There’s been plenty of buzz in Canada about the impacts of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), most recently in context of the Canada-EU Summit that concluded earlier this month in Montreal, and in the wake of the EU’s newly minted regulation on how it will credit foreign carbon prices paid on imports.
Yet in many ways, the discussion around the CBAM is missing the forest for the trees. Yes, the CBAM is material to Canada and the EU’s emerging partnership. And yes, it presents a challenge to Canadian exporters trying to access the EU market. But the CBAM is not like a tariff, either in intent or effect. In fact, it may present an opportunity for Canadian firms in European markets, but only if Canada manages to get its carbon pricing house in order.
This note maps out “the forest” by answering four questions about CBAM. It also identifies the real priorities for Canadian competitiveness in the face of emerging border adjustment mechanisms not just in the EU, but increasingly in other jurisdictions as well.
Question #1: Does the CBAM raise unfair trade barriers against Canadian exports to Europe?
Short answer: No. EU emitters pay a carbon price, too; CBAM levels the playing field between EU producers and Canadian firms based on their carbon costs.
Carbon border adjustments are sometimes referred to as “carbon tariffs,” so it’s understandable that Canadians might imagine a CBAM working similar to the Trump tariffs from the U.S. (i.e., discriminating against imports from Canada to protect domestic EU industry). In fact, that’s the wrong way to think about it.
The CBAM is a first-of-a-kind carbon price charged at the border on imports to the EU, based on how much greenhouse gas was emitted in the process of producing imported goods such as steel, aluminum, cement, and fertilizers. It came into force in January this year at a low initial level, and by 2034 will ramp up to charge 100 per cent of the EU carbon price (currently sitting at around $140 per tonne). Exporters to the EU that have already paid a carbon price can get that price knocked off their border charge.
But critically, it aims to level the playing field between EU producers, who already pay a high domestic carbon price under the EU’s cap-and-trade system, and foreign producers who don’t. In other words, it’s not designed to put imports at a disadvantage but rather to compensate for higher carbon costs in Europe.
Question #2: Does Canada’s carbon pricing system give it a free pass on the CBAM (or should it?)
Answer: No. The only way Canadian producers can avoid the CBAM is if they pay an equivalent domestic carbon price.
Canada has its own industrial carbon pricing system, and Canadian exporters already pay a Canadian carbon price. So shouldn’t it be exempted from the EU CBAM?
It’s a popular idea. According to EU sources, as of December last year Canada was actively seeking an exemption, and Prime Minister Carney in the recent summit’s closing news conference said that Canada had made progress in seeking “common solutions” to the CBAM as a trade irritant. In the lead-up to the summit, the Opposition’s shadow Ministers of Trade and Finance called on the government to “eliminate this threat to Canadian businesses.”
They all know better, or they should. The U.S. has been pushing for exemption since the CBAM was announced in 2019. India pushed for exemption through years of negotiating the EU-Indian “mother of all trade deals,” concluded earlier this year. The answer has always been no.
The EU Commission does not have legal authority to grant exemptions. To get such authority it would have to re-open the CBAM regulation—a long-fought negotiated agreement among the Commission, the Council of Member States and the EU Parliament. It would have to shrug off the fact that exempting Canada would breech World Trade Organization rules against giving special treatment to other members, precisely at the time when the CBAM is facing a WTO legal challenge. And it would have to weather fierce opposition to any special deal from the EU’s heavy industries, who are fighting for their lives in the face of record prices for natural gas and electricity. It’s just not going to happen.
The only way Canadian exporters could fully avoid paying CBAM charges—and, to be clear, this still wouldn’t be an exemption—would be to pay carbon costs under a Canadian carbon pricing system that were equivalent to the EU price. But what does equivalency require?
Question #3: What kind of credit will Canada get under the new EU regulation?
Answer: It won’t be our headline price. It’s carbon costs that matters for the CBAM—and Canada’s are very low.
The CBAM won’t ignore Canada’s carbon pricing efforts. Like all other countries, Canada will have its carbon price credited when Canadian goods show up at the EU border. As noted above, the European Commission just released the regulations detailing how that credit will be calculated.
To be clear, though, that’s nowhere near as good as it sounds. They won’t credit for the current $90 headline price of carbon but rather will credit for the price “effectively paid.”
What does that mean in practice? The EU’s methodology means a tiny discount off the CBAM for two reasons.
First, the credit market prices are low. In a mechanism that may be copied for other provinces, Alberta and the federal government agreed this year to raise those prices by means of a modest carbon price floor, well below the headline price.
