Beyond Sustainability: The Power of Indigenous Healthy Energy Homes

A new approach to housing in Indigenous communities could improve health outcomes for Indigenous Peoples. It could unlock multiple benefits including: reduced healthcare costs, emissions reductions and savings for households. 

Challenges with the housing landscape in Indigenous communities

Current approaches to Indigenous housing are rooted in a colonial legacy. This has resulted in unhealthy housing conditions such as poor ventilation, overcrowding, and homes that are unsuitable for their location or environment. 

For decades, Indigenous Peoples have raised concerns that inadequate and unsafe housing in communities aggravates or causes respiratory, cardiovascular, and mental health illnesses. Climate change impacts such as heat waves worsen both unsafe housing conditions and related health challenges. 

Figure 2: The links between Indigenous community housing and health

This figure shows the links between Indigenous community housing and health. It shows the challenges, implications and consequences of Indigenous homes in the current housing market.

While several factors play a role, governance and accountability challenges are the core issues of these health and housing challenges. They undermine relevant and sufficient investment in Indigenous community housing.

A new approach to Indigenous housing

The housing situation in Indigenous communities has been a long-standing problem. It will continue unless all orders of government not only provide further investments of time and money but, most importantly, take a different and more coordinated, holistic approach to address this issue. The multiple benefits of Healthy Energy Homes make them a worthwhile and smart investment, which could help to drive down healthcare costs while supporting the well-being and health of future generations.

The Healthy Energy Homes project is a partnership between the Canadian Climate Institute’s Indigenous Research stream and Indigenous Clean Energy. It shows how a new approach to housing could address many of these challenges. It could unlock multiple benefits if housing strategies and funding decisions take a holistic view of housing issues and are developed in partnership with Indigenous communities.

The first scoping paper in this project, Beyond Sustainability: The Power of Healthy Energy Homes, sets the foundation for the broader series. It provides important context to both the challenges and innovative solutions linked to housing in Indigenous communities. 

The second report, planned for spring 2025, will focus on the policy changes and recommendations that could support building more Healthy Energy Homes in Indigenous communities.

Indigenous Climate Action

ᐋᖅᑭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐅᕙᑦᑎᓐᓂᑦ | Positioning ourselves

This work is being conducted by Indigenous Climate Action (ICA), an Indigenous-led organization that works to support Indigenous communities in reinforcing their place as leaders in driving climate change solutions. Our current programs are designed to empower Indigenous communities to take action on climate change and to nurture the development of community-led solutions that are rooted in Indigenous knowledge and practices.

This identified research need comes from conversations our organization has held with Inuk relatives through informal engagements with ICA’s steering committee and advisory council. This case study provides ICA the opportunity to engage in a healthy critique of our own work, particularly in the area of our Decolonizing Climate Policy Project (DCP), which “aims to investigate the shortcomings and problems associated with Canadian climate policy while at the same time supporting, and developing Indigenous-led climate policy (ICA, 2024)”. 

This case study serves as an opportunity for ICA to look inward on our research methods and ethics process. It is a stepping stone for future work on better engagement processes with Inuit, and will inform DCP 3 and other relevant work.  

ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖑᔪᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓪᓗᓂ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ (ICA), ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᖅᑕᐅᓪᓗᓂ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᔾᔪᑎᖃᖅᑐᓂ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᑐᐃᓂᕐᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᐅᔾᔨᕈᓱᓕᖅᑎᒃᑲᓐᓂᖅᑐᒋᑦ ᓯᕗᓕᖅᑎᐅᔭᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᐊᔭᐅᕆᓂᕐᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐋᖅᑭᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᖅᑐᓂᑦ. ᒫᓐᓇᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᑦᓴᖁᑎᕗᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓴᙱᓕᖅᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕆᓂᕐᒥ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓗᒍ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᑎᒍᓯᒋᐊᖅᑎᑦᓯᓪᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᓄᓇᓕᖃᖅᑐᓄᓪᓗ ᓯᕗᓕᖅᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᖃᓄᖅᑑᕈᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᑐᙵᕕᖃᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑐᖃᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᔾᔪᓯᑐᖃᖏᓐᓂᓪᓗ.

ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᖅᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂ ᐱᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐅᖃᖃᑎᒌᒍᑕᐅᖃᑦᑕᖅᓯᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᑦᑎᓐᓄᑦ ᑲᑎᑎᑦᓯᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᑦ ᐃᓚᒌᑦᑐᓂᑦ ᑖᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᕋᓛᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐅᖃᐅᔾᔨᒋᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᔨᖏᓐᓂ.  ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓂᖓ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᖃᖅᑎᑦᓯᔪᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔭᐅᓗᓂ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐋᖅᑭᒋᐊᖅᑐᑦᓴᐅᒻᒪᖔᖅ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᕆᓯᒪᔭᕗᑦ, ᐱᓗᐊᖅᑐᒥ ᐃᓗᓕᖃᖅᑐᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᕆᓯᒪᔭᑦᑎᓐᓂ ᑎᒍᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᑦᑎᓐᓂ (DCP), “ᑐᕌᒐᖃᖅᑐᓂ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕆᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᑕᖃᙱᓗᐊᖅᓯᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᐱᓇᐃᓗᑕᕈᖅᓯᒪᔪᓂᓪᓗ ᐊᑦᑐᐊᓂᖃᖅᑐᓂ ᖃᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᓪᓕ, ᐊᑕᐅᑦᓯᑯᑦᓴᐃᓐᓇᖅ ᐃᑲᔪᖅᑐᐃᓪᓗᓂ, ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑦᓯᓪᓗᓕᔾ; ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ-ᓯᕗᓕᖅᑕᐅᔪᓂᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ (ICA, 2024)”. 

ᑖᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᓯᒪᔪᖅ ᐱᕕᑦᓴᖃᕆᐊᖅᑎᑦᓯᕗᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑎᒥᖁᑎᖓᓐᓂ ᑕᑯᒋᐊᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᐃᒻᒥᓄᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑎᖃᖃᑦᑕᕐᒪᖔᑦᑕ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᒪᓕᑦᑕᐅᒋᐊᓕᓐᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᖃᑦᓯᐊᕋᓗᐊᕐᒪᖔᑦᑕ. ᐊᓪᓗᕆᐊᕐᕕᑦᓴᐅᓪᓗᓂ ᓯᕗᓂᑦᓴᑎᓐᓂ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖃᑎᖃᑦᓯᐊᓂᖅᓴᐅᓗᑕ ᐃᓄᓐᓂᑦ, ᐃᓗᓪᓕᖅᑐᐃᒍᑕᐅᓂᐊᕆᓪᓗᓂ DCP 3 ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᓯᖏᓐᓂ

ᓄᐃᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᙵᐅᑎ | Introduction

We know that different environments create different contexts in which the climate crisis unfolds. Consequently, responses to the climate crisis vary across Indigenous communities due to socio-economic, geopolitical, cultural and historical factors.

Indigenous Peoples and communities have been and continue to be structurally excluded from the creation and implementation of Canada’s current climate policy framework. This violates our right to self-determination as well as the right to free, prior and informed consent, which is the inherent “right Indigenous communities have to decide ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to all proposed developments that may affect the collective rights of their communities (What is FPIC, n.d.)”. In Phase 1 of Decolonizing Climate Policy, we highlighted the federal government’s failure to uphold commitments to a Nation-to-Nation and Inuit-Crown relationship, citing examples of violations of Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-determination and free, prior and informed consent in the drafting of the Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change as well as the Healthy Environment and Healthy Economy plan.

Inuit have been and continue to be actively engaged in mitigating the impacts of climate change on their lands despite their structural exclusion from federal climate policy development. The purpose of this study is to uplift the richness and validity of Inuit ways of knowing, and amplify the importance of Inuit perspectives in climate policy. There are clear lessons to be learned from the shortcomings of current engagement practices and approaches to policy. Inuit have articulated their own priorities for policy and engagement, providing valuable information and guidance. ICA, along with other ENGOs, can and should learn from these insights to facilitate better, more grounded research and the policies that this research informs.

This exploratory background work is vital to understand how Indigenous Climate Action can participate in and uphold appropriate engagement and representation of Inuit knowledge and worldview in climate policy. We begin by outlining some of the barriers faced by Inuit to participating in climate policy. We then learn of how Inuit are responding to these barriers. Finally, we explore how we can move forward in the equitable inclusion of Inuit perspectives in climate policy as comrades working towards the shared vision of climate justice. 

The goals of the case study are as follows:

  1. Develop an understanding of Inuit approaches to climate policy throughout Canada according to their own teachings, laws and worldview. 
  2. Seek and support recommendations that ensure Inuit rights, worldviews and laws are equitably represented in ICA’s Decolonizing Climate Policy Project. A sub-objective of this goal is to encourage other environmental organizations and orders of government to undertake similar efforts. 
  3. Strengthen the relationship between Indigenous Climate Action and Inuit living in Inuit Nunangat. 

ᖃᐅᔨᒪᕗᒍᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᒌᙱᓐᓂᖃᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᕙᑏᑦ ᐊᔾᔨᒌᙱᑦᑑᑎᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᒻᒪᑕ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ. ᐱᔾᔪᑎᒋᓪᓗᒍ, ᑭᐅᔾᔪᑎᑦᓴᓕᐊᕆᔭᐅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔫᖃᑎᒌᓂ ᐊᔾᔨᒌᙱᓐᓂᖃᓪᓛᔪᖅ ᐱᔾᔪᑎᒋᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓅᖃᑎᒌᑦᑐᑦ-ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕈᓐᓇᕐᓂᖏᑦ, ᓄᓇᖏᑕ ᒐᕙᒪᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᑕᐅᓂᖏᑦ, ᐃᓕᖅᑯᓯᖃᖃᑎᒌᙱᓐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᔾᔨᒌᙱᑦᑐᓂᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᓯᒪᓂᖏᓐᓂᑦ.

ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᙱᓐᓇᓕᒫᖅᑐᑦ ᐋᖅᑭᓱᖅᓯᒪᔪᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᐃᓚᐃᓐᓈᖅᑕᐅᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᓴᓇᔭᐅᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᖅᑎᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖏᓐᓂᓪᓗ ᑲᓇᑕᐅᑉ ᓯᓚᒥ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐊᕆᕙᑦᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᓯᖁᒥᑦᓯᓂᐅᔪᖅ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅᓱᕈᓐᓇᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᖃᓯᐅᓪᓗᒍᓪᓗ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᑭᖃᙱᑦᑐᒥᒃ, ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂ, ᐱᑖᕆᓯᒪᒐᒥᐅᒃ “ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᓄᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᓐᓇᕐᓗᑎᑦ ‘ᐄ’ ᐅᑉᕙᓘᓐᓃᑦ ‘ᐋᒡᒐ’ ᐱᕙᓪᓕᐊᑎᑕᐅᒐᓱᐊᖅᑐᓕᒫᕐᓂᑦ ᐊᑦᑐᐃᓂᖃᕈᓐᓇᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖃᕐᓂᖏᓐᓂ ᓄᓇᓕᖏᑦᑕ (ᓱᓇᐅᓂᖓ FPIC, n.d.)”. ᐱᓕᕆᐊᖑᓂᖓ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᕐᒥ (1) ᑎᒍᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ, ᐊᓚᒡᒐᐃᒋᐊᒃᑲᓐᓂᖅᑎᓚᐅᖅᑕᕗᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᒃᑯᑦ ᐊᑐᕐᓂᐊᕐᓂᕋᖅᓯᒪᔭᒥᓂᑦ ᒪᓕᙱᑦᓯᒪᓂᕆᔭᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᕐᒥ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᒃᑯᓪᓗ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᖏᑕ, ᐆᑦᑑᑎᖃᖅᑐᖅ ᓯᖁᒥᑦᓯᓯᒪᓂᖏᑕ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅᓱᕈᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑭᖃᙱᑦᑐᒥᒃ, ᓯᕗᓂᐊᒍᑦ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᖏᕈᑕᐅᒋᐊᖃᕐᓂᖓᓂ ᑎᑎᕋᖅᑕᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᕐᒨᖓᔪᖅ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᖅ ᓴᓗᒪᔪᓂᑦ ᐱᕈᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᒍᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐱᖃᓯᐅᓪᓗᒍ ᖃᓄᐃᙱᑦᓯᐊᖅᑐᒥ ᐊᕙᑎᖃᕆᐊᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑮᓇᐅᔭᓕᐅᕋᓱᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐸᕐᓇᐅᑎᒥ. 

ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᖃᑕᐅᖏᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐊᑐᓕᖅᑎᑦᓯᑦᑕᐃᓕᓂᕐᒥ ᐊᑦᑐᖅᑕᐅᒍᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᓄᓇᖏᓐᓂ ᓱᓇᒃᑯᑖᒻᒪᕆᓂ ᐱᑕᖃᖅᑎᑕᐅᙱᒃᑲᓗᐊᕋᒥᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᑐᖃᒃᑯᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐊᕆᕙᑦᑕᖏᓐᓄᑦ. ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕆᐊᕐᓂᐅᑉ ᐱᔾᔪᑎᖓ ᒪᑭᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᒃᑲᓐᓂᕈᒪᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᓪᓚᕆᓐᓂᕆᔭᖓᓂᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᑦᓯᐊᕐᓂᕆᔭᖏᓐᓂᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᔾᔪᓯᖏᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᓂᕐᒧᑦ, ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᑐᓴᖅᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᒃᑲᓐᓂᕈᒪᓪᓗᑕ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᓂᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕐᓂᕆᔭᖏᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᖃᑦᑕᓂᕐᒥ.  ᑐᑭᓯᓇᑦᓯᐊᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᓕᔾᔪᑎᑦᓴᖃᖅᑐᖅ ᒫᓐᓇᒃᑯᑦ ᐱᑕᖃᙱᓗᐊᕐᓂᖏᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐱᓕᕆᔾᔪᓯᐅᕙᑦᑐᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᕐᒧᑦ. ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐅᖃᐅᓯᖃᖃᑦᑕᐃᓐᓇᖅᓯᒪᔪᑦ ᓇᒻᒥᓂᖅ ᓯᕗᓪᓕᐅᑎᒍᒪᔭᕐᒥᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᕐᓂᕐᒧᓪᓗ, ᑐᑭᓯᑎᑦᓯᒋᐊᖅᑐᑎᑦ ᐊᑑᑎᖃᓪᓚᕆᑦᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᒫᖓᐃᕆᐊᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᖅᑐᓂᓪᓗ. ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ, ᐱᖃᓯᐅᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑦ, ᐃᓕᑦᑐᓐᓇᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓕᑦᑕᕆᐊᖃᖅᑐᑎᓪᓗ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓂᖓ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᑦᓯᐊᕐᓂᕐᓴᐅᒍᓐᓇᖁᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᑲᑎᒪᓂᐅᔪᓂᑦ, ᑐᙵᕕᖃᕐᓂᖅᓴᓂᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑎᖃᖅᐸᓪᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑕᐅᓂᐊᖅᑐᓄᑦ ᐱᔾᔪᑎᒋᓪᓗᒍ ᑖᓐᓇ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᔪᖅ.  

ᑕᒪᓐᓇ ᕿᒥᕐᕈᔭᐅᕙᓪᓕᐊᔪᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᒍᓐᓇᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐱᒻᒪᕆᐅᔪᖅ ᑐᑭᓯᒪᖁᓪᓗᑕ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ ᓈᒻᒪᑦᓯᐊᖅᑐᓂᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᑭᒡᒐᑐᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᓪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᖃᐅᔨᒪᔭᑐᖃᖏᑦ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᒥᓪᓗ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕈᓯᖏᑦ ᓯᓚᒨᖓᔪᓂᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑕᐅᕙᑦᑐᓄᑦ? ᐱᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᖅᑯᒍᑦ ᓇᓗᓇᐃᔭᖅᑐᒋᑦ ᐃᓚᖏᑦ ᐊᐳᖅᑕᕈᑕᐅᕙᑦᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᓐᓄᑦ ᐃᓚᐅᖃᑕᐅᓂᕐᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᕐᒥ. ᐃᓕᒍᑎᒋᓂᐊᕆᓪᓗᑎᒍᓪᓗ ᖃᓄᖅ ᐃᓄᑦ ᑭᐅᔾᔪᑎᖃᖅᐸᓪᓕᐊᒻᒪᖔᑕ ᑕᒪᒃᑯᓄᖓ ᐊᐳᕈᑕᐅᕙᑦᑐᓄᑦ. ᑭᖑᓪᓕᕐᐹᕐᒥ, ᕿᒥᕐᕈᒋᐊᕐᓂᖃᖅᑯᒍᑦ ᖃᓄᖅ ᓯᕗᒧᐊᒋᐊᕈᓐᓇᕐᒪᖔᑕ ᐃᓚᐅᑎᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᓇᓕᒧᒌᓐᓂᒃᑯᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕐᓂᕆᔭᖏᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᒥ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖃᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᑖᑦᓱᒥᖓᑦᓴᐃᓐᓇᖅ ᑕᐅᑐᒐᖃᓕᕐᓗᑎᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑦ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐋᖅᑭᒋᐊᕈᑕᐅᔪᓄᑦ.  

ᑐᕌᒐᕆᔭᖏᑦ ᑕᒪᑐᒪ ᖃᐅᔨᓴᕈᑕᐅᔫᑉ ᒪᑯᐊᖑᔪᑦ:

  1. ᑐᑭᓯᕙᓪᓕᐊᒍᑎᒋᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐊᑐᕆᐊᖅᐸᑦᑕᖏᓐᓂᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᑲᓇᑕᓕᒫᕐᒥ ᒪᓕᓪᓗᒋᑦ ᐃᓕᓴᖅᑕᐅᒍᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᑦ, ᐱᖁᔭᓕᕆᔾᔪᓯᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕐᓂᕆᔭᖏᑦ. 
  2. ᐃᑲᔪᖅᑐᖅᑕᐅᒍᒪᓪᓗᑕ ᐱᖁᔨᕗᖔᓕᐅᖅᑎᓪᓗᑕ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᐱᔪᓐᓇᐅᑎᖏᑦ, ᓄᓇᕐᔪᐊᕐᒥ ᑕᑯᓐᓇᕐᓂᕆᔭᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐱᖁᔭᖏᑦ ᑭᒡᒐᑐᖅᑕᐅᑦᓯᐊᐊᓗᐊᕐᒪᖔᑕ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᒋᓯᒪᔭᖏᑎᒍᓯᒋᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᖅ ᐊᐅᓚᑦᓯᓂᕐᒥ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᑐᐊᒐᓕᐅᕈᑎᖃᕐᓂᕐᒥ ᐱᓕᕆᐊᕆᔭᖓᓂ. ᐱᔭᐅᖃᓯᐅᑎᒍᒪᒻᒥᔪᖅ ᑕᒪᑐᒪᓂ ᑐᕌᒐᕆᔭᐅᔪᒥ ᑲᔪᖏᖅᑐᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᑦ ᐊᓯᖏᑦ ᐊᕙᑎᓕᕆᓂᕐᒧᑦ ᑎᒥᐅᔪᑦ ᒐᕙᒪᐅᔪᓪᓗ ᑕᐃᒫᑦᓴᐃᓐᓇᒐᓚᒃ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᕈᑎᖃᕐᓗᑎᑦ. 
  3. ᓴᙱᓕᕆᐊᖅᑕᐅᓗᑎᑦ ᐱᓇᓱᐊᖃᑎᒌᓐᓂᕆᔭᖏᖅ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑳᖅᓯᒪᔪᐃᑦ ᓯᓚᐅᑉ ᐊᓯᔾᔨᐸᓪᓕᐊᓂᖓᓄᑦ ᐊᐅᓚᔾᔭᒋᐊᕈᑎᖏᑦ ᐊᒻᒪᓗ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖃᖅᑐᑦ ᐃᓄᐃᑦ ᓄᓇᖓᓐᓂ. 

