to achieving global low-carbon growth.

Nova Scotia will need to make significant progress in each of these areas if it is to meet its ambitious climate goals. In many cases, it will require pushing even harder on energy efficiency, decarbonizing the electricity grid, fostering clean technology and other sources of growth, and investing in more climate-related infrastructure. Reducing emissions from the transportation sector, for example, will require accelerating adoption rates of low-carbon technologies, such as electric and fuel cell vehicles. It will also likely require investments in “enabling” infrastructure—such as charging networks, cycling infrastructure, and public transit. And it will require investments in renewable power generation and efficiency improvements to ensure the province has sufficient clean energy to support the ongoing shift to greater electricity use. In each case, the province should consider how to best align these policies and technologies to achieve potentially transformative change (Haley, 2018).

Efforts are well underway to determine where and how Nova Scotia can achieve its climate goals while also addressing its other important economic and social objectives. The provincial government, for example, has planned consultations with citizens, rights-holders, and other stakeholders on its proposed Sustainable Development Goals Act (delayed due to the 2020 pandemic) and is developing its next climate change plan. The region is also working on the Clean Power Roadmap for Atlantic Canada, which aims to provide a vision for how the shift to cleaner power will fit within the broader energy needs of the region (CICS, 2019). Lastly, the province is awaiting a feasibility study on the potential of hydrogen production, storage, distribution, and use in the Maritimes, expected to be released in late 2020 (OERA, 2020).

3. Ensuring Nova Scotia households have affordable energy

As Nova Scotia looks to implement more ambitious policy to achieve its climate goals, energy affordability is a key consideration. Whether an energy policy reduces the cost of efficient retrofits or raises the price of gasoline to encourage the use of cleaner alternatives, the transition to a low-carbon economy has implications for households and affordability. And while climate policy cannot singlehandedly resolve complex and deep-rooted socioeconomic disparities, policies can and should be designed to keep energy affordable—especially for financially vulnerable households.

Energy affordability is an ongoing challenge in Nova Scotia. Nova Scotia has some of the highest electricity rates in the country, and a large number of households still burn furnace oil or wood to heat their homes, which can be costly and inefficient options (Hydro Quebec, 2019; CER, 2018). At the same time, natural gas prices in the province are expected to climb even higher with the closure of its offshore gas production (Casey, 2019). And while Nova Scotia has made good progress on making energy more affordable for the most financially vulnerable (discussed above), the bulk of Nova Scotians spend more of their household budget on energy than households in other provinces.

Figure 5 shows the average share of household energy expenditures in Nova Scotia and Canada for 2017. Households are broken out into five groups based on their income—called quintiles—ranging from the lowest-income households to the highest. Energy expenditures include home heating and power, along with transportation expenditures (i.e., gasoline, public transit, taxis).

Overall, Nova Scotians spend a larger share of their household income on energy compared to households in the rest of Canada. For example, lower- to middle-class households (i.e., those in the second and third quintiles) spend 60 per cent more of their household budget on energy compared to the average Canadian. These two income brackets include households that, in many cases, have bigger houses than the lowest-earning segment and are more likely to own and drive private vehicles.

Household energy expenditures in Nova Scotia have, however, decreased over time across all income segments. In 2010, for example, households in the second income quintile spent 19 per cent of their total expenditures on energy. By 2018, these same households spent (on average) 13 per cent of their total expenditures on energy. This downward trend also happened during a period where electricity prices and gasoline prices increased, suggesting that improvements in energy efficiency played a key role in reducing average energy expenditures (NRCan, 2020).¹

Still, scaling up energy efficiency programs for households could help make energy more affordable for those paying a disproportionately high share of their income on energy. Expanding the existing energy efficiency program for Mi’kmaq communities, for example, could help build capacity and allow communities to lead energy efficiency projects themselves.

4. Improving air quality in rural Nova Scotia

Clean air is central to the health and well-being of Nova Scotians. And while Nova Scotians generally enjoy clean air relative to other parts of the world, there are still strong links between sources of GHG emissions, air pollution, and risks to Nova Scotians’ health. As a result, Nova Scotia has significant opportunities to improve the health of residents as it accelerates action to reduce GHG emissions.

Although Nova Scotia only has a handful of monitoring stations, data from 2017-18 suggest that several rural areas experienced relatively high levels of ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter—central ingredients in smog. Figure 6 below shows annual average levels of ground-level ozone and fine particulate matter for several Nova Scotia municipalities where data is available, along with Toronto and Vancouver for comparison. The figures also include the Canadian Air Quality Standards for reference, which are jointly set by federal and provincial governments.

Figure 6: Annual Average Ground-level Ozone (top) and Fine Particulate Matter Emissions (bottom) (2017-18)

Overall, six municipalities in Nova Scotia had ground-level ozone levels that were higher than Halifax and Vancouver. Perhaps surprisingly, ozone levels in these mostly small and rural municipalities approached levels found in Toronto. Levels of fine particulate matter tell a similar story, where levels were similar to or exceeded those in Halifax (with the exception of Aylesford).

These high levels of O3 and particulate matter pose serious health risks to Nova Scotians. Health Canada, for example, estimates that roughly 260 Nova Scotians die prematurely from air pollution each year.² When controlling for population, Nova Scotia has the seventh highest risk exposure of premature mortalities when compared to all 13 provinces and territories. Efforts to reduce GHG emissions in the province would have clear health benefits.

Sulphur dioxide emissions in Nova Scotia—although well below national emissions standards—also have health implications for rural communities, with possible connections to the province’s remaining stock of coal-fired electricity facilities. Sulphur dioxide levels in Port Hawksbury, Pictou, and Sydney, for example, are two to three times higher than in Halifax. Each of these three communities have coal- fired electricity generating stations in or near their communities. And while existing regulatory measures to reduce coal-fired generation in Nova Scotia will help prevent 89 premature deaths, 8,000 asthma episodes, and 58,000 days of breathing difficulty (Gunn, 2019), its remaining coal-fired power plants still pose health risks.

Improving air quality in Nova Scotian communities, however, is not entirely within the government’s control. A portion of Nova Scotia’s poor air quality comes from the eastern U.S., where coal-fired electricity is also common. The small Nova Scotia towns of Kejimkujik and Aylesford, for example, are both rural and do not have any major source of industrial emissions nearby. In these cases, efforts to shift to cleaner electricity in the Eastern U.S. could go a long way toward making Nova Scotia’s air healthier.

CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS LEARNED

This case study provides a window into Nova Scotia’s journey toward low-carbon growth, looking at both its successes and areas for future improvement. Its provincial context is unique, but many lessons are applicable to other provinces and territories that are seeking their own pathways to cleaner growth:

Nova Scotia demonstrates that it is possible to maintain economic growth while reducing GHG emissions. The province also managed to keep job growth consistent with population growth and increase wages and salaries faster than in most other provinces.
A big reason for the province’s success was reducing GHG emissions from its emissions-intensive electricity sector. Other provinces with emissions- intensive electricity grids could achieve similar gains.
Nova Scotia is the first province with an independent and well-funded energy efficiency utility, helping reduce emissions while generating cost savings. Energy efficiency improvements have helped keep energy affordable for low-income households, reduced peak demand and the need for new capital spending, and have created a burgeoning industry with well-paying jobs.
Nova Scotia’s mature ecosystem of research and development has been instrumental in building a successful clean technology sector. Key factors include strong public investment in R&D, a dense network of universities, and policies that leverage these resources.
Investing in low-carbon electricity and renewable power generation is a critical first step toward the broader switch to clean electricity throughout the economy. All climate-related investments, however, should be accompanied by a full assessment of their economic and environmental value to help prioritize projects with the highest financial and societal return.

While Nova Scotia has been successful in accelerating low-carbon growth, this case studied highlighted several challenges the provincial government will need to confront in the coming years if is to achieve its ambitious and laudable climate commitments. Here too, insights from Nova Scotia’s experience are relevant to other jurisdictions, especially as more governments, businesses, and communities commit to achieving net-zero emissions by 2050.

Shifts in global markets have left many small and rural areas in the province with high unemployment rates, particularly in Indigenous communities. Retraining parts of the labour force while developing new market opportunities will be essential to achieving inclusive and lasting growth in the future.
Additional GHG reductions—and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050—will be a difficult task. Like many other provinces, Nova Scotia is struggling to reduce transportation emissions. Electrification provides a key opportunity to help decarbonize this sector, along with buildings and industrial sectors, though it will likely require an expansion in low-carbon electricity production.
Although Nova Scotia has done well with keeping energy affordable for those with the lowest incomes, most Nova Scotians spend substantially more on energy than in other provinces. Keeping energy affordable is likely to be a key consideration as governments continue to support and build cleaner energy systems.Many small and rural communities—both in Nova Scotia and in the rest of Canada—grapple with levels of air pollution that sometimes exceed urban areas. Reducing GHG emissions can significantly improve local air quality and generate big health benefits.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This case study was prepared by Jonathan Arnold of the Canadian Climate Institute, with staff contributions from Rachel Samson and Weseem Ahmed.

REFERENCES

ACOA (Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency). 2020. “The Labour Market in Atlantic Canada.” Government of Canada. https://www.canada.ca/en/atlantic-canada-opportunities/services/ researchstudies10.html

Campbell, Mary. 2019. “When the Emergency is Chronic.” Cape Breton Spectator. 6 March. https:// capebretonspectator.com/2019/03/06/when-the-emergency-is-chronic/

Casey, Q. (2019). “The highest gas bills in Canada about to get higher as East Coast production dries up.” Financial Post. 1 March. https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/the-highest-gas-bills-in-canada- about-to-get-higher-as-east-coast-production-dries-up

CER (Canada Energy Regulator). 2017. “Canada’s Renewable Power Landscape 2017 – Energy Market Analysis.” Government of Canada. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/sttstc/lctrct/rprt/2017cndrnwblpwr/prvnc/ ns-eng.html?=undefined&wbdisable=true

CER (Canada Energy Regulator). 2018. “Market Snapshot: What is in your residential natural gas bill?” Government of Canada. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/snpsht/2018/07-04rsdntlntrlgsbll- eng.html

CER (Canada Energy Regulator). 2019. “Market Snapshot: Growing heat pump adoption – how does the technology work?” Government of Canada. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/snpsht/2019/04- 03grwnghtpmpdptn-eng.html

CER (Canada Energy Regulator). 2020. “Provincial and Territorial Energy Profiles – Nova Scotia.” Government of Canada. https://www.cer-rec.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/mrkt/nrgsstmprfls/ns-eng.html

CICS (Canadian Intergovernmental Conference Secretariat). 2019. “Atlantic Growth Strategy Maps Atlantic Canada’s Clean Energy Future.” Atlantic Growth Strategy Leadership Committee. https://scics.ca/en/ product-produit/news-release-atlantic-growth-strategy-maps-atlantic-canadas-clean-energy-future/

Cleantech Group. 2020. “Cleantech Group Names 2020 Global Cleantech 100 – Top Private Companies in Clean Technology.” https://www.cleantech.com/release/top-private-companies-in-clean-technology- named/

Conference Board of Canada. 2020. “How Canada Performs: Public R&D.” https://www. conferenceboard.ca/(X(1)S(31sazs5b1e1gv0mxqqrwquqs))/hcp/provincial/innovation/perd. aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1

Dobson, Sarah, and Kent Fellows. 2017. Embodied Emissions in Inputs and Outputs: A Value-Added Approach to National Emissions Accounting. Canadian Public Policy 43(2): 1-25.