Second, the CBAM discount won’t correspond to the full credit market or floor price. Most carbon pricing regimes in Canada protect producers against cost increases by only making them pay for part of their emissions—specifically, those emissions above an emissions intensity threshold. If we work out the price per tonne for all the GHGs they emit, it’s much lower than even the credit market price. Emitters in most critical sectors pay for emissions above a threshold set at 95 per cent of sectoral average emissions, meaning an average producer pays for only 5 per cent of total emissions. Assuming the Alberta-federal $60/tonne price floor by 2030, that equals an average carbon cost of $3 per tonne, or about 2 per cent of CBAM certificate costs at current prices. That’s what the CBAM will consider a carbon price effectively paid.
To be clear: those low prices are a feature, not a bug: by charging only for excess emissions, Canadian systems can keep incentives to reduce emissions high but protect Canadian firms from competitors that don’t face carbon pricing, both in our domestic market and in export markets like the United States. (Critically, that’s assuming that markets are working as designed, which they currently aren’t. More on that in a minute). It’s not a viable option to charge firms the full cost of all their emissions (which is what the EU is doing) unless Canada follows the EU example and implements its own border carbon adjustment.
In the meantime, Canadian exports to Europe will be charged the difference between low carbon costs borne in Canada and the high costs borne by European producers.
That doesn’t mean, however, that fixing carbon pricing in Canada is unimportant when it comes to competing in the EU.
Question #4: Does Canada’s carbon pricing system do us any good in the face of the CBAM?
Answer: It could. Carbon pricing in Canada incentivizes firms to reduce their GHG emissions, increasing their competitiveness in EU markets and beyond.
If Canadian firms are only getting credited for a carbon price they effectively paid at home, and Canadian carbon pricing regimes and credit markets are designed to keep those prices low on average, does that mean Canadian carbon pricing is useless in helping us compete in markets like the EU?
Not at all. Because European firms and others are also paying the carbon price, the real competitive advantage goes to firms that can produce their goods with lower emissions. Anything that reduces the carbon footprint of Canadian heavy industry also reduces that premium. And there is widespread agreement that industrial carbon pricing is Canada’s most powerful tool for reducing industrial emissions, when working to its full potential.
Canadian carbon prices may be low on average, but at the margin the full price prevails, with the potential to incentivize major low-carbon investments. But that’s only if credit markets are working to their full potential. Currently in Canadian credit markets, a glut of credit supply and limited demand means that credits are trading at low prices.
Fixing carbon pricing in Canada so that credit markets are working and credit prices are high (even as carbon costs stay relatively low) is critical. Establishing a clear minimum standard, for example, can help equip Canadian negotiators get full recognition for Canadian carbon pricing under the CBAM in the short-term.
The EU will be working with Canada and other trading partners to create a default carbon price. These will be used by any importer that’s using the default GHG intensities as opposed to actual emissions data, which will happen a lot, so they are important. Other aspects of the CBAM regime suggest that the defaults will be conservative, even punitive.
Absent any improvements, the EU is likely to survey Canada’s current patchwork of non-transparent carbon markets and assign Canada-wide values that correspond to the lowest provincial results they can estimate. If their reference point is Alberta, where prices are very low, or Saskatchewan, which is effectively charging zero, our default carbon credit will not be worth the paperwork it takes to apply for it. So a meaningful minimum price would yield meaningful returns to Canadian exporters.
More importantly, as argued above, in the medium-term fixing industrial carbon pricing can drive the investments in emissions performance here at home that create a real competitive edge in European markets and elsewhere.
Next steps for Canada’s carbon competitiveness in Europe and beyond
Reducing Canada’s exposure to the EU’s CBAM is only the leading edge of a broader climate competitiveness strategy. Industrial decarbonization would also help with the coming CBAMs in the UK, Norway, Serbia and Taiwan, the proposed CBAM in Australia, proposed border carbon charges in the U.S., and a rising raft of private-sector green demands transmitted up the value chain. Lowering Canadian emissions would set us up to be globally competitive in the face of a rising green wave of trade restrictions.
That takes us back to where we started. Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms do change the competitiveness landscape for Canadian exporters, but not because they could unfairly discriminate against Canadian firms. CBAMs set a level playing field. Canadian firms can thrive in the European market, not because robust industrial carbon pricing in Canada would justify a full exemption from the CBAM (though it would help by generating credits that were worth actually applying for), but because it would create the incentives for Canadian firms to compete—and win—in EU markets that explicitly recognize the value of producing low-cost and low-carbon products.