Methodology

Recognizing the unique geopolitical landscapes, specific histories and diverse cultures that shape Inuit globally, as articulated by Kuakkanen (2007), this study is deliberately focused within Canada. It’s important to note that the Canadian context differs from that of Scandinavia or Greenland, and these distinctions play a crucial role in shaping the understanding of self-determination across various regions. 

As the only Indigenous-led climate action organization in Canada, ICA bears the responsibility of facilitating meaningful engagement with our kin in the development of our organization offerings so we do not risk mimicking functions of a pan-Indigenous approach to the development of knowledge. Moving away from a Eurocentric discourse and towards one that is rooted in reclaiming, re-storying and researching from our own distinct ways of knowing allows us to nurture and further instill Indigenous worldviews. 

Therefore, we have conducted this research using an Indigenous resurgence paradigm. As Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel (2021) suggests, an Indigenous resurgence paradigm reframes colonization by shifting focus away from the State, and instead towards the relationships between Indigenous nationhood, placed-based, and community-centred practices that work to revitalize acts of renewal and regeneration. There is no one approach to resurgence, it is constantly being reimagined and reinvisioned dependent on contextually grounded Indigenous landscapes and seascapes. However, Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel points to four interrelated elements that stand out from past resurgent mobilizations and emerging literature (Corntassel 2021, p. 74): 

  1. Centering Indigenous nationhood and land/water-based governance; 
  2. Honoring and practicing relational responsibilities, which form the basis for Indigenous self-determining authority; 
  3. Turning away from the state and decentering the politics of recognition, heteropatriarchy, and settler colonialism; 
  4. Engaging in everyday acts of renewal, remembering, and regeneration.

Our selection of methodology is rooted in the understanding that the need for strategies that are contextually grounded in Inuit ways of knowing cannot be understated. Where are the various sites where we might develop relationships with people or places in the search for knowledge? What do contextually grounded methods of knowledge production look like? These are some of the questions we ask ourselves in the application of an Indigenous resurgence paradigm. 

During this case study, we embarked on a critical analysis of existing literature that is focused on Inuit approaches to climate change. We engaged with a range of sources to develop this understanding, including:

  • federal policies, 
  • Inuit representational organizations, 
  • community practices, and cultural teachings.

In alignment with an Indigenous resurgence paradigm, we largely sought literature focused on relationships between nationhood, placed-based relationships and community centred practices. Geographic application of the literature was Canadian-focused; however, we recognize that organizations like Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK), an international non-governmental organization representing Inuit of Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia are in service of Inuit on an international scale. 

Additionally, we interviewed Inuk participants who were familiar with ICA’s offerings in order to broaden our Decolonizing Climate Policy work towards ensuring that the rights, perspectives and approaches of Inuit are included and centred. Throughout this analysis, we looked for themes of how the climate crisis is described, the shortcomings of current policies, what values and relations should be emphasized moving forward, and proposed solutions.


Why current policy frameworks pose significant barriers to Inuit participation

The already dire climate crisis is compounded for Inuit living throughout Inuit Nunangat, which is comprised of four regions: Inuvialuit (Northwest Territories and Yukon), Nunavik (Northern Quebec), Nunatsiavut (Labrador) and Nunavut, due to its remote location, unique environmental conditions, and the enduring legacy of colonialism. As such, Inuit are facing exacerbated effects of climate change such as thawing permafrost, melting sea ice, and extreme weather. 

Canada’s federal climate policy framework continues to pose significant barriers to meaningful engagement of Inuit participation. To begin, the existing federal climate policy framework does not differentiate between northern and southern regions thus failing to create strategies to properly address climate change based on different geographic regions. This is echoed by Inuk woman, Bryanna Brown, who shares:

“The lack of understanding of how we are living life up in the North is really different from the South. So sometimes, a lot of things are not considered, even, for example, the issues that we have with infrastructure and permafrost, and how that causes difficulty with issues like plumbing and waste management. Or capacity issues in various departments and issues with food insecurity and how that impacts people and their ability to continue working (B. Brown, personal communication, April 4, 2024).”

A deeper understanding of the experiences of colonization and how it has manifested differently from Coast to Coast, as well as the subsequent impacts is necessary to support Inuit self-determination. Another evident barrier to meaningful engagement of Inuit participation in the existing federal framework is the tokenistic nature of engagement with Indigenous Peoples, where communities are often consulted as a formality rather than an equal partner in decision-making processes. For example, during the development of the Pan-Canadian Framework (PCF), there was a glaring absence of mechanisms to ensure that the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), ITK, and Metis National Council (MNC) could meaningfully gather input about the PCF Framework on behalf of the Indigenous peoples they are meant to represent (DCP, 2019). As Russel Diabo (2017) highlights, this oversight enabled Canada to mislead the public about the extent of Indigenous Peoples’ involvement and created a facade of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC). 

Inuit are facing exacerbated effects of climate change such as thawing permafrost, melting sea ice, and extreme weather. 

Another glaring example can be seen in the case of the development of the 2030 Emissions Reduction Plan (ERP), wherein the 2023 ERP Progress Report shared that Indigenous Peoples felt that engagement timelines in the 2030 ERP were inadequate and “highlighted the need for their early, meaningful and consistent involvement in federal climate policy and programming” (ERP Progress Report, p. 58).

A phenomenon known as “siloing” exacerbates these challenges by prioritizing engagement with Indigenous-led political organizations as opposed to grassroots and community-based ones, which further hinders the participation of Indigenous peoples by excluding vital perspectives. To learn more about existing barriers to Indigenous-led climate solutions, check out our recently released DCP Phase 2 Part 1


Indigenous Climate Action banner

A collective pathway for engagement in the pursuit of climate justice

Inuit have persistently advocated for the safeguarding of their homelands, waters, and livelihoods through various means including Inuit governance, community-based organizing, and grassroots direct action. This section will delve into these advocacy strategies employed across Inuit Nunangat and underscore the importance of ICA’s (and other ENGOs) proper engagement with these strategies. 

Inuit representational governance organizations have provided clear pathways and actionable steps to ensure inclusion of Inuit knowledge. In 2019, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami introduced the National Inuit Climate Change Strategy (NICCS) which sought to identify climate priorities across Inuit Nunangat. It provided a starting point for provincial and federal governments, international bodies, and non-governmental organizations to coordinate climate strategies within Inuit Nunangat. The goal was to shape climate policies at local, regional, national, and international levels, promoting Inuit-driven research, policy-making and actions through ethical partnerships that address the unique, pressing and diverse needs (ITK, 2019). 

The strategy highlights actions that focus on increasing accessibility of information through knowledge transfers for and with Inuit, and Inuit-led research. The five main priority areas identified for action are:

  1. “Advance Inuit capacity and knowledge use in climate decision-making.
  2. Improve linked Inuit and environmental health and wellness outcomes through integrated Inuit health, education and climate policies and initiatives.
  3. Reduce the vulnerability of Inuit and market food systems.
  4. Close the infrastructure gap with climate resilient new builds, retrofits to existing veils, and Inuit adaptations to changing natural infrastructure.
  5. Support regional and community-driven energy solutions leading to Inuit energy independence (ITK 2019, p. 19)”.

While not specifically focused on climate, in 2023, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the national organization representing the rights and interests of Inuit living in so-called Canada, released The Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement. This report outlines best practices for researchers, decision-makers and others who are interested in uplifting the interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible rights of Inuit. There are eight protocols:

  1. “Nothing About Us Without Us’ – Always Engage with Inuit
  2. Recognize Indigenous Knowledge in its Own Right
  3. Practice Good Governance
  4. Communicate with Intent
  5. Exercise Accountability – Building Trust
  6. Build Meaningful Partnerships
  7. Information, Data Sharing, Ownership and Permissions
  8. Equitably Fund Inuit Representation and Knowledge (ICC 2023, p. 14)”.

These protocols provide a collective pathway for engagement with Inuit in the pursuit of climate justice, calling for the federal government to approach engagement with the recognition that Inuit have a right to self-determination that must be respected within the context of any climate program, policy or service that is delivered in their territory (ITK, 2019). Furthermore, it highlights that the voices and perspectives of Inuit Elders, women, youth, children, and persons with disabilities must be centred in climate initiatives (ITK, 2019).

During our discussion together, Bryanna Brown highlighted the benefits of a unified front among Inuit representational organizations. Inuit representational organizations have cooperative mechanisms in place that Brown believes offer a promising avenue for effective climate policy integration, because they facilitate seemingly quicker decision-making processes (Personal Communication. April 4, 2024). 

However, quicker decision-making processes are not beneficial if they are not inclusive of all community voices, which is often the case in Crown-Inuit relationships where representation often just consists of affiliates from political organizations. One of the Inuit youth interviewed felt that inclusive engagement should extend beyond political organizations: 

 “The people that should be included are the ones that live in the community and experience the changes first hand. It’s not about who is there but who is not there at decision-making spaces” (M. Dicker, Personal Communication. April 5, 2024).

For instance, youth, who disproportionately bear the brunt of climate change, are often excluded from decision-making processes. Youth bring gifts, knowledge and insight that is vital to addressing the climate crisis. It is imperative that we empower them to be active participants. To do so, we must go beyond inviting them to the decision-making tables, and ensure that their perspectives are valued and implemented in subsequent actions. 

Grassroots and community organizers have vital perspectives because of their place-based nature. Establishing a connection to place is integral to truly understanding the impacts of the climate crisis: “If people aren’t experiencing something first hand, or don’t have a connection to a place…they’re not experiencing the same things. It could be easier to brush it off or just think like it’s happening (M. Dicker, Personal Communication. April 5, 2024).” 