EAC (Ecology Action Centre). 2020. Electric vehicle adoption in Nova Scotia: 2020-2030. Prepared by Dunsky Energy Consulting.

ECCC (Environment and Climate Change Canada). 2018a. “Regulations Amending the Reduction of Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Coal-fired Generation of Electricity Regulations.” Canada Gazette, Part 1 (152). http://gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/p1/2018/2018-02-17/html/reg3-eng.html

ECCC (Environment and Climate Change Canada). 2018b. “National air pollution surveillance program.” Government of Canada. Retrieved from http://data.ec.gc.ca/data/air/monitor/national-air-pollution- surveillance-naps-program/Data-Donnees/?lang=en

ECCC (Environment and Climate Change Canada). 2020. Canada’s Official Greenhouse Gas Inventory. Government of Canada. http://data.ec.gc.ca/data/substances/monitor/canada-s-official-greenhouse-gas- inventory/

Efficiency Canada. 2019. Canadian Provincial Energy Efficiency Scorecard. https://www.scorecard. efficiencycanada.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Scorecard.pdf

Efficiency One. 2018. “Annual Report: All the Good Things.” https://s3-ca-central-1.amazonaws.com/ ens-efficiency-ns-prod-offload-647701102377-ca-central-1/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/07011835/ENS_ AnnualReport_2018.pdf

Efficiency One. 2020. “Homes in Mi’kmaw communities across Nova Scotia to benefit from energy- efficient upgrades.” News & Events. https://www.efficiencyone.ca/news/

Government of Nova Scotia. 2012. “LED Street Lighting”. https://energy.novascotia.ca/energy-efficiency/ efficiency-and-conservation/buildings-and-appliances/led-street-lighting

Government of Nova Scotia. 2019. Nova Scotia’s Cap and Trade Program: Regulatory Framework. Nova Scotia Environment. https://climatechange.novascotia.ca/sites/default/files/Nova-Scotia-Cap-and-Trade- Regulatory-Framework.pdf

Government of Nova Scotia. 2020. “Developmental Tidal Feed-in Tariff Program.” https://energy. novascotia.ca/renewables/programs-and-projects/tidal-fit

Gunn, Andrea. 2019. “Coal fires most of Nova Scotia’s energy; will we still be burning it in 20 years?” Chronicle Herald. 30 April 2019. https://www.thechronicleherald.ca/news/local/coal-fires-most-of-nova- scotias-energy-will-we-still-be-burning-it-in-20-years-307232/

Haley, Brendan. 2018. Integrating structural tensions into technological innovation systems analysis: Application to the case of transmission interconnections and renewable electricity in Nova Scotia, Canada. Research Policy 47: 1147–1160.

Halifax Regional Council. 2020. Strategic transit projects. https://www.halifax.ca/sites/default/files/ documents/city-hall/regional-council/200526rc917pres.pdf

Jarratt, Emma. 2020. “The Jeff Dahn effect: superstar alumni and a growing regional battery cluster.” Electric Autonomy Canada. 21 August 2020. https://electricautonomy.ca/2020/08/21/the-jeff-dahn-effect/

King, Nancy. 2019. “No production time lost at Port Hawkesbury Paper despite fire.” Cape Breton Post. https://www.capebretonpost.com/business/local-business/no-production-time-lost-at-port-hawkesbury- paper-despite-fire-331329/

Lau, R. (2020). Smart meters coming to Nova Scotia Power customers. Global News. 12 June 2020. https:// globalnews.ca/news/4268675/nova-scotia-power-smart-meters/

Lionais, Doug, Christina Murray, and Chloe Donatelli. 2020. “Dependence on Interprovincial Migrant Labour in Atlantic Canada Communities: The Role of the Alberta Economy.” Societies 10 (11).

OERA (Offshore Energy Research Association). 2020. “Feasibility Study to Evaluate Hydrogen Production, Storage, Distribution and Use in The Maritimes.” https://oera.ca/news/news-release-feasibility-study- evaluate-hydrogen-production-storage-distribution-and-use

Municipality of Digby. 2020. “LED Street Lights.” https://www.digbydistrict.ca/led-street-lights.html Nova Scotia PACE. 2020. “PACE Programs.” https://novascotiapace.ca/pace-programs/

NRCan (Natural Resources Canada). 2020. “Weekly Average Retail Prices for Furnace Oil in 2017.” http:// www2.nrcan.gc.ca/eneene/sources/pripri/prices_bycity_e.cf m?

NRCan (Natural Resources Canada). 2020. “Weekly Average Retail Prices for Furnace Oil in 2017.” https:// www.nrcan.gc.ca/our-natural-resources/domestic-international-markets/transportation-fuel-prices/ furnace-oil-prices/4799

NSP (Nova Scotia Power). 2020a. “Nova Scotia Reaches 30% Renewable Energy Milestone. https://www. nspower.ca/about-us/press-releases/details/2019/06/10/nova-scotia-power-reaches-30-renewable-energy- milestone”

NSP (Nova Scotia Power). 2020b. “Smart Grid Nova Scotia.” https://www.nspower.ca/community/ innovation/smart-grid-nova-scotia

NSURB (Nova Scotia Utility and Review Board). 2019. Ten Year System Outlook. https://irp.nspower.ca/files/ key-documents/background-materials/20190702-2019-10-Year-System-Outlook.pdf

PPC (Pulp & Paper Canada). 2019. “Port Hawkesbury Paper signs MOU to develop wind farm plan for green energy.” https://www.pulpandpapercanada.com/port-hawkesbury-paper-signs-mou-to-develop- wind-farm-plan-for-green-energy/

Quebec Hydro. 2019. Comparison of Electricity Prices in Major North American Cities. https://www. hydroquebec.com/data/documents-donnees/pdf/comparison-electricity-prices.pdf

Statistics Canada. 2016. “Data Tables: 2016 Census.” Government of Canada. https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/

Statistics Canada. 2019. “Gross Domestic Product, Expenditure-based, Provincial and Territorial, Annual.” Government of Canada. https://www150.Statistics Canada.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3610022201

Statistics Canada. 2020a. “Table 14-10-0090-01: Labour force characteristics by province, territory and economic region, annual.” Government of Canada. https://doi.org/10.25318/1410009001-eng

Statistics Canada. 2020b. Table: 14-10-0023-01: Labour force characteristics by industry. https://www150. statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410002301.

Statistics Canada. 2020c. Table: 11-10-0239-01: Income of individuals by age group, sex and income source, Canada, provinces and selected census metropolitan areas.

Statistics Canada. 2020d. “Table 36-10-0630-01: Environmental and Clean Technology Products Economic Account, gross domestic product.” Government of Canada. https://doi.org/10.25318/3610063001-eng

Statistics Canada. 2020e. “Environmental and Clean Technology Products Economic Account, 2018.” Government of Canada. https://www150.Statistics Canada.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/200313/dq200313b- eng.htm

Statistics Canada. 2020f. “Table 36-10-0608-01: Infrastructure Economic Accounts, investment and net stock by asset, industry, and asset function.” Government of Canada. https://www150.Statistics Canada. gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/cv.action?pid=3610060801#timef rame

Statistics Canada. 2020g. “Table 36-10-0402-01: Gross domestic product (GDP) at basic prices, by industry, provinces and territories.” Government of Canada. https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/ tv.action?pid=3610040201

Statistics Canada. 2020h. “Household spending by household income quintile, Canada, regions and provinces.” Government of Canada. Retrieved from https://www150.Statistics Canada.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/ tv.action?pid=1110022301

Torrie, Ralph. 2019. Accelerating the Coal Phase Out: Nova Scotia and the Climate Emergency. Prepared by Torrie Smith Associates for the Ecology Action Centre. https://ecologyaction.ca/sites/default/files/ images-documents/EAC%20Coal%20Phaseout%20Report%20-%20April%202020.pdf

Townfolio. 2020. “Port Hawkesbury: Labour Force.” https://townfolio.co/ns/port-hawkesbury/labour-force

Verschuren Centre. 2020. “Solutions and opportunities to grow a sustainable economy.” http://www. verschurencentre.ca/

Climate Legislation in British Columbia

SUMMARY

In 2018, the Government of British Columbia (B.C.) introduced the Climate Change Accountability Act. The Climate Change Accountability Act amended and renamed the Greenhouse Gas Reductions Targets Act from 2007 and introduced a number of legislated updates, including setting 2030 and 2040 emissions reduction targets en route to the previously set 2050 target, providing a framework to develop reports on climate change risks and progress, and enabling the minister to set sectoral Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets.

In 2019, the Government of B.C. passed Bill 38, amending the Climate Change Accountability Act of 2018. The 2019 legislative amendments introduced a broader climate accountability framework that mandates the setting of sectoral and interim emissions reduction targets (though does not set them out in the legislation), implements more detailed and regular reporting requirements for government, and establishes an independent expert advisory body to provide advice. It also grants the Lieutenant Governor in Council the authority to enact regulations prescribing requirements and targets for public sector buildings, vehicle fleets, and the fuels they employ. This case study explores the core features of B.C.’s amended Climate Change Accountability Act 2019 (the Act).

FEATURES OF B.C.’S LEGISLATION

1. Legislating climate accountability processes

The 2019 amendments to the Act established a climate accountability framework for B.C., including a number of key features. In particular, the amended Act mandates that the Government of B.C.:

Set an interim target for GHG emissions reductions on the path to the existing legislated 2030 target;
Establish emissions reductions targets for individual sectors;
Adhere to new, more frequent, and more detailed reporting requirements across both climate mitigation and adaptation goals and policies; and
Establish an independent advisory committee.

2. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities

B.C. Government Duties

Under B.C.’s Act, the responsible minister has a statutory duty to establish emissions targets, to appoint an advisory committee, to report on progress towards targets and the actions taken to achieve them, and to report on actions to manage climate change risks.

The legislative amendments also introduce new requirements for the provincial government and other public sector organizations to report on actions taken towards minimizing their organizational GHG emissions (see Section 5 for more details).

Advisory Committee

The amended legislation establishes an independent advisory body to provide advice on an annual basis to the minister on climate change issues. In particular, the advisory committee must provide advice on:

Plans and actions to meet long-term emissions reduction targets;
Plans and actions to mitigate and manage climate change risks;
Opportunities for sustainable economic development and job creation in the transition to a low-carbon economy; and
The effects on individuals and businesses that result from actions to address climate change.

The new independent advisory body, named the Climate Solutions Council, will carry on the advisory role of the Climate Solutions and Clean Growth Advisory Council, whose mandate wrapped up in 2019 (Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy, 2020).

The independent advisory body will be comprised of up to 20 members, at least half of which must be women. The advisory body must also include at least one representative from each of the following groups: local governments, Indigenous peoples, environmental organizations, academia, unions, residents of rural and remote communities, and the business community.

Members of the advisory committee were announced in February 2020. The legislation requires that the minister publish the names of the advisory members. It also limits their terms of appointment to six years. Notably, the legislation does not establish any statutory oversight duties for the advisory committee. However, the Minister’s annual report must include the advice received from the advisory committee.

3. Establishing interim emissions reduction milestones

The Greenhouse Gas Reductions Target Act, passed in 2007, established provincial GHG emissions reduction targets for 2020 (33 per cent reductions below 2007 levels) and 2050 (80 per cent reductions below 2007 levels). The 2018 Climate Change Accountability Act introduced additional targets for 2030 (40 per cent reductions below 2007 levels) and 2040 (60 per cent reductions below 2007 levels) and repealed the province’s previously set 2020 target, which the province was projected to miss.

The 2019 legislative amendments introduced a requirement for government to establish an additional interim target for a year prior to 2030. The government must establish the interim emission target no later than December 31, 2020. The minister retains already established powers to set additional emissions reductions targets for other years or periods.

The legislative amendments also mandate the minister to establish emission reduction targets for individual sectors no later than March 31, 2021. The minister must review the targets before the end of 2025 and at least once every five years following the initial review. The minister may establish other GHG emissions reduction targets for additional individual sectors at any time. Notably, the legislation does not name specific sectors or how those sectors will be defined or broken down. The sectoral targets will be established following engagement with stakeholders, Indigenous peoples and communities throughout the province.

4. Producing action plans to meet milestones

Each year, the government is required to table a report that outlines the actions taken and proposed to reduce GHG emissions and manage climate risks, including details on past and planned expenditures, as well as how these actions are expected to achieve the objectives and emissions reduction targets set out in legislation. It must also outline the government’s plans for continued progress towards achieving its emissions reduction targets and for managing climate change risks. The
report must outline the advice received by the minister from the expert advisory committee. Every five years, starting in 2020, the annual report must also include a determination of climate change risks.

5. Monitoring and reporting

The legislative amendments introduced a number of new reporting requirements for the government. In addition to the mandatory reporting on past and proposed action plans (detailed above), the government’s annual report must also include a number of additional elements, including:

A determination of provincial GHG emissions in the most recent calendar year for which measurements are available;
Estimates of provincial GHG emissions in the current calendar year in which the report was prepared;
Estimates of provincial GHG emissions for the subsequent two years; and
An estimate of provincial emissions for the year between the latest provincial inventory report and the year in which the government’s report is prepared.

This improves upon B.C.’s existing public reporting on GHG emissions using the provincial inventory report, for which there is currently a two-year delay. While the reporting will still rely on the provincial inventory report, the government will use other tools to estimate provincial emissions for interim years.

The annual report must be tabled in B.C.’s Legislative Assembly during the calendar year in which it was prepared. If the report is finalized after the Legislative Assembly has risen, it must be tabled in the first sitting upon its return in the following year.

The legislative amendments also introduce new climate accountability reporting requirements for the provincial government and other public sector organizations. Every year, the minister must prepare, and make publicly available, a climate change accountability report, which must include (among other elements) an estimate of GHG emissions from the provincial government that year, the actions taken in that year by the provincial government to minimize the public sector’s GHG emissions, the provincial government’s plans to continue to reduce those emissions, as well as the actions taken by the provincial government to achieve any prescribed targets related to public sector buildings, motor vehicles, and the fuels they use.

Each public sector organization other than the provincial government (e.g. crown corporations, health authorities, advisory boards, tribunals, and school districts) is required to release an annual report following the same reporting requirements, except for the requirement to achieve any targets related to public sector buildings, vehicle fleet, and fuels, which applies only to the provincial government.

6. Beyond emissions reductions

The legislative amendments go beyond a singular focus on emissions reductions to integrate climate change risk and adaptation, as well as broader social and economic impacts of climate policy. With respect to adaptation, the legislation dictates that every year the minister’s report must outline information about climate change risks and the government’s actions to manage them—both those taken to date and planned. Every five years, the report must also include a detailed provincial climate change risk assessment. The new legislative amendments also require that public sector organizations manage the risks to their organization that could result from climate change as well as take steps to minimize their environmental impacts.

In addition to a focus on adaptation, the legislation also integrates broader social and economic considerations. In particular, the advisory committee is required to provide advice to the minister on opportunities for sustainable economic development and job creation in the transition to a low- carbon economy as well as with respect to the impacts of climate policy on individuals and businesses.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

Sectoral targets can help guide policy development, but may present challenges B.C.’s legislative amendments commit to setting sectoral targets by 2021, to be reviewed every five years. Sector-level targets provide more detail on how and where emissions reductions could occur. However, setting targets at the sector-level may also present challenges. First, defining discrete sectors can be challenging, as can divvying up emissions reduction targets between them. Exactly how B.C. will allocate and break out its sector targets remains to be seen, though the government has committed to allocating them based on consultation with communities, people, and industry (Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy. 2019). In addition, sectors themselves are not accountable entities so challenges may arise when it comes to enforcement and accountability. However, in B.C.’s case, the sector targets are primarily intended to provide more detailed sector goal posts to enhance provincial planning and tracking, as well as broader provincial accountability, rather than increase sector-level enforcement. Lastly, imposing fixed targets on sectors has the potential to limit flexibility and create rigidities that force reductions in parts in the economy despite more cost-effective reductions being available elsewhere, potentially resulting in inefficiencies. B.C.’s review of sector targets every five years helps to mitigate these risks by creating frequent opportunities for course correction if more optimal reduction pathways become available.

Regular and detailed reporting supports transparency and accountability

The 2019 amendments to the Climate Change Accountability Act introduced more regular and detailed reporting requirements for the provincial government. As discussed above, the annual reports must outline the steps the government is taking to reduce emissions and manage climate risks, as well as the latest emissions data trends and projections. This annual reporting is an improvement from B.C.’s existing public reporting on GHG emissions. Transparent, regular, and publicly available data is essential for informing governments, stakeholders, and individuals on progress towards climate change goals. It is key to enabling early course- correction if the government is not on track. And it allows B.C. residents to better hold their government to account if the government is not meeting its climate change commitments.

Lack of independent oversight limits accountability

While the Act’s establishment of an independent committee to advise government on climate change issues is key to enhancing the credibility of its climate accountability framework, the legislation does not mandate the advisory committee (or any other independent body) to monitor government progress towards targets. The absence of independent oversight represents a weakness of B.C.’s legislation. Independent oversight is essential to ensuring that assessments of government progress are perceived to be evidence- based and non-partisan. This, in turn, helps support credibility and transparency, as well as widespread buy-in.

Broadening the scope beyond a singular focus on emissions reductions

B.C.’s legislative amendments go beyond a singular focus on reducing emissions to also recognize the importance of managing climate change risks and supporting broader clean growth objectives. As described above, the Act emphasizes the importance of managing climate change risks throughout, including in the advice provided by the advisory committee, in the minister’s annual report, and through the climate change risk assessment to be conducted every five years. However, while reporting on actions taken and planned to manage climate change risks is critical, the Act lacks any formal requirements for those risks to actually be reduced (as it does for GHG emissions).

In addition to the Act’s inclusion of managing climate change risks, it also integrates a focus on clean growth. In particular, the Act requires that the advisory committee advise the government on opportunities for sustainable economic development and job creation while B.C. transitions to a low-carbon economy, as well as consider the effects on individuals and businesses that result from actions to address climate change. While this is a notable inclusion, the legislation does not explicitly require that the government’s plans include specific measures to support workers, communities, and industries impacted by the transition towards a low-carbon economy.

Absence of a mechanism to review long-term targets limits credibility and transparency

While the Climate Change Accountability Act introduced 2030 and 2040 targets, it did not revise the 2050 target, originally set through the 2007 Greenhouse Gas Reductions Targets Act. Some critics have called for a revision of the 2050 target to a net zero one, in order to align with climate science and guidance from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Ecojustice, 2019; Georgia Strait Alliance, 2019). Although the Act requires a review of the sectoral targets at least every five years, it does not include any sort of mechanism to review its long-term or interim emissions reductions targets. Several jurisdictions that have implemented climate accountability legislation—including New Zealand and the United Kingdom—have legislated clear and codified rules governing how targets are set and the circumstances in which they can be revised. This approach supports transparency and credibility, while also allowing for flexibility in the face of changing conditions – such as developments in climate science or international commitments. Without clear guidelines for target revision, B.C.’s legislation risks either maintaining targets that do not keep pace with climate science or changing the targets in a way that does not appear transparent or credible.

REFERENCES

Climate Change Accountability Act, 2019.
http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/complete/statreg/07042_01

Ecojustice. 2019. “New climate accountability bill triggers much-needed reboot of B.C. climate laws.” 31 October 2019.
https://www.ecojustice.ca/pressrelease/new-climate-accountability-bill-triggers-much- needed-reboot-of-b-c-climate-laws/

Gage, Andrew. “Looking for accountability in BC’s Climate Change Accountability Act.” West Coast Environmental Law. 14 May 2018. https://www.wcel.org/blog/looking-accountability- in-bcs-climate- change-accountability-act

Georgia Strait Alliance. 2019. “B.C. strengthens Climate Accountability Act.” 30 October 2019.
https://georgiastrait.org/press/b-c-strengthens-climate-accountability-act/

Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Act, 2007.
http://www.bclaws.ca/civix/document/id/consol22/consol22/00_07042_01

Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets Amendment Act, 2018.
https://www.leg.bc.ca/parliamentary-business/legislation-debates-proceedings/41st- parliament/3rd- session/bills/first-reading/gov34-1

Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy. 2020. Clean BC Building a cleaner, stronger BC: 2019 Climate Change Accountability Report. Government of British Columbia.
https://www2. gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/climate-change/action/progress-to- targets/2019-climatechange- accountability-report-web.pdf

Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy. 2019. “News Release: Climate action gets new teeth with accountability act.” Government of British Columbia. 30 October 2019.
https://news.gov.bc.ca/ releases/2019ENV0110-002082

Ministry of Environment and Climate Change Strategy. 2020. “Renewed team with help B.C. build on first year of climate action.” Government of British Columbia. 10 February 2020.
https://archive.news.gov. bc.ca/releases/news_releases_2017-2021/2020ENV0003- 000250.pdf

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This case study was prepared by Anna Kanduth of the Canadian Climate Institute, with contributions from Jason Dion.