Examining engagement strategies produced by Inuit representational organizations highlights the importance of ICA and other ENGOs employing inclusive approaches to engagement and decision-making. Complementing this policy review with interviews shows how it can be hard to ensure the right voices are being included in the engagement process, despite specific calls to prioritize perspectives of Inuit elders, women, children and youth in the ITK engagement strategy. By embracing the protocols while recognizing the barriers to their successful implementation, organizations like ICA can be more mindful about their engagement pathways to ensure they contribute to more effective and inclusive efforts towards Inuit-led climate justice. 


The path forward

The biggest threats to actualizing Indigenous-led climate solutions and land rights are ongoing systems of colonization, inadequate funding and supports, and a lack of dissemination of critical information directly to communities. Essentially, there is a failure to uphold free, prior, and informed consent by keeping communities disconnected and upholding processes of research done on our communities rather than by or for our communities. There is a clear information gap, lack of funding and access to decision-making spaces that leaves our communities in a deficit, which adds an overwhelming layer of complexity to advancing our solutions. 

The biggest threats to actualizing Indigenous-led climate solutions and land rights are ongoing systems of colonization, inadequate funding and supports, and a lack of dissemination of critical information directly to communities.

As outlined above, Inuit have taken the time to lay out the groundwork for us in how to effectively engage with Inuit on climate policy. We must respect and honour this work by engaging with it and applying it to our approach. 

The path forward for ICA in the inclusive representation of Inuit knowledge and worldview in our work requires that we do so through a contextually grounded approach. This requires recognition and respect of the unique socio-economic, geopolitical, cultural and historical factors they are faced with. It involves fostering inclusive engagement of Inuit at all levels, from all lived experiences. ICA has and plans to commit to this work through the following actions and initiatives: 

Actualize Inuit rights through increased knowledge development and sharing 

ICA is currently undergoing a revamp on their research methods and ethics process. This case study is a stepping stone for future work on better engagement processes with Inuit, and will inform DCP 3 and other relevant work.

Centre Inuit knowledge systems by continuing to centre best practices, include marginalized voices and counter misinformation

Research risks serving as a tool for advancing various forms of economic and cultural imperialism by shaping and endorsing unjust power relations (Smith, 2019). Indigenous knowledge is often seen as secondary to the perceived validity of Western knowledge, leading to its misappropriation and exploitation. This sentiment is often reflected in the engagement methods that facilitate researcher’s data collection. 

Indigenous knowledge is often seen as secondary to the perceived validity of Western knowledge, leading to its misappropriation and exploitation.

The legitimacy granted to policies by research underscores the importance of inclusive engagement in the research process. Adopting a contextually grounded approach to data collection includes adopting a contextually grounded approach to engagement, which means going beyond Western ideas of whose voices should be included. For policies to be tailored to local communities they must provide a comprehensive understanding of existing unique challenges and opportunities, which can only come from lived experience.

The process of centering Inuit knowledge systems also requires that we prioritize relations with the land. The structure of ICA’s Advisory Committee was intentionally made up of representatives from each of the five biomes. Biomes are characterized by their distinct climate conditions and unique combinations of biotic and abiotic features (DCP Phase 2: Part 1, 2023). Our inspiration was derived from our desire to incorporate Indigenous knowledges from different lands and their human and non-human communities. Throughout the colonial project, Indigenous Peoples were put into groupings that stripped us of our relationality to each other, to our non-human kin and to the land. Decision-making processes that draw from local community observations and efforts provide a more holistic understanding of the climate crisis. 

The process of centering Inuit knowledge systems also requires that we prioritize relations with the land.

Support Inuit in developing relevant and effective climate strategies beyond response-based and towards community-driven solutions

Evidently, there is a need for deeper analysis into the potential benefits of contextually grounded approaches to curbing the climate crisis. But the reality is that the funding mechanisms to support this work at the scale that is required are inadequate. Other ways this can be realized are by providing adequate resources and time for Inuit to meaningfully contribute, as well as supporting community-led solutions and local observations of the land.


Conclusion

Through an Indigenous resurgence paradigm, this case study sought to understand how ICA and other ENGOs can participate in and uphold appropriate engagement and representation of Inuit knowledge and worldview in climate policy. 

What we found is that this demands a comprehensive understanding of the unique factors shaping Inuit community, paired with a contextually grounded approach to policy development. By centering Inuit voices, ICA and other ENGOs, can contribute to more effective and inclusive efforts towards Inuit-led climate justice. 

The path forward involves a concerted effort to dismantle structural barriers and fostering inclusive engagement of Inuit at all levels, from all lived experiences. This study serves as a call to action for Indigenous Climate Action and other ENGOs alike, to strengthen their relationships with Inuit, uplift Inuit knowledge systems, and advocate for policies that are grounded in self-determination and notions of free, prior and informed consent.


References (click to expand)

Aporta, Claudio & Bishop, Breanna & Choi, Olivia & Wang, Weishan. (2020). Knowledge and Data: An Exploration of the Use of Inuit Knowledge in Decision Support Systems in Marine Management.

Canada. (2023). Emissions Reduction by 2030: 2023 Progress Report [Overview]. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/climate-plan-overview/emissions-reduction-2030/2023-progress-report/part-1.html

Canada. (n.d.). Indigenous partnership on climate change. Retrieved from https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/climate-change/indigenous-partnership.html

Corntassel, J. (2021). Life Beyond the State: Regenerating Indigenous International Relations and Everyday. Challenges to Settler Colonialism. Vol. 2021 No. 1 (2021): The Politics of Indigeneity, Anarchist Praxis, and Decolonization.

Indigenous Climate Action. (2023). Decolonizing Climate Policy in Canada, Phase 1. Retrieved from https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e8e4b5ae8628564ab4bc44c/t/6061cb5926611066ba64a953/1617021791071/pcf_critique_FINAL.pdf

Indigenous Climate Action. (2023). Decolonizing Climate Policy: Phase 2, Part 1. Retrieved from https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/programs/decolonizing-climate-policy 

Indigenous Climate Action. (2024). Decolonizing Climate Policy. Retrieved from https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com/programs/decolonizing-climate-policy

Indigenous Climate Action. (2024). Decolonizing Climate Policy: Phase 2 Part 2. Forthcoming.

Inuit Circumpolar Council. (n.d.). About ICC. Retrieved from https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/about-icc/

Inuit Circumpolar Council. (2022). Circumpolar Inuit Protocols for Equitable and Ethical Engagement. Retrieved from https://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/project/circumpolar-inuit-protocols-for-equitable-and-ethical-engagement/

Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami. (2019). National Inuit Climate Strategy. Retrieved from https://www.itk.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/ITK_Climate-Change-Strategy_English_lowres.pdf

Kuokkanen, R. (2007). Indigenous self-government in the Arctic: Assessing the scope and legitimacy in Nunavut, Greenland, and Sápmi.

Smith, L. T. (2019). Decolonizing Methodologies. Bloomsbury.
“What is FPIC?” n.d. Retrieved from https://whatis.fpic.info/#:~:text=Free%2C%20Prior%20%26%20Informed%20Consent%20is,collective%20rights%20of%20their%20communities

Indigenous Seed Keeping and Seed Climate Adaptation

INDIGENOUS SEED KEEPING: A CULTURAL FOOD AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION PRACTICE

While agriculture is not part of all Indigenous communities’ food systems and practices, many communities’ ancestral food systems include seed keeping and crop cultivation practices. For some Indigenous communities, seed keeping and agriculture was not historically part of their food systems, but has since become so, in some cases due to Indigenous mobility and displacement across regions, climate change altering territories’ growing parameters, and cross-community knowledge sharing. Although the practice of saving and adapting seeds is not exclusive to Indigenous Peoples, they conduct these practices in ways that are culturally distinct, informed by intergenerational belonging to place, and involve Indigenous science, economics, spirituality, gender, environmental stewardship, and community laws and governance. 

For generations, Indigenous seed keepers have been seed keeping to develop, maintain, or restore ancestral and culturally significant seed varieties and to adapt existing and newer varieties to respond to regional growing conditions. Indigenous seed practices are guided by ethics of responsibilities and form a culturally specific role often referred to as Indigenous seed keeping or being an Indigenous seed keeper. Indigenous seed keepers steward food crops that have significance to communities’ diets and that support spiritual or cultural practices. These relationships with select seed varieties carry cultural significance, with many communities having stories, songs, dances, games, ceremonies, specific language, food processing technologies, and/or recipes connected to particular crops and varieties. Historically and currently, some communities specialize in particular crops and varieties, trading these with other communities in reciprocal economic alliances for other foods. Seeds have travelled and continue to move across territories through trade routes and exchange networks, resulting in the seed and food biodiversity we see today. Indigenous seed keepers have always adapted and selected seed varieties for new climates and growing conditions, and varieties that thrive in a given territory over time become significant to a family’s or community’s diet and food culture. Through adaptation-oriented decision-making, seed varieties become more equipped to growing conditions influenced by climate change, resulting in more resilient seeds and more successful harvests. 

Indigenous seed keeping and agricultural food sovereignty are compromised by both climate change and colonialism. Indigenous seed keepers are having to preserve at-risk cultural seed varieties for cultural survival while also adapting these varieties to be responsive to changing climate factors for current and future food provision .Climate change factors are altering growing conditions and seasons and are destabilizing cultural knowledge about planting cycles, and in consequence, Indigenous seed keepers are struggling with crop yields and seed losses. Indigenous people growing for food production are similarly impacted, with culturally significant seed variety food crops struggling under increasingly unpredictable environmental variables, impacting communities’ health, food access, food security, and food cultures. 

Indigenous seed keeping and agricultural food sovereignty are compromised by both climate change and colonialism.