Manitoba’s Climate and Green Plan Implementation Act 2018

SUMMARY

In 2018, Manitoba became the first province in Canada to implement climate accountability legislation. Manitoba’s approach and experience offers valuable lessons for Canadian governments contemplating interim emissions reduction milestones and broader climate accountability legislation. Unlike other jurisdictions that have implemented climate accountability legislation, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and British Columbia, Manitoba’s legislation does not include long-term emissions reductions targets or a clearly-defined emissions reduction pathway. This case study reviews the defining features of Manitoba’s legislation.

FEATURES OF MANITOBA’S LEGISLATION

1. Legislating climate accountability processes

The Climate and Green Plan Implementation Act, 2018 (the Act) introduced a Carbon Savings Account (CSA), which sets cumulative emissions reduction goals for five-year periods and is supported by accountability features and process, including an independent expert advisory body, compulsory government action plans, and regular monitoring and reporting.

2. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities

Manitoba government duties

The Minister of Conservation and Climate (formerly named the Minister of Sustainable Development) is the minister responsible for administering the Act. Under the Act, the Minister’s duties include establishing governance structures, maintaining the CSA, developing plans to reduce emissions, and regularly reporting on progress. The legislation also commits to creating a Low Carbon Government Office, which is responsible for developing and implementing policies and initiatives to reduce emissions and promote sustainable government operations.

Expert Advisory Council

The Act also established an Expert Advisory Council (EAC), an independent group of experts with a mandate to provide advice and recommendations to the Minister on the Climate and Green Plan, including the CSA. Members of the EAC are appointed by the Minister.

The EAC’s roles include providing advice on what policies should be included in the Climate and Green Plan, reviewing progress on the implementation of the plan, and providing recommendations for setting emissions reduction goals. In providing advice and recommendations, the EAC must take into consideration a number of parameters laid out in the legislation, including economic, industrial, and demographic projections; the implementation of GHG reduction measures; and the availability and use of new and emerging technologies. Notably, the EAC has no statutory powers.

3. Establishing interim emissions reduction milestones

Manitoba’s CSA establishes five-year cumulative emissions reduction goals for the province, set one CSA period at a time. Each five-year CSA is measured against the year before the CSA period commences, known as the dynamic year baseline (Expert Advisory Council, 2019). The Government must establish the emissions reduction goal for each CSA period before its start date and they must take into account the advice and recommendations of the EAC when doing so. In developing its recommendation on the emissions-reductions goal, the EAC relies on original modelling of emissions- reduction scenarios and measures, sector analysis, stakeholder input, and emissions trends and forecasts (Expert Advisory Council, 2019).

The Minister set the CSA for the first five-year period (2018-2022) at 1 Mt of cumulative emissions reductions, in line with the recommendation provided by the EAC (Government of Manitoba, 2019). In March 2020, the Government of Manitoba introduced plans to legislate a flat $25/tonne carbon levy effective July 1, 2020, which the Government estimates will double cumulative emissions reductions for the first CSA period to 2 Mt (Government of Manitoba, 2020).

The Manitoba model is somewhat flexible in terms of meeting its CSA. At the end of a CSA period, any shortfalls must be added to the subsequent budget, as part of the debit feature of the CSA. There is no limit to what can be carried forward. However, each CSA will increase over the previous period (Government of Manitoba, 2017).

4. Producing action plans to meet milestones

The Minister of Conservation and Climate is responsible for developing the Climate and Green Plan, which outlines a comprehensive set of policies and programs to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Legislation dictates that, when developing and implementing the plan, the Minister must take into account the advice of the EAC.

5. Monitoring and reporting

Each year, the government is required under the Act to table in the Legislative Assembly an annual report on emissions reductions, policies implemented, and progress against the carbon savings account. The annual report must also outline the emissions from all government departments and agencies for that year.

At the end of each five-year CSA period, the government must prepare a final report on emissions during the period, including an assessment on whether the goal was achieved. The EAC supports these efforts by establishing the methodology and benchmarks to measure CSA progress (Expert Advisory Council, 2019).

6. Beyond emissions reductions

The Climate and Green Plan Implementation Act goes beyond a narrow focus on emissions reductions to also include broader economic and environmental objectives. In particular, the Climate and Green Plan must include a comprehensive set of programs, policies and measures that:

reduce GHG emissions and address the effects of climate change;
promote sustainable development;
improve the management and protection of the Manitoba’s water resources; and
preserve and protect the province’s natural habitat and diversity.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

Cumulative emissions reductions budgets offer benefits over single-year targets

The CSA sets a five-year cumulative emissions reductions budget, as opposed to setting a target for the end-year of the account period. Cumulative emissions budgets limit the total emissions over a given period, while emissions reduction targets do not (since any number of pathways could be followed to reach a single-year target).

The cumulative approach recognizes that what ultimately matters for reducing the impacts on climate change are the total emissions released into the atmosphere, not just the level of emissions in any given year. The federal government can learn from Manitoba’s approach when determining whether its five-year milestones represent targets or emissions budgets.

Lack of a long-term target diminishes accountability, predictability, and certainty

Manitoba’s Climate and Green Plan Implementation Act does not enshrine a long- term emissions reduction target into law, nor does the province have a publicly stated long-term goal. Making a long-term target legally binding through legislation increases government’s accountability to act on climate change and provides increased certainty and predictability around the future emission reduction path for businesses, investors, consumers, and policy makers at all levels of government. Without this long-term target, there is also less information to guide the setting of interim milestones.

Setting budgets one-at-a-time reduces accountability, predictability, and certainty

While Manitoba’s approach of setting one budget at a time provides flexibility to policy makers to respond to changing conditions, it lacks the certainty of a long-term path that a more deterministic pathway provides, such as one where a minimum of three budgets are in place at any given time. In addition, having only one budget in place opens the door to discretionary changes to the budget, including for political reasons. Although the government’s commitment to increase emissions reductions over each CSA period implies a certain level of sustained ambition, a more deterministic pathway would enable greater accountability, predictability, and certainty.

A big step forward

Manitoba’s Climate and Green Plan Implementation Act is a significant step forward for climate policy in Canada. The legislation of an accountability framework— complete with formalized governance processes, cumulative emissions reduction targets, and expert advice—is something that could benefit governments across Canada as they seek to reduce emissions and tackle climate change.

REFERENCES

Expert Advisory Council. 2019. Report of the Expert Advisory Council to the Minister of Sustainable Development – A Carbon Savings Account for Manitoba.
https://manitoba.ca/asset_library/en/eac/eac_carbon_savings_report2019.pdf

Government of Manitoba. 2017. A Made-in-Manitoba Climate and Green Plan: Hearing from Manitobans.
https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/climatechange/climategreenplandiscussionpaper.pdf

Government of Manitoba. 2020. A Made-in-Manitoba Green Levy: Moving Manitoba Forward with the Climate and Green Plan.
https://news.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/newslinks/2020/03/BG-Carbon_ Pricing-PR.pdf

Government of Manitoba. 2019. Manitoba’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Goal for 2018 to 2022.
https://www.gov.mb.ca/asset_library/en/eac/sd_response.pdf

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This case study was prepared by Anna Kanduth of the Canadian Climate Institute, with staff contributions from Jason Dion, Caroline Lee and Dave Sawyer.

Climate Legislation in Aotearoa/New Zealand

SUMMARY

Aotearoa/New Zealand’s³ Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act was passed in 2019 with near- unanimous support. The Act enshrines long-term emissions reduction targets, five-year emissions budgets, as well as a number of governance structures and processes to support their attainment. The Act was largely inspired by the UK’s Climate Change Act and consequently mirrors a number of its core features.

However, Aotearoa/New Zealand departs from the UK in important ways, including by enshrining separate emissions reduction targets for biogenic methane and all other greenhouse gases (GHG), as well as through its emphasis on engagement, recognition, and inclusion of iwi⁴ and Māori throughout the development and implementation of the Act. This case study reviews the defining features of Aotearoa/New Zealand’s legislation.

FEATURES OF AOTEAROA/ NEW ZEALAND’S LEGISLATION

1. Legislating climate accountability processes

Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act legislates a climate accountability framework that shares many features with the UK’s Climate Change Act, including: Setting 2050 emissions reduction targets;

Establishing an independent expert advisory body;
Introducing five-year, interim cumulative emissions budgets en route to the long-term target;
Requiring governments to develop action plans to meet budgets, based on a set of considerations laid out in legislation;
Obliging the advisory body and government to regularly monitor and report on progress;
Providing flexibility for government to roll over unused emissions from previous budgets or to—within limits—borrow emissions from successive budgets when targets have been missed; and
Requiring governments to conduct climate change risk assessment and develop adaptation planning.

The legislation requires that all greenhouse gas emissions, other than biogenic methane, be net zero by 2050. Aotearoa/New Zealand’s legislation enshrines a separate set of targets for biogenic methane: a 10 per cent reduction from 2017 levels by 2030 and a reduction of between 24 per cent and 47 per cent below 2017 levels by 2050.

The long-term targets can only be changed if there have been significant developments in global action, science, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s economic or fiscal circumstances, obligations under international agreements, technological developments, distributional impacts, equity implications (including generational equity), risks associated with emissions reductions, or social, cultural, environmental, and ecological circumstances.

2. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities

New Zealand Government Duties

Under the legislation, the Minister responsible for the Act has a statutory duty to set emissions budgets, make plans to attain them, and to meet the targets, as well as to develop plans to adapt to climate change risks. However, neither the 2050 target nor the emissions budgets are legally enforceable. Section 5ZM of the Act explicitly states that “No remedy or relief is available for failure to meet the 2050 target or an emissions budget, and the 2050 target and the emissions budgets are not enforceable in a court of law.” According to the New Zealand Law Society, “a court may only make a declaration that the target or a budget has not been met and award costs” (Ballinger, 2019). In practice, the Minister responsible is New Zealand’s Minister for Climate Change.

Climate Change Commission

The Climate Change Commission (the “Commission”) was established through legislation to provide independent, expert advice to Government on setting emissions budgets as well as on the direction of the policies required to meet them and to adapt to the effects of climate change. The Commission is also responsible for monitoring and reviewing Government’s progress towards its climate change goals. The Commission consists of a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson, and five members, who are appointed by the Minister for their expertise. The commissioners are experts in the fields of climate science, adaptation, economics, agriculture, economics, and the Crown-Māori relationship (Climate Change Commission, 2019).

In late 2017, prior to the introduction of the Zero Carbon Bill in Parliament, the Government established an Interim Climate Change Committee to begin work on key areas of climate change. The Interim Committee was responsible for providing independent advice and analysis on issues outlined in the Government’s Terms of Reference, to be passed on to the Climate Change Commission, once established, to inform its recommendations (Interim Climate Change Commission, 2019).

3. Establishing interim emissions reduction milestones

The Act dictates that, starting December 31, 2021, Aotearoa/New Zealand must set five-year emissions budgets at the national level, with three consecutive budgets in place at any time.⁵

An emissions budget can only be revised as a result of methodological improvements in the way emissions are measured and reported or significant changes to the conditions upon which the budget was set (including, but not limited to, scientific advice, technological developments, the results of public consultation, the impacts of actions across regions and communities, the technical or economic feasibility of budgets, and the implications, or potential implications of land-use change for communities). In addition, the revision must be recommended by the Climate Change Commission.

If the total emissions in a budget are lower than the emissions budget for that period, the excess reductions can be carried forward to the next budget period. If total emissions in a budget are greater than the permitted amount, no more than 1 per cent of the next emissions budget can be borrowed.

4. Producing action plans to meet milestones

The Government is required to prepare and make publicly available a plan for how it will meet an emissions budget. The plan may also include policies for meeting future emissions budgets. The Act does not prescribe how the Government must meet its budgets or which policies must be used. However, it does establish a set of considerations that must be taken into account by government when setting targets and establishing plans.

The plan must include at minimum sector-specific policies, multi-sector strategies, adaptation policies, and strategies for minimizing impacts on workers, employers, regions, and communities. Aotearoa/New Zealand’s legislation also dictates that emissions must be met, as far as possible, through domestic emissions reductions as opposed to through international carbon credits.

The Act also dictates that a national climate change risk assessment be prepared every six years to identify and address the risks from a changing Aotearoa/New Zealand climate. The Minister for Climate Change is required to prepare the first National Climate Risk Assessment, with all subsequent assessments prepared by the Commission. In response to each national climate change risk assessment, the Minister must prepare a national adaptation plan that demonstrates how government plans to address those risks.

5. Monitoring and Reporting

The Commission is required to regularly monitor and report on progress towards meeting emissions budgets and the longer-term target. The Commission must prepare annual progress reports that outline emissions reductions and assess the adequacy of current plans. The Minister must publish a response no later than three months after receiving the Commission’s report.

The Commission must also prepare a report to government, due two years after the end of a budget period, which evaluates the progress made in that period and recommends whether banking or borrowing would be appropriate. The Government must make publicly available a response that provides a rationale for any shortfalls as well as any departures from the Commission’s advice.

6. Beyond emissions reductions

The scope of the Act goes beyond emissions reductions to consider climate change risk and adaptation, as well as broader social, economic, and cultural impacts of climate policy. As outlined above, the legislation requires that the Minister prepare and make publicly available a national climate change risk assessment, which must be followed by a national adaptation plan. The national adaptation plan must set out the Government’s objectives, the strategies, policies, and proposals to meet those objectives, the time frames for implementation, as well as the measures and indicators that will enable regular monitoring and reporting.

Beyond adaptation, the Act also ingrains broader social and economic considerations into the process for setting budgets, developing action plans to meet them, and for managing climate change risks. For example, when performing its functions and duties, the Climate Change Commission must take into account a number of considerations, notably:

social, cultural, environmental, and ecological circumstances, including across sectors and regions;
the distribution of costs, benefits, and risks across generations;
the likely economic effects; and
the Crown-Māori relationship.

In addition, the government’s action plan to reduce emissions must include strategies for minimizing impacts on workers, employers, regions, and communities.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

Timeliness of government action plan

The majority of timelines outlined in the Aotearoa/New Zealand Act are aligned with those in the UK Climate Change Act 2008, including setting emissions budgets three at a time and at least a decade in advance. However, unlike the UK Act, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Act enshrines a set timeframe within which the government must release its action plan to meet the emissions budgets. A legislated deadline ensures governments are accountable for developing policies in a timely manner and avoids undue delay. In the UK case, the absence of such a deadline allowed the government to take fifteen months to publish its action plan for the fifth emissions budget (Fankhauser et al, 2018).

Treating short-lived pollutants differently

As outlined above, Aotearoa/New Zealand’s Act defines two separate emissions reduction targets—one for all GHG, other than biogenic methane, and separate targets for biogenic methane.

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, agriculture is a major driver of the economy, but it is also a significant contributor to the country’s emissions inventory—notably producing considerable amounts of methane. The Act’s two-target approach can be seen as trying to balance the demands of different stakeholder groups and economic sectors with the country’s unique opportunities and costs associated with climate change mitigation, as well as with what climate science can tell us (Reisinger and Leahy, 2019). Nevertheless, it has drawn criticism from both sides of the debate, being condemned as too weak by some (largely environmental groups) and too strong by others (largely the agricultural sector and the Official Opposition). While the wide range set for biogenic methane emissions reductions (between 24 per cent and 47 per cent below 2017 levels by 2050) may have increased buy-in across diverse stakeholders, it does not provide as much certainty and predictability for the agriculture sector as would a more definitive target. In addition, the Act does not make clear how biogenic methane factors into the five-year emissions budgets.

Despite debate over the level at which Aotearoa/New Zealand’s methane targets were set, the approach of treating short-lived pollutants (like methane) and long-lived pollutants (like carbon dioxide and nitrous oxide) differently merits consideration. Whereas emissions from long-lived pollutants stay in the atmosphere for hundreds to thousands of years, methane has a much shorter lifetime in the atmosphere, on average 12 years (USEPA, 2020). But it is an extremely potent pollutant, trapping over 70 times more heat than the equivalent amount of carbon dioxide over a 20-year period (ECCC, 2019). As short- and long-lived pollutants have different life cycles and impacts, there may be value in treating them differently, including through separate emissions reduction targets and budgets.

In Canada, methane is the second most common GHG, accounting for 15 per cent of Canada’s total GHG emissions. The oil and gas sector is the largest industrial polluter of methane emissions in Canada, with landfills, wastewater, animal waste management, and coal mining being other key contributors (ECCC, 2019). While in Aotearoa/New Zealand, nearly all methane is biogenic—presenting different emissions reduction opportunities and costs than methane emissions from, say, the oil and gas sector—governments here may nevertheless wish to learn from Aotearoa/New Zealand’s experience to determine whether setting separate emissions reduction targets and budgets is a useful approach in the Canadian context.

Early and frequent engagement with Indigenous Peoples

In Aotearoa/New Zealand, the Government worked closely with iwi and Māori representative organizations throughout the development of the Zero Carbon Bill. The legislation features frequent consultation and engagement with Māori and iwi representatives, consideration of traditional knowledge, as well as recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi—an agreement signed in 1840 between the Crown and Māori chiefs that establishes and guides the Crown-Māori relationship (The University of Melbourne, 2020). For example, the legislation requires that:

The government’s emissions reduction plans include a strategy to recognize and mitigate the impacts of emissions reduction actions on iwi and Māori as well as ensuring that they have been adequately consulted on the plan;
The national adaptation plan takes into account the economic, social, health, environmental, ecological and cultural impacts of climate change on iwi and Māori;
Particular attention is paid to seeking nominations for the Climate Change Commission from iwi and Māori representative organization; and
Before recommending appointment of a member to the Commission, the minister considers the need to have members who have technical and professional skills, experience, and expertise relevant to the Treaty of Waitangi, as well as the Māori world, customs, language, and traditional knowledge.

Although the legislation requires that members of the Commission have understanding and expertise relating to Māori rights and traditional knowledge, the legislation does not explicitly require Māori representation. However, Māori leaders pressed the Government to have a voice at the table and ultimately, an Indigenous representative was appointed as Deputy Chair of the Commission. The Aotearoa/ New Zealand Māori Council came out in support of the Zero Carbon Act in advance of its passing in Parliament (Scoop News, 2019).

While Aotearoa/New Zealand’s experience can offer helpful lessons for Canada, it should not be replicated without due consideration here, since its approach is suited to its own context. There are profound differences between the experience of Indigenous peoples across and within both countries—including historical context, constitutional and treaty rights, culture, language, and diversity—that must be acknowledged. Governments in Canada should strive for the highest standard of representation and inclusion of Indigenous peoples.

REFERENCES

Ballinger, Duncan. 2019. “The Zero Carbon Bill – a framework for New Zealand’s climate change journey.” New Zealand Law Society. 30 August 2019.
https://www.lawsociety.org.nz/practice-resources/practice- areas/environmental-law/the-zero-carbon-bill-a-f ramework-for-new-zealands-climate-change-journey

Climate Change Response (Zero Carbon) Amendment Act 2019.
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2019/0061/latest/whole.html#LMS183736 Climate Change Commission. 2019. “Home.” https://www.climatecommission.govt.nz/

Environment and Climate Change Canada. 2019. “About methane emissions.” Government of Canada.
https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/global-methane- initiative/about-methane-emissions.html

Fankhauser, Sam, Alina Averchenkova and Jared Finnegan. 2018. 10 Years of the UK Climate Change Act. The Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment and The Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy.
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/ uploads/2018/03/10-Years-of-the-UK-Climate-Change-Act_Fankhauser-et-al.pdf

Generation Zero. 2019. “Zero Carbon Act – FAQ.” https://zerocarbonact.nz/faq/

Interim Climate Change Committee. 2019. “Our Work.” https://www.iccc.mfe.govt.nz/what-we-do/our-work/

McLachlan, Robert. 2019. “NZ Introduces Groundbreaking Zero Carbon Bill, Including Targets for Agricultural Methane.” The Conversation, 8 May 2019. https://theconversation.com/nz-introduces- groundbreaking-zero-carbon-bill-including-targets-for-agricultural-methane-116724

Reisinger, Andy and Sinead Leahy. 2019. Scientific aspects of New Zealand’s 2050 emissions targets: A note on scientific and technical issues related to the Zero Carbon Bill. New Zealand Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Research Centre.
https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/52SCEN_EVI_87861_ EN6883/b5b7958b4909176cf1571434eaa7776bcc35e4bd

Scoop News. 2019. “NZ Māori Council Backs Zero Carbon Bill.” 9 May 2019. https://www.scoop.co.nz/ stories/PO1905/S00120/nz-maori-council-backs-zero-carbon-bill.htm

The University of Melbourne. 2020. “New Zealand Law Guide: Treaty of Waitangi.”
https://unimelb. libguides.com/NewZealandLaw/treaty

United States Environmental Protection Agency. 2020. “Overview of Greenhouse Gases: Methane Emissions.”
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhouse-gases

Walls, Jason. 2019. “Controversial Biological Methane Target in Zero Carbon Bill Unchanged despite Lobbying.” NZ Herald, 21 October 2019. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_ id=1&objectid=12278436

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This case study was prepared by Anna Kanduth of the Canadian Climate Institute, with staff contributions from Jason Dion and Caroline Lee.