Compounding these climate pressures are the historical and ongoing impacts of colonization Indigenous food cultures and practices. Land dispossession and displacement, federal regulation of identity, the assimilatory imposition of European and industrial agriculture, forced starvation, and the restriction of Indigenous access to capital and equity are all detrimental influences on the health of Indigenous food sovereignty (Carter 2019; Robin et al. 2020). Colonization also continues to obstruct Indigenous seed keepers’ self-determined access to healthy land, preventing seed keepers from conducting agricultural food practices and cultural seed adaptation. Additional facets of colonialism dissect Indigenous Peoples from their relationships with their cultural foods and food knowledge systems, such as the legislation and criminalization of food practices, seed biopiracy and knowledge appropriation, and child apprehension and family rupture through residential schools, the Sixties Scoop, incarceration, and the current child welfare system, among others (Robin et al. 2021; Simpson 2004). Indigenous seed varieties were historically appropriated by museums, private collectors, and companies, and many of these seeds are still in institutional archives and non-Indigenous corporate inventories. Seeds are often retained or sold without the consent of the communities who developed them. While Indigenous seed keepers continue to steward these varieties, low stocks and obstacles to growing have impacted varieties’ genetic health and stability. Cumulatively, these factors have led to the loss of seed varieties and interruptions to knowledge transmission within and across generations.

As stewards of food cultures and climate adaptation, Indigenous seed keepers and growers are a frontline of self-determination through their resistance to and insistence on self-determination from colonialism and biodiversity loss. While there is an information gap on crop biodiversity in Canada, in the past century, there has been a 75 per cent global loss in food crop biodiversity, and today, only 9 to 12 crops comprise 75 per cent of today’s global crop-based food intake (FAO 2004; FAO 1997; Khoury et al. 2021). This trend is concerning as seed biodiversity is significant both culturally and from a dietary perspective to Indigenous people and global populations, and it is also critical to growers to provide greater food security and food system resilience. Genetic and trait diversity across seed varieties also allows for greater regional and genetic solutions for seed keepers to choose from to adapt climate vulnerable food crops.


METHODOLOGY

Sovereign Seeds, a national Indigenous by-and-for seed and agricultural food sovereignty organization, has been working to advance Indigenous-led seed efforts by revitalizing seed keeping knowledges and supporting the adaptation of cultural crops to respond to climate change. Insights generated from Sovereign Seeds’ activities were gathered over three years and were anonymized and analyzed for recurring themes and trends.

These insights were documented with contributors’ consent through a variety of virtual and in-person climate adaptation-oriented activities including collaborative community programming, collective visioning sessions, and partnership communications. This analysis included 16 insight events, as well as email and call correspondence, with 52 contributors in total. Insight event contributors comprised Indigenous individuals, families, grassroots initiatives, organizations, and businesses, with the majority of individuals and groups operating in not-for-profit capacities. A majority of insight contributions occurred between 2022 and 2023; however, some insights gathered in 2021 were provided retrospective consent for inclusion in the analysis. Contributors’ ancestral territory affiliations varied significantly, particularly in cases of urban-situated groups and in multi-group and multi-community events and conversations. Localities spanned British Columbia, Alberta, Manitoba, Ontario, and Quebec. Insights were gathered and analyzed using Indigenous research methodologies and frameworks. This case study is one of several organizational actions of relational accountability as an applied Indigenous research methodology in response to community-expressed demands for multi-sector support for Indigenous agricultural food sovereignty and seed adaptation climate action. These learnings offer insights into the intersections of Indigenous food sovereignty and Indigenous climate adaptation that are intimately known and lived by Indigenous people but are often overlooked by non-Indigenous actors and by those operating with influence over levers of power. 

With limited public literature on these topics, it is important to acknowledge language use and the case study limitations (see Glossary and Notes on Case Study Language). Not all Indigenous perspectives and experiences are represented here. Indigenous for-profit activities are underrepresented relative to not-for-profit activities, and important realities of gender, sexuality, and multiracial identity are not addressed.

Seeds of wild-harvested or foraged foods native to communities’ ecosystems are also culturally significant food species, but this case study is limited to cultivated food varieties within garden and farming contexts. Further, land dispossession and displacement is the dominant barrier to Indigenous seed adaptation and climate action, but adequately addressing this barrier was beyond the limitations of this case study. Similarly, concerns and recommendations towards international governance mechanisms were voiced in insight events but are also not presented in this case study for brevity. Insight events highlighted some Indigenous priorities and generated calls to action in agricultural food and seed sovereignty that are not included here due to being specific to inter- and/or intra-Indigenous conversations. Lastly, this case study does not present a comprehensive treatise of the historical and ongoing impacts of colonization and the dominant globalized industrial agricultural food system on Indigenous Peoples’ food sovereignty and climate adaptation efforts.


KEY LEARNINGS AND THEMATIC FINDINGS

Findings gathered through Sovereign Seeds’ insight events highlighted barriers and needs in cultural food crop climate adaptation specific to communities’ and regions’ historical, environmental, geographical, and political contexts. Assessed together, common themes related to Indigenous seed and agricultural food sovereignty and adaptation emerged, including knowledge revitalization and transmission, resourcing seed sovereignty and seed climate adaptation efforts, and governance and leadership.

Knowledge revitalization and transmission and seed variety adaptation efforts

Indigenous-led knowledge revitalization is urgently needed to start, strengthen, and continue seed climate adaptation response action. Due to colonial interruptions to seed knowledge transmission, there are not many people within families and community networks with the cultural knowledge and memory of seed keeping who carry multi-decade experience, or what many refer to as seed Knowledge Holders or seed Elders. This relatively small number of experienced seed Knowledge Holders are the primary practitioners of seed climate adaptation and are encouraging newer seed keepers to take climate action. New and emerging seed keepers, who comprise a majority, are keen to revitalize these cultural climate adaptation practices, but identify that seed adaptation is a knowledge and skill set ahead of their current knowledge set. 

All seed learners and leaders identified that a strong foundation in culturally rooted knowledge in gardening and seed keeping is a prerequisite to being able to adapt food crop varieties to changing climate conditions. Both emerging and experienced seed keepers expressed a need for improved access to Indigenous-only culturally relevant seed learning opportunities for newer seed keepers to gain the foundational knowledge and applied experience needed to undertake seed adaptation. New and emerging seed keepers named time, capacity, and lack of financial support for learning as barriers. Experienced seed keepers expressed personal capacity concerns, citing financial stressors and lack of resources to fund their and their helpers’ time as barriers to teaching. Many seed Knowledge Holders, also noted negative experiences with non-Indigenous institutional, governmental, non-profit, and small-scale sustainable agriculture actors that resulted in having their knowledge and ideas appropriated, their labour under-compensated, and/or their invited involvement tokenized. 

Seed keepers articulated that colonialism has and is impacting Indigenous seeds and knowledge transmission, and that climate change, which is already threatening seed and food cultural crops, is also impacting knowledge transmission, a key activity needed to take climate adaptation action. Between the reality that many experienced Indigenous seed keepers are aging, and the multiple structural and climate-associated challenges that both younger and older experienced Indigenous seed keepers face in learning and teaching, knowledge transmission is a significant and pressing requirement for Indigenous seed climate adaptation.

Seed keepers articulated that colonialism has and is impacting Indigenous seeds and knowledge transmission, and that climate change, which is already threatening seed and food cultural crops, is also impacting knowledge transmission, a key activity needed to take climate adaptation action.

Seed adaptation is multi-year climate action. In this long-term commitment, Indigenous seed keepers face financial precarity arising from the challenges of securing and maintaining infrastructure, labour, equipment, and sustained and self-determined access to land. This precarity undermines the long-term strategic planning and action required to adapt seed varieties for climate. Seed Elders and Knowledge Holders identified the responsibility they carry in both ensuring the survival of culturally significant at-risk seed varieties in their community networks while also teaching others cultural seed keeping and climate adaptation practices. Under these pressures, compounded by a lack of resources, there is little opportunity for experienced seed keepers to scale back their efforts, tend to their wellness, or innovate, let alone navigate a challenging growing season and low seed yield. These combined pressures means newer seed keepers have few learning opportunities and little room for error learning with at-risk cultural seeds while older seed keepers don’t have the time, capacity, or resources for succession of seed inventory and transition of responsibility to others. 

Recognizing and resourcing knowledge transmission and adaptation efforts

Insight event contributors—both for-profit and non-profit— overwhelmingly named granting and lending relevance and access across government and philanthropic resources pathways as significant obstacles to seed keeping and variety adaptation. 

Contributors expressed frustrations with granting and lending actors not recognizing the complexity of Indigenous cultural agricultural food revitalization and food adaptation, which are not simply practices of food production and distribution or climate monitoring. Contributors noted that across all sectors, funders and lenders did not understand or value the relevance of seeds and seed keeping to culture, education, food security, health, and climate action. For those engaged in non-profit activities, this issue was particularly challenging as they felt funders thought seed-focused projects were irrelevant to granting priorities. Those engaged in for-profit activities experienced a lack of recognition and understanding of the specific barriers and needs they have to start, maintain, or grow for-profit activities due to historical and ongoing Indigenous-context specific barriers they face.  Contributors voiced concern that funds often go to initiatives and entities whose activities fit the restrictive criteria and siloed solutions of non-Indigenous funders and lenders. 

Those engaged in non-profit seed and agricultural food revitalization and climate adaptation activities emphasized funding approach and delivery as barriers. Non-profit contributors noted that funders prefer new projects and ideas over existing activities and that they predominantly provide short-term and non-renewable funding commitments, an approach that is not appropriate for Indigenous seed keeping projects, which often require multi-year support commitments. Contributors also reported experiences of funders prioritizing investments in Indigenous entities that are high-profile, well-funded, and well-staffed with substantial governance infrastructure, entities that have non-Indigenous partnerships, and entities that promote reconciliation narratives and do not openly express critical viewpoints. These contributors also named the lack of available unrestricted funding opportunities as a challenge. Contributors articulated a need for more self-determination in expenses, greater application and reporting accessibility, greater timeline flexibility, less prescriptive evaluations, culturally appropriate and accessible language, and reduced application and reporting demands. 

Indigenous people engaged in both non-profit and for-profit activities strongly expressed a need for funders and lenders to shift away from prescriptive and paternalistic funding models.

Some Indigenous cultural food organizations and businesses are not directly involved in but support and engage with Indigenous seed adaptation initiatives through the use or purchase of their produce and seed harvests. These contributors named conflicts with grantors and lenders on product or service sourcing: many contributors value sourcing from Indigenous producers, while granting or lending partners prioritize profit. Environmentally sustainable and/or climate-responsive Indigenous for-profit food initiatives noted a conflict between their priority to support cultural values of social and environmental seed and food production responsibility with the economic priority of grantors and lenders, who devalue or discredit cultural ethics. These businesses felt overlooked for enterprises that are more in line with western capitalist markets, such as industrial agriculture activities and agriculture initiatives without cultural or social reciprocity-oriented objectives.

Indigenous people engaged in both non-profit and for-profit activities strongly expressed a need for funders and lenders to shift away from prescriptive and paternalistic funding models. Contributors across both activity types identified issues with eligibility requirements, and noted that purchase of land, equipment, and infrastructure should be supported expenses. Recipient eligibility was also a concern. The eligibility criteria in many non-profit government and philanthropic sector funding opportunities disqualified a number of contributors from accessing resources, and for contributors’ for-profit endeavors, small-scale activities were often disqualified based on insufficient capital contribution and perceived insufficient income-generating and scaling potential. 

Seed governance, leadership amplification, and understanding and accessing policy-making

While some initiatives are resourced through provincial and federal programs, the Indigenous food sovereignty movement and Indigenous seed variety adaptation efforts are overwhelmingly occurring outside of Canadian government policy and program development. Insight event contributors largely prioritized Indigenous sovereignty and governance and expressed a degree of mistrust of and/or frustration with all orders of Canadian government. The majority of seed keepers noted limitations of government recognition and policy change and that government processes are designed to be inaccessible to grassroots actors. Contributors also felt that while change will not be primarily achieved through policy engagement, national and provincial policies are impacting their seeds, food systems, climate action, cultures, and territories. Many felt strongly that Indigenous people should be meaningfully engaged as sovereign nations and leaders instead of as stakeholders or special interest groups, and that current engagement and translation of government policies, plans, and programs is inadequate. Some barriers identified include exclusionary engagement pathways, inaccessible policies and programs, culturally inappropriate interactions and solutions, and perpetuation of colonization through government regulation of identity, food systems, and territories. There were also challenges of erasure of on-the-ground growers’ voices through preferential engagement with government-recognized Indigenous representative bodies.

Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy (NAS), released in 2023, is the first strategy for climate adaptation objectives, and was accompanied by the re-release of the Government of Canada’s Adaptation Action Plan, which outlines federal financial commitments to climate adaptation amongst provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments (Government of Canada 2023a; 2024). The degree of meaningful and adequate engagement with Indigenous people in the strategy and action plan was questionable. Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC) held a National Adaptation Strategy Visioning Forum in 2021 to develop the NAS; of the over 60 participants engaged in the Forum, only two National Indigenous Organizations (NIO) were involved but were not identified, and no other Indigenous participation was named (Government of Canada 2023b). Absent from the NAS is mention of the importance of food crop seed biodiversity and seed adaptation in climate resilience, seed adaptation as a climate action, Indigenous crop adaptation leadership, cultural agricultural food production and factors impacting these activities, and the relationship between Indigenous Peoples and cultural agriculture overall. Similarly, Canada’s 2020 National Biodiversity Strategy (NBS) presents sustainable agriculture as a solution to reduce the impacts of industrial agriculture on biodiversity, yet it only briefly addresses the role of seeds and only in the context of native non-cultivated plants such as trees, with no mention of food crop seed adaptation (Government of Canada 2024a). Further, while it engaged federally-recognized Indigenous governing bodies, the NBS engaged no Indigenous seed or agricultural food sovereignty groups in its engagement sessions (Government of Canada 2024a). 

Federal programs funding climate change adaptation efforts fail to adequately recognize and resource Indigenous seed variety adaptation. The First Nation Adapt Program, a Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada climate response program, was developed to support First Nations communities and organizations south of the 60th parallel to assess climate change impacts and develop and take climate response action (Government of Canada 2023c). While not restricted to these action areas, the program has focused largely on climate-related natural disaster mitigation and response, as directed by the again unidentified First Nations groups that ECCC and Natural Resources Canada engaged in the development of the program. Among the 40 projects funded in the 2022-2023 cycle, none were dedicated to food adaptation (Government of Canada 2023d). Similarly, Indigenous Services Canada’s now closed Climate Change and Health Adaptation Program funded a number of meaningful community agricultural food projects through a Food Security stream, yet seed adaptation and adapting crops for climate change were not identified activities in any of the funded projects (Government of Canada 2023e; Climate Telling 2021). 

The erasure of Indigenous food climate adaptation leadership from government climate conversations also extends to federal responses to agricultural challenges and solutions.

The SAS discussion document names climate adaptation and resilience as one of five priority issue areas, and specifically, recognizes regionally specific applied climate adaptation research programs as a crucial solution. The SAS 2023 What We Heard” report highlights barriers and priorities that seed keepers have also named in our insight events, yet the SAS consultation process did not engage an adequate breadth of Indigenous sustainable agriculture experiences and leadership. The report disproportionately represents Indigenous for-profit food producers’ perspectives, and SAS document language overall emphasizes market production activities and examines adaptation for the purpose of increasing commercial yields and commercial product quality. This market based perspective neglects the many cultural value based perspectives Indigenous seed and agricultural actors have on applied Indigenous economics. As a result, Indigenous not-for-profit initiatives and activities, which comprise a majority of Indigenous seed climate adaptation leadership and cultural food knowledge, are largely underrepresented and undervalued in the SAS. 

The erasure of Indigenous food climate adaptation leadership from government climate conversations also extends to federal responses to agricultural challenges and solutions.

The absence of Indigenous cultural crop climate adaptation across national action plans and programming reveals government funding priorities and definitions of climate adaptation activities, and it also reflects what contributors strongly voiced in Sovereign Seeds’ insight events, including issues of engagement and consultation, funding priorities, and funding access in areas of climate, culture, and agriculture. Many contributors felt government responses favoured for-profit market participation and sector-based food production as solutions to Indigenous food insecurity and climate adaptation. Contributors described this as culturally inappropriate and assimilationist and an approach that is deepening economic pressures, pitting culture against survival, and creating divisions amongst Indigenous people in the food sovereignty movement. While contributors largely agreed that support is needed for Indigenous for-profit cultural agriculture producers and agrifood market participants that operate sustainably and with accountability to cultural values, many expressed that government responses and policy priorities are neglecting the contributions and perspectives of Indigenous food leaders who are protecting crop biodiversity and leading sustainable agricultural climate adaptation outside of for-profit food production. 


RECOMMENDATIONS

Create transparency and accountability of processes and support and increase Indigenous leadership engagement and amplification

The imposition of Canadian state federalism onto Indigenous governance has resulted in preferential engagement with government-favoured Indigenous representative bodies that do not represent seed keepers and cultural growers. Further, bureaucratic accountability has shifted between provincial and federal jurisdictions in ways that do not support Indigenous territorial and traditional governance and nation-to-nation negotiations. Indigenous food sovereignty and seed governance, and the cultural and place-based laws that inform this governance, are sovereign and legitimate, independent of recognition by Canadian and international governments and law. Within western governance frameworks, Indigenous seed keeping and seed climate response exists within and at junctions of climate strategy, intellectual property, biodiversity, cultural rights, and Indigenous rights. Nation-to-nation engagement in Indigenous agriculture and climate adaptation requires increased access to decision making tables, a demystification of mechanisms and decision processes, and more time for preparation and participation. While not a substitute for community-based, community-specific grassroots leadership and Indigenous governance that exists independent of colonial government recognition, Indigenous-led models can generate policies and programs that are better accountable and responsive to community priorities. Our analysis identified recommendations and pathways to improved participation for and amplification of on-the-ground community groups in areas of food sovereignty, agriculture and agri-foods, cultural revitalization, and climate action:

  • Deploy an Indigenous-led collaborative model to support decision making transparency, access, and appropriate process timelines. This model would see Indigenous-dedicated Indigenous liaisons across all relevant departments and advisory bodies tasked with providing transparency and translation of processes, documents, and decisions to cultural agriculture leaders and practitioners. The objective of such a model is not to assimilate Indigenous negotiation and decision-making processes within non-Indigenous rights-based governing bodies via Indigenous employment, but rather to better facilitate and operationalize nation-to-nation governance. 
  • Support on-the-ground Indigenous food and food climate adaptation leadership through multi-year commitments for and the formation of independently organized Indigenous -led and -comprised coalitions. Improved leadership amplification through these measures would help to address the intersecting issues of food sovereignty, agriculture and agri-foods, cultural revitalization, land remediation, and climate action. To ensure accountability and representation, such bodies must be organized by, governed by, and representative of for-profit and not-for-profit regional food producers, growers, and Knowledge Holders independent of (though potentially supported by) band council and government-funded service agency leadership. These collective organizing bodies can act as liaisons with relevant government departments to advance policy change, providing member-responsive programs, and would be accountable to their members’ priorities.  
  • Operate Indigenous hiring streams within tiers of Canadian government for the development and deployment of Indigenous-led consultations, programs, policy, and strategies with nation-to-nation partnership principles. Give priority accountability to community coalitions’ and on-the-ground leaders’ priorities, timelines, and protocols of conducting governance. 
  • Improve Indigenous engagement and consultation in government strategies and program development to ensure balanced representation of for-profit and non-profit activities, improved grassroots participation, and more accessible engagement timelines and communications to facilitate their participation. In the case of the SAS for instance, subsequent revisions and associated programs must better recognize Indigenous seed keeping as a uniquely impactful and active climate adaptation action and more strongly engage Indigenous seed keepers and non-profit Indigenous food sovereignty practitioners as key actors in sustainable agriculture and climate response.
  • Provide stronger support for the creation of Indigenous-authored content, including policy analyses and research that is developed by Indigenous seed and food sovereignty-dedicated individuals and initiatives operating independently of federally favoured Indigenous representative agencies. Funding support and access to policy power is needed for new and existing Indigenous food sovereignty and Indigenous food climate adaptation research and education centres, programs, community groups in order to generate community-accountable and responsive collaborative contributions. 
  • Extend greater authority and legitimacy to Indigenous contributions in cultural and creative forms that do not reflect western research and research. Indigenous publications need to be weighed as meaningful contributions to policy and program development across government and philanthropy. 