Enhancing Community Resilience as Wildfire Risk Increases

SUMMARY

As climate change increases the risk of wildfires, individuals, communities, and governments will need to put more effort into protecting homes at the wildland-urban interface, where communities border on wilderness areas. Canada’s FireSmart program is a well-recognized and effective tool to support informed local action and help build capacity and knowledge. Additional regulatory and financial tools are, however, also needed to reduce costs from property damage.

CLIMATE CHANGE INCREASES THE RISK OF WILDFIRE FOR COMMUNITIES

As climate change leads to increased temperatures and drier conditions, wildfires are likely to become more frequent, grow more intense, and last longer across many regions in Canada. Studies show that the number of dry, windy days that let fires start and spread could increase by as much as 50% in western Canada and 200% in eastern Canada (Climate Atlas, 2020). In fact, wildfire activity has already increased, with the average area burned in recent years double the size of what it was in the early 1970s (NRCan, 2016).

Wildfires can be devastating and costly for communities and individuals. Researchers estimate the 2016 Fort McMurray fire cost almost $9 billion through physical, financial, health, mental, and environmental impacts (Snowdon, 2017). The fire destroyed more than 2,400 structures and displaced 85,000 people in the largest evacuation in Canadian history (Westhaver, 2017). One of the most compelling examples of the profound societal impact of the Fort McMurray fire was the staggering rise in mental health concerns such as depression and suicidal thoughts among grade 7-12 students eighteen months afterward (Brown et al. 2019).

Wildfire smoke can also affect the health of people far from the fire through reduced lung function, bronchitis, exacerbation of asthma, and increased risk of death. Air pollution from fires is a particular risk to pregnant women, children, the elderly, and those with pre-existing cardiovascular or respiratory conditions (BCCDC, 2020). Prolonged exposure to smoke from wildfires, as people in British Columbia and California experienced in 2018, increases the risk of immediate and future health problems. In addition, people living in wildfire-prone areas may experience exposure to smoke year after year.

An increase in the frequency and intensity of fires will mean that we see more of these large-scale traumatic events. As Figure 1 illustrates, Canada has an estimated 32.3 million hectares of wildland-urban interface, with 60% of all cities, towns, settlements, and remote communities facing interface fire risk (Canada Wildfire, 2018).

**Figure 1:** Map of the Wildland-Urban Interface in Canada
Source: Canada Wildfire, 2018

HOW CAN COMMUNITIES REDUCE THEIR RISK?

After the Fort McMurray fire, people wondered why some homes survived and others did not. There were cases where the fire destroyed all homes in a neighbourhood except one. According to detailed assessments, most home ignitions were caused by embers from the forest fire, rather than direct contact with flames of the burning forest (Westhaver, 2017). So, the homes that survived must have either had features that protected them from embers, or the absence of common ignition hazards like leaves in gutters or a wooden deck.

Comparing the characteristics of homes after the fire, experts found that surviving homes had low to moderate hazard level across 20 factors for ignition potential. Destroyed homes predominantly had high to extreme hazard level ratings. The review did not find any one critical hazard factor. Rather, a single weakness could result in a home’s destruction (Westhaver, 2017). For instance, the ignition hazard could be a woodpile or shrubs next to the house, gutters with dried leaves, long grass, wood chips in the garden, wood siding, wood decks, or a roof with low fire resistance.

ALBERTA’S FIRESMART PROGRAM

One of the recommendations of the review of the Fort McMurray fire was to increase emphasis on reducing home vulnerability, through programs such as FireSmart. FireSmart, created by the Alberta-based multidisciplinary non-profit association Partners in Protection (PiP), helps communities and individuals take initiative to reduce their wildfire risk. It aims to build capacity and knowledge for people living in areas at risk of wildfire. Expanding from its roots in Alberta, FireSmart is now adopted in other provinces and at the national level (FireSmart Canada, 2018a). It receives funding from federal, provincial, and territorial governments, as well as insurance companies (ICLR, 2019).

FireSmart recommends removing ignition hazards, including wooden decks and siding, within 10 metres of the home (Figure 2). Over the longer term, homeowners that have enough financial resources can invest in more costly solutions such as more protective roofing materials (FireSmart Canada, 2019a; 2018a; 2018b). For more detail, see table in this case study.

**Figure 2:** FireSmart Home Ignition Zone
Source: FireSmart (2019b)

To help homeowners make decisions to reduce fire risk, FireSmart uses trained firefighters to assess homes directly, pointing out simple preventative measures as well as longer-term investment options. They then return after a couple of years to assess progress. FireSmart Alberta has also developed a mobile app that allows homeowners to conduct self-assessment and identify key vulnerabilities on their own, with access to information resources and expert networks.

Government of Alberta via Flickr (CC-by-NC-ND-2.0)

For example, some types of roofs are more fire resistant than others. Class A materials, such as asphalt shingles, fibreglass, clay or concrete tiles, and metal roofing (with the old roof removed) are the most fire resistant. Class C materials, such as cedar shakes, have a low fire resistance (FireSmart Lesser Slave Region, 2020). Clear information can make it easier for homeowners to demand fire resistant roofing materials and techniques.

The FireSmart program also encourages entire communities to adopt a plan, track progress, and make investments in risk reduction. As more properties within a community adopt FireSmart practices, the heat and speed of fire can be reduced for everyone (FireSmart, 2019b). The town of Canmore, Alberta, won FireSmart’s Community Protection Achievement award in 2019. Its Wildfire Mitigation Strategy outlines FireSmart activities for the town and includes an updated hazard assessment, wildland fuel type and wildfire behaviour potential maps, and vegetation management options. It also makes recommendations for each of the seven FireSmart disciplines: vegetation management; development; public education; legislation; inter-agency cooperation; cross-training; and emergency planning (Canmore, 2020).

WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE?

While FireSmart programs are a useful resource for homeowners, they place the burden of protection on individuals and communities—and not everyone is in a position to act. Homeowners may not be able to afford a new roof or siding. Lower-income, remote, and Indigenous communities may also have limited resources and competing priorities.

Strengthen Building Codes and Regulations

In 2016, a federal-provincial review found that most communities are not actively participating in FireSmart (CCFM, 2016). Experts have questioned whether there should be a greater role for provincial and federal governments in promoting fire resilience, given the broader public benefit of individual risk reduction efforts (Westhaver, 2017; Tymstra et al. 2019). Quebec is the only province that has regulatory standards that guide local governments in reducing wildfire risk (Tymstra et al. 2019). In most provinces and municipalities, building codes do not require builders to use fire resistant materials, which leaves homeowners shouldering the cost of renovation when seeking to reduce their risk. While new national codes are being developed to reflect climate change risk, it could be years before they trickle down to provincial codes (CP, 2020; ICLR, 2019). The National Fire Protection Association had proposed stricter building codes for wildland interface communities in 2011, but the idea was rejected at the time due to concerns about the burden of enforcement (CP, 2012). In the absence of building codes, FireSmart Canada, the Canadian Homebuilders Association, and the Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation are working to develop a FireSmart checklist for developers and homebuilders building in wildland-urban interface areas (Moudrak, 2020).

Undertake Meaningful Consultation

Research by Walker (2020) also highlights the importance of meaningful consultation when FireSmart programs are implemented, particularly when wildfire risk extends across multiple jurisdictions in a small geographical area. When the FireSmart program was implemented in the La Ronge region of Saskatchewan, for example, some Indigenous and non-Indigenous community members voiced concerns over how the local vegetation was being cut back in areas used for medicinal plant gathering and land-based education programs.

Limit Urban Sprawl

Many cities also continue to sprawl further into the wild, seeking inexpensive land for residential developments, increasing their risk and the overall cost of wildfires (McMahon, 2018). Few governments have been willing to limit development, and wildfire hazard maps that could help identify areas unsuitable for development are not yet commonly available (ICLR, 2019).

Invest in Risk Reduction

The response of governments to a changing fire regime in Canada has thus far been largely reactive, with financing focused on wildfire response and recovery. However, it is increasingly clear that investment in risk reduction is significantly more cost effective (IAWF, 2020). Further, the most effective wildfire risk management strategies involve a combination of home ignition reduction (through programs such as FireSmart) and forest management practices that reduce the likelihood and severity of wildfires (Calkin et al., 2014). In preparation for a fire-prone future, proactive, largescale investment in these types of integrated strategies by federal, provincial, and local governments could dramatically reduce the impacts of wildfire on Canadians.

FIRESMART ADVICE FOR HOMEOWNERS IN WILDFIRE-PRONE AREAS

For more information visit https://firesmartcanada.ca/homeowners/

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This case study was prepared by Rachel Samson of the Canadian Climate Institute, with staff contributions from Jonathan Arnold, Ryan Ness and Dylan Clark.