Increase opportunities for and improve processes of low-barrier, multi-year, and self-determined resource distribution for non-profit and for-profit entities

Multi-year commitments create greater space for food relationships and systems to be repaired and help shift initiatives from survival-based operations to long-term success and sustainability, while also making space for exploration and innovation, which is in alignment with Indigenous ways of knowing, being, and doing. Non-Indigenous for-profit and not-for-profit organizations and businesses should consider multi-year and low-barrier contribution policies of directing resources to Indigenous cultural agriculture seed and food initiatives through unrestricted donations and/or multi-year and low-barrier grants opportunities. This funding must be flexible and Indigenous-led or -guided, Indigenous-staffed, accessible, and culturally relevant, with advisory council, board, and/or staff representation of on-the-ground cultural food and climate response experience. Our analysis identified key needs and recommendations to promote these improvements:

  • Increase low-barrier and Indigenous-led or Indigenous-guided funding funding support from government and non-government granting foundations for Indigenous-led not-for-profit groups addressing agricultural climate adaptation, seed efforts, and cultural agriculture knowledge transmission. This applies to all funding actors, particularly from large, greater-resourced sources such as granting foundations and multi-year governmental funding programs.
  • Increase Indigenous-led or Indigenous-guided flexible funding commitments from values-aligned partners with significantly lower administrative requirements for local scale non-profit efforts, such as seed libraries/banks, community gardens, and cultural food sovereignty learning programs. 
  • Improve low-barrier investments from Indigenous and non-Indigenous governing bodies and granting agencies for both for-profit and non-profit Indigenous seed keeping and cultural food production initiatives and leadership. 
  • Provide greater support from all levels of government, local leadership, granting entities, and investment and lending institutions to Indigenous for-profit seed and food initiatives, such as for market gardeners, cultural food producers, and agritourism businesses, and small-scale and family entrepreneurs and enterprises.
  • Ensure low-barrier Indigenous-led access to capital and granting from for-profit Indigenous initiatives conducting seed adaptation, and for-profit Indigenous initiatives that provide support to these initiatives, that champions activities and business models that reflect Indigenous economies and ethics. 
  • Ensure resourcing of cultural agriculture climate adaptation efforts is culturally relevant from development through to delivery. Responsive and effective resourcing includes ensuring Indigenous individuals, families, entities, and formal and informal groups doing the on-the-ground work define and assess success and shape funding processes in food system revitalization and climate adaptation.
  • Improve the factors and educate the actors that are influencing the issue of qualified donee status and granting eligibility for non-profit initiatives. Significant change is needed to combat the power disparities and exploitation Indigenous initiatives face as grassroots initiatives operating both independently of and on shared platforms and in intermediary relationships, to dismantle barriers Indigenous initiatives face in accessing resources and expanding administrative capacity. 
  • Ensure multi-year granting and lending commitments for all Indigenous seed and agricultural food adaptation initiatives, both for-profit and non-profit. Project efficacy is depedent on multi-year planning and action.
  • Improve access to unrestricted funding in granting and lending commitments for all Indigenous seed and agricultural food adaptation initiatives, both for-profit and non-profit. Eligible expense criteria need to support Indigenous self-determination by allowing unrestricted funding for self-identified priorities, such as equipment and infrastructure, operations and administration, staff and organizational development, and land access, return, and acquisition.

Recognize seed keeping and food culture and spirituality in food adaptation policy and resourcing

To reduce fundraising burdens on Indigenous initiatives to defend community-informed and culturally appropriate solutions, granting entities need strong operationalized awareness of the role of holistic approaches in Indigenous food adaptation solutions and of the historical and ongoing harms to Indigenous food systems. Our analysis identified recommendations to advance community-responsive and culturally appropriate policy and granting and lending programs:

  • Improve anti-oppressive training and education for all actors across government and philanthropic sectors on Indigenous food sovereignty history, politics, perspectives, and ethics. Training that emphasizes non-Indigenous actors learning to practice Indigenous cultural food practices, rather than these learning priorities, fails to address power imbalances inherent in funding relationships, risks replicating histories of cultural knowledge extraction, and does not create systemic and structural awareness needed to create tangible sector change.
  • Government and non-government entities must recognize Indigenous seed keeping as a climate adaptation practice. These entities must also recognize associated practices such as healing, food culture, and language learning activities as relevant priorities that are indivisible from seed keeping and climate response action. Spiritual, cultural, and technical knowledge revitalization and knowledge transmission activities are necessary for Indigenous-led food system climate adaptation. 
  • Extend recognition beyond optics and apply labour justice across government and non-government strategies and programs to see ethical compensation for seed learning and teaching labour and investment in seed adaptation efforts. For Indigenous food systems to thrive, Indigenous food leaders and learners must be provided conditions to thrive.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous seed keeping and Indigenous food sovereignty is subjected to the pressures of survival under an imposed capitalist economic system, the globalized industrial food system, climate change, and colonially constructed food insecurity. As an act of agency and self-determination under these oppressions, Indigenous seed climate adaptation action also exists at the intersections of knowledge revitalization movements, decolonial governance, anti-capitalist community organizing, and entrepreneurship and reimagined cultural economies. While these intersections engender political and cultural tensions across Indigenous seed keepers and the government, philanthropic, and corporate sector powers that impede their efforts, Indigenous seed adaptation learners and leaders continue to apply responsive climate solutions. Learners and leaders do this through the extensive land-based knowledge and community collaboration that has seen Indigenous food systems persist through both colonization and climate change. Pressures to have Indigenous knowledge and strategies fit western philanthropic and government models are not only hindering Indigenous food and climate leadership but are assimilatory and counterproductive to seed biodiversity, agricultural climate monitoring, and adaptation. The Indigenous food climate adaptation movement needs to be recognized as critical climate action and Indigenous seed and food growers need to be engaged as frontline climate responders. For just and effective Indigenous food climate adaptation, government and non-profit actors must better defer to Indigenous definitions of success and Indigenous-led holistic assessments of the activities and resources they need to take action. Indigenous governance and self-determination must lead the development and delivery of funding and investment programs and the development of strategic action plans and policies impacting Indigenous people in climate change and agriculture. Thematic insights revealed in this case study analysis emphasize the interconnectivity of Indigenous sovereignty, seed and food biodiversity, and climate resilience, and the deep need for restitution of leadership and resources towards a just and climate-resilient food sovereignty future.

Indigenous seed keeping and Indigenous food sovereignty is subjected to the pressures of survival under an imposed capitalist economic system, the globalized industrial food system, climate change, and colonially constructed food insecurity.


GLOSSARY AND NOTES ON CASE STUDY LANGUAGE (click to expand)

Indigenous views on the case study topics and associated definitions vary. These terms and definitions are not reflective of all Indigenous perspectives. 

Agriculture: Agriculture and farming are alienating terms for many Indigenous peoples in Canada due to their association with colonial efforts to assimilate Indigenous people via western agriculture and its contemporary relationship with industrial farming (NWAC 2021). Forced assimilation and oppression through settler farming methods spanned residential schools, church-run farm settlements, experimental research farms and forced labour farms, and pass and permit policies, among others. Some preferred terms include food sovereignty, growing, and gardening. The term agriculture in other contexts extends to includes livestock, livestock feed, aquaculture, and other food production activities, agriculture and cultural agriculture are used interchangeably in this case study to speak specifically to plant crops grown for food with cultural teachings and methods.

Canada: The use of the term Canada does not reflect many contributors’ perspectives on the politics of acknowledgement of the Canadian state, with many preferring to use so-called Canada, what is colonially known as Canada, and within the colonial borders of Canada as an acknowledgement of settler-colonial occupation and Indigenous displacement and as a linguistic assertion of Indigenous sovereignty. 

Communities: Use of the terms communities and community partners  refers to and is inclusive of Indigenous on- and off-reserve urban and rural communities, organizations, grassroots initiatives, and informal groups. 

Culturally significant seed varieties: In this case study, culturally significant seed varieties and seeds refers to cultivated food crop varieties that Indigenous peoples historically and/or presently have relationships with as part of their cultural food systems. This largely involves seed varieties that were developed by Indigenous ancestors hundreds of years ago and might or might not persevere today, but this term can also include other seed varieties that families and communities have recently developed or adopted into their food systems and have created cultural meaning with in recent decades.

Indigenous: Indigenous in this case study refers to people Indigenous to what is known in the English language as North America. 


REFERENCES (click to expand)

Carter, Sarah. 2019. Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy (2nd ed.). Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.

Climate Telling. 2021. Food Security. http://www.climatetelling.info/food-security.html

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 1997. The State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). https://www.fao.org/3/w7324e/w7324e.pdf

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). 2004. What is Happening to Agrobiodiversity? Building on Gender, Agrobiodiversity and Local Knowledge. Rome, Italy: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). https://www.fao.org/3/y5609e/y5609e02.htm

Government of Canada. Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada. 2022. Government launches consultations for a Sustainable Agriculture Strategy. https://www.canada.ca/en/agriculture-agri food/news/2022/12/government-launches-consultations-for-a-sustainable-agriculture-strategy.html

Government of Canada. Environment and Natural Resources. 2023a. Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-
plan/national-adaptation-strategy/intersol-report.html

Government of Canada. Environment and Natural Resources. 2023b. Canada’s National Adaptation Strategy: Vision Forum. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/national-adaptation-strategy/intersol-report.html

Government of Canada. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. 2023c. First Nation Adapt Program. https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1481305681144/1594738692193

Government of Canada. Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. 2023d. First Nation Adapt Program: funded projects in 2022-2023. https://www.rcaanccirnac.gc.ca/eng/1698771955468/1698771985864

Government of Canada. Indigenous Services Canada. 2023e. Climate Change and Health Adaptation Program. https://www.sac-isc.gc.ca/eng/1536238477403/1536780059794

Government of Canada. Environment and Natural Resources. 2024. Government of Canada Adaptation
Action Plan. https://www.canada.ca/en/services/environment/weather/climatechange/climate-plan/national-adaptation-strategy/action-plan.html

Government of Canada. Environment and Natural Resources. 2024a. Canada’s 2030 National
Biodiversity Strategy. https://www.canada.ca/en/environment-climate-change/services/biodiversity/national-biodiversity-strategy/milestone-document.html

Hart, Michael. 2007. “Cree Ways of Helping: An Indigenist Research Project”. Doctoral dissertation, University of Manitoba.