The Institute wishes to acknowledge the contributions of:

Blair Feltmate
Chair, Expert Panel on Adaptation, Canadian Climate Institute and Head, Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation, University of Waterloo

Natalia Moudrak
Director of Climate Resilience Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation, University of Waterloo

Laura Stewart
FireSmart Specialist, Alberta Agriculture and Forestry

Maureen G. Reed, PhD
Distinguished Professor and Assistant Director, Academic UNESCO Co-Chair in Biocultural Diversity, Sustainability, Reconciliation and Renewal School of Environment and Sustainability

Heidi Walker
PhD Candidate, University of Saskatchewan School of Environment and Sustainability

REFERENCES

BCCDC. 2020. “Wildfire Smoke and Your Health.” British Columbia Centre for Disease Control. http://www.bccdc.ca/ resource-gallery/Documents/Guidelines%20and%20Forms/Guidelines%20and%20Manuals/Health-Environment/BCCDC_WildFire_FactSheet_HowToPrepare.pdf

Brown, M.R.G., Agyapong, V., Greenshaw, A.J. et al. 2019. “After the Fort McMurray wildfire there are significant increases in mental health symptoms in grade 7–12 students compared to controls.” BMC Psychiatry 19, 18. https://doi. org/10.1186/s12888-018-2007-1

Canmore. 2020. “FireSmart.” Town of Canmore. https://canmore.ca/municipal-services/emergency-services/emergency-management/firesmart

Calkin et al. 2014. “How risk management can prevent future wildfire disasters in the wildland-urban interface.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences. Jan 2014, 111 (2) 746-751; DOI: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1315088111

Canada Wildfire. 2018. “Mapping Canadian wildland fire interface areas.” https://www.canadawildfire.org/mapping-wui

CCFM. 2016. “Canadian Wildland Fire Strategy: A 10-year Review and Renewed Call to Action.” Canadian Council of Forest Ministers. https://cfs.nrcan.gc.ca/publications/download-pdf/37108

Climate Atlas of Canada. 2020. “Forest Fires and Climate Change.” https://climateatlas.ca/forest-fires-and-climate-change

CP. 2020. ‘‘A new focus for us’: Canada’s building code being modernized to address climate change.” CBC News. 1 January 2020. https://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/climate-change-canada-building-codes-1.5412390

CP. 2012. “Building-code changes rejected for wildfire-prone areas.” CBC News. 3 December 2012. https://www.cbc.ca/ news/canada/edmonton/building-code-changes-rejected-for-wildfire-prone-areas-1.1177036

FireSmart Canada. 2020. “FireSmart Begins at Home Manual.”https://firesmartcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/ FS_Generic-HomeOwnersManual_Booklet-November-2018-Web.pdf

FireSmart Canada. 2019a. “FireSmart Community Recognition Program.” https://www.firesmartcanada.ca/ firesmart-communities/firesmart-canada-community-recognition-program/

FireSmart Canada. 2019b. “Ignition Zone.” https://www.firesmartcanada.ca/firesmart-communities/firesmart-canada-community-recognition-program/ignition-zone/

FireSmart Canada. 2018a. “About FireSmart.” https://www.firesmartcanada.ca/about-firesmart/

FireSmart Canada. 2018b. “FireSmart Home Assessment.” https://www.firesmartcanada.ca/mdocs-posts/ firesmart-home-assessment/

FireSmart Lesser Slave Region. 2020. “FireSmart for Homeowners.” https://livefiresmart.ca/homeowners/

IAWF. 2020. “Reduce Wildfire Risks or Pay More for Fire Disasters.” International Association for Wildland Fire. https:// www.iawfonline.org/article/reduce-wildfire-risks-or-pay-more-for-fire-disasters/

ICLR. 2019. “Fort McMurray Wildfire: Learning from Canada’s costliest disaster.” Institute for Catastrophic Loss Reduction. https://www.iclr.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Fort-McMurray-Wildfires_Canadian-Copright.FINAL-2_One-Page.pdf

McMahon, Tamsin. 2018. “In wildfire-prone B.C. and California, urban sprawl and bad planning are fuelling future infernos. What can we do?” The Globe and Mail. 24 February 2018. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-in-wildfire-prone-bc-and-california-urban-sprawl-and-bad-planning/

Moudrak, Natalia. 2020. Personal Communication with Natalia Moudrak from the Intact Centre on Climate Adaptation. https://www.intactcentreclimateadaptation.ca/

NRCan. 2016. “Peatland fires and carbon emissions.” Natural Resources Canada. https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/climate-change/impacts-adaptations/climate-change-impacts-forests/forest-carbon/peatland-fires-carbon-emissions/13103

Reed, M.G. and Walker, H., with Fletcher, A. 2020. “Accounting for gender and diversity in adaptation planning and action: Speaking from Canadian experiences”. Presentation for Adaptation 2020, Feb 20, 2020. More information available from the authors.

Snowdon, Wallace. 2017. “Fort McMurray wildfire costs to reach almost $9B, new report says.” CBC News, 17 January 2017. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/fort-mcmurray-wildfire-costs-to-reach-almost-9b-new-report-says-1.3939953

Stewart, Laura. 2019. Personal communication with Laura Stewart, FireSmart Provincial Representative for Alberta. June 2019.

Tymstra et al. 2019. “Wildfire Management in Canada: Review, challenges and opportunities.” Progress in Disaster Science. 5 (2020) 100045. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pdisas.2019.100045

Walker, H. 2020 (forthcoming). “Building inclusive responses to climate hazards: Learning from experiences of wildfire in northern Saskatchewan.” (Doctoral dissertation in progress). University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada. More information available from author.

Westhaver, Alan. 2017. “Why Some Homes Survived: Learning from the Fort McMurray wildland/urban interface fire disaster.” https://www.iclr.org/wp-content/uploads/PDFS/why-some-homes-survived-learning-from-the-fort-mcmurray-wildland-urban-interface-fire-disaster.pdf

Climate Legislation in the United Kingdom

Summary

The United Kingdom (UK)’s Climate Change Act 2008 was the first law of its kind. It makes long-term emissions reduction targets legally-binding, opening the door to citizen lawsuits if the government misses them, and introduces interim targets or “carbon budgets” to keep the UK on track. It also established an independent advisory body to provide advice to governments on meeting targets and to monitor progress. Notably, the scope of the legislation is not limited to climate change mitigation, but also introduced governance and processes related to adaptation. The Act has since been cited as a model by other jurisdictions who have introduced similar legislation. This case study reviews the six defining features of the UK’s legislation.

FEATURES OF UK LEGISLATION

1. Legislating climate accountability processes

The 2008 Act enshrined a long-term emissions reduction target of 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 as well as five-year “carbon budgets”—interim, cumulative emission-reduction milestones to put the UK on track to meet its 2050 target. In 2019, the UK passed legislation that increased its 2050 target to net-zero emissions, meaning that any UK emissions in 2050 would be balanced out by actions to offset an equivalent amount of emissions from the atmosphere.

2. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities

UK Government Duties

The Act defines the duties and powers of UK government departments and devolved administrations with regards to climate change policy. The Minister of State for Energy and Clean Growth is the minister responsible for meeting the legislated long-term targets and overseeing the UK carbon budgets. The primary UK government departments responsible for implementing climate change policies are the Department for Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) and the Department for Environment and Rural Affairs (Defra). BEIS leads on policy to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the UK and internationally, whereas Defra leads on domestic adaptation policy.

Committee on Climate Change

To provide independent oversight, the Act established a publicly funded Committee on Climate Change (CCC), which advises the UK government and devolved administrations on how to reduce GHG emissions and prepare for and address the impacts of climate change today and in the future. The primary duties of the committee are to:

Perform independent analysis;
Engage with stakeholders and the public to promote informed discussions on climate change;
Provide independent advice on setting and meeting carbon budgets and preparing for climate change; and
Monitor progress.

The CCC is comprised of a Chairman and eight independent members and is supported by a secretariat of roughly 30 staff. The CCC members are experts in the fields of climate change, science, economics, behavioural science, and business.

Funding for the CCC is provided by the UK government as well as the devolved administrations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

Devolved administrations

The Act recognizes the roles of the devolved administrations in climate policy. The devolved administrations have their own emissions reduction targets and climate change policies, but also contribute to meeting the UK’s carbon budgets and implementing UK-wide policies. The CCC is available as a resource for the devolved administrations to provide advice and report on progress for their respective carbon budgets and emissions reduction targets.

Each devolved administration has taken a different approach. Under the Environment (Wales) Act 2016, the Welsh Government committed to a net Welsh emissions account of at least 80% reductions from the baseline year ⁽¹⁾ by 2050, as well as five-year cumulative carbon budgets beginning with the period of 2016 to 2020. Through its 2009 Climate Change Act, the Parliament of Scotland elected to set annual emissions targets at least twelve years in advance, rather than follow the UK’s five-year approach. Scotland has legislated an emissions reduction target of net zero by 2045. Northern Ireland does not have its own climate change legislation and emissions reduction targets.

In the UK, long-term targets may only be amended following significant developments in climate change science or international policy or law, and budgets may only be amended following significant changes affecting the basis on which the budget was set.

3. Establishing interim emissions reduction milestones

In order to meet its long-term emissions reduction targets, the UK Climate Change Act dictates that the government must set five-year carbon budgets at the national level from 2008 to 2050 with three budgets set at a time. These budgets are cumulative, meaning that they restrict the amount of GHGs the UK can legally emit in a given period. The government is required to consider, though not follow, the advice of the CCC when setting budgets.

Long-term targets may only be amended following significant developments in climate change science or international policy or law, and budgets may only be amended following significant changes affecting the basis on which the budget was set.

4. Producing action plans to meet milestones

The Government is required to develop and implement plans to meet carbon budgets and adapt to climate impacts. These plans must be tabled before Parliament, though the Act does not establish a set timeline for publication.

The Act does not prescribe how the Government must meet its targets or which policies must be used. However, it does lay out a set of considerations that must be taken into account by government and the CCC when making decisions or recommendations regarding action plans.

The UK model offers some flexibility in terms of meeting its carbon budgets, but with limits. When a budget is going to be missed by a small amount, the government is able to borrow one percent from the next budgetary period. Likewise, when net emissions are below the allowance, they can be carried forward to the next budgetary period. However, any amount carried forward must be recommended by the CCC and, to date, they have consistently recommended against it. The Act also allows Government to purchase international carbon credits in order to meet its carbon budgets.

The Act does not include any punitive enforcement mechanisms to prevent governments from weakening the stringency of their policy measures. However, the fact that the target is legislated opens the door to litigation by citizen groups if the government fails to meet its statutory obligations under the Act.

5. Monitoring and reporting

Legislation dictates that, each year, the Secretary of State must table in Parliament a statement on annual UK GHG emissions. The CCC is also mandated to prepare and present to Parliament progress reports, including an annual report on the implementation of carbon budgets and a bi-annual report on adaptation. The Secretary of State is required to, in turn, present to Parliament a response to the CCC’s reports within a set timeline outlined in legislation.

At the conclusion of a budget period, the Government is required to publish a final report outlining, among other things, the net UK carbon account for the period and whether emissions will be banked or borrowed for the next budget. If the carbon account exceeds the allowed amount, the report must provide a rationale as well as outline proposals and policies to address the excess emissions.

6. Beyond emissions reductions

The Act goes beyond a singular focus on reducing emissions, notably to legislate governance and processes related to climate change adaptation. For example, the Act requires the establishment of an Adaptation Sub-Committee of the CCC. Whereas the CCC advises on how to reduce GHG emissions, the Adaptation Sub-Committee provides advice on how to adapt to the risks posed by climate change. The Adaptation Sub-Committee is comprised of a Chairman and five independent members.

Legislation also introduced additional adaptation-related measures. For example, the Act mandates that the Government produce a climate change risk assessment every five years as well as a National Adaptation Programme. In addition to the National Adaptation Programme, the Act also granted the government Adaptation Reporting Power, which allows them to require certain organizations to report on how they are adapting to climate change.

Beyond adaptation, the Act also ingrains broader social and economic considerations into the process for setting budgets and developing action plans to meet them. For example, the legislation establishes a set of considerations that must be taken into account by both the CCC and the government when providing advice or making decisions relating to carbon budgets. These considerations include (but are not limited to) impacts on the economy and the competitiveness of particular sectors, differences in circumstances between England and the devolved administrations, and social circumstances, notably how specific decisions or advice could contribute to, or prevent, fuel poverty.

LESSONS FOR CANADA

Independent, expert advice is essential

The CCC has garnered a strong reputation with diverse stakeholders in the UK (including across political parties) as a credible, authoritative, and trusted voice on climate change—and its advice has been broadly accepted by governments. For example, the first five UK carbon budgets were all set at the levels recommended by the CCC, despite changes of government (as discussed below). It suggests that an independent, expert advisory body is key to ensuring consistent and credible climate policy, as well as evidence-based decision making. As a result, its example has been replicated in other countries that have implemented climate accountability legislation.

Climate legislation could establish a similar body in Canada. Like the CCC, it could have a clear mandate enshrined in law, adequate resources to conduct research and analysis, and sufficient power to hold governments to account, including authority to monitor and report on progress. Similar to the CCC, a Canadian advisory body could be available as a resource to other levels of government to provide independent, expert advice on climate policy.

Legislation can acknowledge devolution of power

While the UK has a centralized governance structure, the Act recognizes the roles of the devolved administrations of Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. Although the devolved administrations have, to varying degrees, implemented their own emissions reduction targets and climate change policies, they also contribute to meeting the national UK carbon budget. A similar approach could be adopted in Canada, whereby other levels of governments have their own targets and policies, but also contribute to national goals.

Adaptation should feature in climate accountability legislation

Notably, the Act goes beyond a singular focus on reducing emissions to also recognize the importance of preparing for, and adapting to, the impacts of climate change. As described above, the Act includes a number of measures related to climate adaptation. While Canada can learn from the inclusion of adaptation planning in the UK’s legislation, it is worth noting that the Act has been criticized for its lack of focus on adaptation action.

The Act has been relatively durable, despite political changes

Implemented more than a decade ago, the UK Act has shown a strong degree of political durability. The Act was originally passed under a Labour government and was broadly endorsed by all political parties at the time. Since then, the Act has been primarily administered by Conservative governments and continues to be widely supported, even through several changes in government.

An important factor in maintaining political will and cross-party consensus is the relative flexibility that is built into the Act. While legislation sets out the long-term destination and some parameters for how to get there, it leaves decisions—like policy instrument choice—up to the government of the day. The Act also grants governments a degree of flexibility in meeting the budgets, permitting governments to carry forward over-achievements from previous periods or borrow up to 1% from subsequent ones.

However, some observers have cast doubts as to whether this political durability will last. While there was widespread political support in 2008 for the first three carbon budgets, adopting the fourth proved to me more fraught, with the UK Cabinet divided over whether to accept the CCC’s advice. The Prime Minister ultimately intervened and adopted the advice, albeit with some caveats, notably the ability to review and revise the budget again in 2014. The political commitment to the Act will likely be tested more and more as the task of meeting budgets becomes increasingly difficult.

In addition, the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU) (commonly referred to as “Brexit”) raises concerns about the durability of the Act and the impact on the UK’s ability to deliver on its legislated commitments. Seeing as the Act is a domestic law, Brexit does not change the UK’s legal duties to meet its emissions reductions targets, nor its overall approach to attaining them.

While it is too soon—in early 2020—to know whether and how Brexit could affect the Act, it is not too early to identify some issues. For example, Brexit may impact the accounting of carbon budgets. For example, if the UK leaves the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, the accounting rules for how its national carbon budgets are measured could change. Second, Brexit will impact policy for meeting carbon budgets and long-term targets. Notably, strained relations between the UK and the EU could impede joint efforts on climate action. In addition, the UK will need to introduce new policies and regulations in instances where EU schemes no longer apply. However, this also presents an opportunity for the UK to develop more stringent policies and regulations than the current EU approaches. Regardless, implementing Brexit will be a significant distraction for UK governments and will present challenges that may threaten UK progress towards its carbon budgets and long-term emissions reduction targets.

ASSESSING THE UK’S PROGRESS TO DATE AND LOOKING AHEAD

Since the introduction of the Act in 2008, the UK has experienced notable emissions reductions—particularly in the power sector—while maintaining continued economic growth. In 2018, UK emissions were 44% below 1990 levels, well beyond the target of 37% by 2020. The UK met both its first (2008 to 2012) and second (2013 to 2017) carbon budgets and is on track to outperform its third (2018 to 2022).

However, the UK is currently not on track to meet its fourth and fifth carbon budgets, let alone its newly legislated net-zero target. According to a 2019 report by the CCC, the UK government and all devolved administrations must significantly and urgently ramp up policy in order to get back on track.

Meeting the first three carbon budgets was relatively straightforward, as the UK government benefited from low-hanging fruit and factors outside their control. Three-quarters of emissions reductions between 2012 and 2016 came from using less coal for power generation. In addition, lower economic growth as a result of the financial crisis in the late 2010s meant lower energy demand, and therefore lower emissions. However, now that coal-fired electricity generation has reached very low levels, the UK must shift its attention to pursuing emissions reductions in more challenging sectors of the economy to meet future carbon budgets and the 2050 target.

While climate accountability legislation is by no means a silver bullet and cannot guarantee that government efforts will be successful in reducing emissions, the UK example illustrates the value of establishing a legislated process to identify and tackle challenges that arise—through independent oversight, transparent monitoring and reporting, and regular opportunities for course correction.

⁽¹⁾ In the Welsh legislation, the baseline year for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide is 1990 and the baseline year for hydrofluoro-carbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride is 1995.

⁽²⁾ In the Scottish legislation, the baseline year for carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide is 1990 and the baseline year for hydrofluoro-carbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and nitrogen trifluoride is 1995.

REFERENCES

Benson, Davis, and Irene Lorenzoni. 2014. “Examining the Scope for National Lesson-Drawing on Climate Governance.” The Political Quarterly 85(2): 202–11. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-923X.12080

Climate Change Act, 2008. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/introduction Climate Change (Scotland) Act, 2009. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/asp/2009/12/contents

Committee on Climate Change. “Carbon Budgets: How We Monitor Emissions Targets.” https://www. theccc.org.uk/tackling-climate-change/reducing-carbon-emissions/carbon-budgets-and-targets/

Committee on Climate Change. “Meeting Carbon Budgets – Implications of Brexit for UK Climate Policy.” https://www.theccc.org.uk/publication/meeting-carbon-budgets-implications-of-brexit-for-uk-climate-policy/

Committee on Climate Change. 2019. Reducing UK Emissions: 2019 Progress Report to Parliament Committee on Climate Change. www.theccc.org.uk/publications

Committee on Climate Change. “UK Regulations: The Climate Change Act.” https://www.theccc.org.uk/ tackling-climate-change/the-legal-landscape/the-climate-change-act/

Environment (Wales) Act, 2016. http://www.legislation.gov.uk/anaw/2016/3/section/30/enacted

Fankhauser, Sam et al. 2018. 10 Years of the UK Climate Change Act About the Authors and Acknowledgements. www.cccep.ac.uk

Farstad, Fay, Neil Carter, and Charlotte Burns. 2018. “What Does Brexit Mean for the UK’s Climate Change Act?” Political Quarterly 89(2): 291–97. http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1467-923X.12486

Gage, Andrew. 2015. A Carbon Budget for Canada. https://www.wcel.org/sites/default/files/publications/ CarbonBudget (Web)_0.pdf

Gillard, Ross. 2016. “Unravelling the United Kingdom’s Climate Policy Consensus: The Power of Ideas,

Discourse and Institutions.” Global Environmental Change 40: 26–36

Kōmihana, Te, Whai Hua O Aotearoa, and Teresa Weeks. 2017. Examining the UK Climate Change Act 2008 The New Zealand Productivity Commission Research Note: Examining the UK Climate Change Act 2008. www.productivity.govt.nz

Lockwood, Matthew. 2013. “The Political Sustainability of Climate Policy: The Case of the UK Climate Change Act.” Global Environmental Change

Lord Deben. 2019. Net-Zero and the Approach to International Aviation and Shipping Emissions. www.theccc.org.uk

SUMMARY

INGREDIENTS OF CLEAN GROWTH IN NOVA SCOTIA

Figure 1: GDP, Employment, and GHG emissions, Nova Scotia, 2005-2018

1. Fuel switching in the electricity sector

2. Energy efficiency gains

3. Clean tech sector growth

4. Climate-related infrastructure investment

Figure 2: Investment Flows for Select Infrastructure Categories (2009-2019)

5. A gradual shift from emissions-intensive goods toward services

Figure 3: Changes in GDP and Employment across Select Sectors in Nova Scotia (2005–2018)

CHALLENGES IN MAKING FUTURE PROGRESS

1. Declining goods-production and high unemployment in small, rural communities

Figure 4: Unemployment Rate by Population Centre (2016)

BOX 1: Mobile workers in Cape Breton

2. Reducing economy-wide emissions and achieving net-zero emissions by 2050

3. Ensuring Nova Scotia households have affordable energy

Figure 5: Share of Household Expenditures on Energy (2017)

4. Improving air quality in rural Nova Scotia

Figure 6: Annual Average Ground-level Ozone (top) and Fine Particulate Matter Emissions (bottom) (2017-18)

CONCLUSIONS & LESSONS LEARNED

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

REFERENCES

SUMMARY

FEATURES OF B.C.’S LEGISLATION

LESSONS FOR CANADA

REFERENCES

SUMMARY

FEATURES OF MANITOBA’S LEGISLATION

LESSONS FOR CANADA

REFERENCES

SUMMARY

FEATURES OF AOTEAROA/ NEW ZEALAND’S LEGISLATION

LESSONS FOR CANADA

REFERENCES

SUMMARY

CLIMATE CHANGE INCREASES THE RISK OF WILDFIRE FOR COMMUNITIES

HOW CAN COMMUNITIES REDUCE THEIR RISK?

ALBERTA’S FIRESMART PROGRAM

WHAT ELSE CAN BE DONE?

FIRESMART ADVICE FOR HOMEOWNERS IN WILDFIRE-PRONE AREAS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

REFERENCES

Summary

FEATURES OF UK LEGISLATION

1. Legislating climate accountability processes

2. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities

3. Establishing interim emissions reduction milestones

4. Producing action plans to meet milestones

5. Monitoring and reporting

6. Beyond emissions reductions

LESSONS FOR CANADA

Independent, expert advice is essential

Legislation can acknowledge devolution of power

Adaptation should feature in climate accountability legislation

The Act has been relatively durable, despite political changes

ASSESSING THE UK’S PROGRESS TO DATE AND LOOKING AHEAD

REFERENCES