Khoury, Colin K., Stephen Brush, Denise E. Costich, Helen Anne Curry, Stef de Haan, Johannes M. Engels, Luigi Guarino, et al. 2021. “Crop Genetic Erosion: Understanding and Responding to Loss of Crop Diversity.” New Phytologist, 233(1) (October 20, 2021): 84–118. https://doi.org/10.1111/nph.17733.

Native Women’s Association of Canada (NWAC). 2021. The Agrodiversity Pilot Project: Report on Findings Related to Best Practices & Investment Opportunities for Indigenous Women. https://nwac.ca/assets-documents/AGRI-REPORT-2-final-2-2.pdf

National Farmers Union. 2023. AAFC’s Sustainable Agriculture Strategy: Eight things you should know.
https://www.nfu.ca/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/SAS-8-things-you-need-to-know.pdf

Robin (Martens), T. R., Mary K. Dennis, M. K., and Michael A. Hart. (2020). “Feeding Indigenous People in Canada”. International Social Work, 65(4): 652–662.

Robin, Tabitha., Kristin Burnett, Barbara Parker, and Kelly Skinner. (2021). “Safe Food, Dangerous Lands Traditional Foods and Indigenous Peoples in Canada”. Frontiers in Communication, 6.

Simpson, Leanne. 2004. “Anticolonial Strategies for the Recovery and Maintenance of Indigenous Knowledge”. American Indian Quarterly, 28(3): 373–384.


Ceremony is for Us, for Mother Earth

The Four Siblings Prophecy

Shared by Elaine Alec

In the beginning, there were four siblings from each of the four races and they all lived on the same Land. In our Stories, we have always talked about the siblings and the four colours, like the medicine wheel: black, red, white, and yellow. When our Elders told these Stories, they did not reference the colours of the races in a derogatory way. They have shared these teachings for decades to talk about our relationships and to remind each other that we are all relatives. 

Each sibling was given a gift that they were supposed to master. The Creator told the siblings, “You must go off and master these gifts, and when you come back together again, you will teach each other what you have mastered, and you will listen to each other and learn, and the world will be good. If you do not share your gifts, if you keep them to yourselves, or if you do not listen to each other, there will be war.” 

The Creator gave each of the siblings a teaching. Some of our nations say the Creator gave each of the siblings a tablet with instructions and that those tablets are still out there. These tablets carry the original teachings that were meant to be shared between people so they could live in peace on Earth together. They were told that if even one of them forgot those teachings or cast their teachings to the side, that all humans would suffer, and the Earth would die. These teachings are said to be on tablets in Arizona, Tibet, Switzerland, and Mount Kenya. 

The black sibling was given the gift of water. They were told that even in the desert, they would be able to find water and know how to harness its power. The yellow sibling was given the gift of air, that they would be able to harness its power for discipline and strength. The white sibling was given the gift of fire, that they would harness its power and use it to create engines and machines. The red sibling was given the gift of Land, that they would learn everything about the Land and its Natural Law and know everything about regenerating it.

The Creator told the four siblings that they would be sent into the four directions to master their gifts, and that what separated them would be what brought them back together again. So, the Creator struck the Land with a wooden stick and the Land began to crack and separate. And as the Land began to separate, what came up between them was water. It would be water that would bring them back together again.

Artist: Michelyn Lepage, as shared in the Spiritual Knowledge Keepers Gathering on Climate Change What We Heard Report (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a).

Introduction

The global climate crisis is the most pressing challenge facing humanity. Activists, Knowledge Keepers, and scientists have been calling for urgent and concerted climate action at all levels (UNICEF n.d.; Onjisay Aki 2017; EEAS 2021). Yet colonial policy frameworks inhibit climate action through their entrenched patterns of inequality, exploitation, and environmental degradation (Deranger 2021), and are poorly equipped to truly address the challenges now facing society (Jackson and Victor 2019). The disconnect between Indigenous approaches to climate change—rooted in Sacred and Natural Law and Ceremony—and colonial policy frameworks—often siloed and surface-level—presents further challenges to developing effective climate policy. It is imperative that Indigenous Peoples and colonial governments work together to address this crisis and that Indigenous Peoples’ voices and perspectives guide climate policy processes. Climate change is not just an environmental issue, but an issue of human social, economic, and industrial organization at a global scale (Turner 2022; Kyle 2021); Indigenous Peoples know that all people are one with the Land, and that we must all therefore pursue climate policy methods and ways of being that facilitate holistic and interconnected approaches to the problem. As this case study will show, one way this must be done is through Ceremony.

Our case study responds to the question, How should First Nations’ Ceremony in so-called British Columbia (B.C.) influence climate policy? To search for answers, we reflect on our experiences and learnings from the Spiritual Knowledge Keepers’ Gathering on Climate Change (The Gathering) (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a). The Gathering was a two-and-a-half-day governance Ceremony hosted in November 2023 on Tsleil-Waututh Territory. It brought together 23 First Nations Knowledge Keepers from around B.C. to address the climate crisis, discuss its underlying causes and impact on the Land and all beings, and offer space to share Stories, songs, and healing. It kicked off the B.C. First Nations Climate Leadership Agenda process between the federal government and B.C. First Nations, coordinated by the B.C. Assembly of First Nations (BCAFN), and funded by Environment and Climate Change Canada and Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. The process seeks to set out a B.C. First Nations-specific policy agenda to guide changes to Canadian federal climate policy, programs, and funding through a memorandum to Cabinet. This memorandum will inform federal government budget decisions (BCAFN 2024)1

The Gathering was grounded in Sacred and Natural Law through the Circle process, which promotes that all voices speak (based on observations from Natural Law that each being is needed for the ecosystem to thrive)2. It was also grounded in prayer and acknowledgement of ancestors, animals, and all living beings, and songs, dances, and Stories that both represent and allow people to embody the natural world in governance. Naqsmist, an Indigenous consulting firm, captured notes and video to create a summary and develop a Mandate for moving the work forward. The event resulted in the Spiritual Knowledge Keepers Gathering on Climate Change report (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a) and Mandate (Figure 1):

Figure 1: British Columbia Spiritual Knowledge Keepers’ Mandate (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a)

The fourteenth Mandate item asks us to “create a new path forward in relationship with Mother Earth.” This is the fundamental challenge and where Ceremony can play a pivotal role. To better understand this dynamic, we consider below the legacy and limitations of colonial policies and the potential for their transformation using decolonial approaches rooted in Ceremony and Sacred and Natural Law.


What is ceremony, and why is it essential to climate policy? 

“Ceremonies are intended to elicit the deepest response from yourself, from your soul and spirit. It is important in itself, significant; it can’t just be politics anymore. We’ve got to do something. We’ve got to stand up and be counted, be a voice.” — Hereditary Chief Dr. Robert Joseph (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a)

Indigenous Ceremony is fundamentally about connecting to the Land and all of Creation, and is itself a way of life. Ceremonies are often place-based, can take many forms, and are “a way of transferring knowledge, and remember[ing] the responsibility we have to our relationships with life” (Cajete 2000). They are also a protocol for belonging—to a family, to a people, to the Land, and to the Sacred, emphasizing interconnectedness, reciprocity, and respect through balance and renewal (Kimmerer 2013; Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a; Cajete 2000).

Ceremony, in connection with Sacred and Natural Law, can be seen as both a policy in itself (i.e. parameters to guide future decisions), and as something broader (a way of being, a feeling, an ongoing process of discovery and action through relationships). In Ceremony, we arrive with respect and reverence for the Creator and we appeal to Natural and Sacred Law for permission and protection. Including Ceremony in policy helps to set the right relationship with one another and the Land. Ceremony reminds us to be humble and to hold responsibility rather than entitlement. Thus, it translates relational knowledge into parameters (principles, values, and intent) that guide decision making and resource allocation—or what the government of Canada calls policy (CHIN 2021).

Governance Ceremonies are a place where people gather and share Stories. As Indigenous Peoples, we use the information from those who have been on the Land to make decisions for how we will be on the Land for the next four seasons. By applying this understanding to climate policy, we arrive at a more holistic understanding that helps root decisions in larger systems thinking. Ceremony is a protocol and a practice for providing access to this way of thinking and being.


Tensions between ceremony and policy

“We had policy within our ceremonies. We had policies in our day to day life. They were brought out from watching our natural world and looking at creation. We had original instructions given to us. How do we follow those now? How do we maintain that in a colonial state? I think it’s really going back to listening to Land, listening to our youth. Listening to our Elders. Where are they trying to take us?” — Ginnifer Menominee (ICA 2023)

Indigenous Peoples have always known how to act in relationship to the Land. They recognize that the disconnect between people and the Land is the reason for the climate crisis. Policies are tools by which people operationalize values, and are thus a pathway for Indigenous worldviews to help address climate issues. But they are just that: tools. In the wrong hands, they can become weapons. So we must ask what values underlie their use.

Historical policies in Canada have been designed to assimilate and erase Indigenous Peoples. For example, some forms of policy undermined Indigenous Governance by targeting Ceremonial practice. Potlatches, which happen along the northwest coast, were banned by federal government policy from 1885 to 1950 (Section 3 of An Act Further to Amend The Indian Act, 1880, as cited in Indigenous Corporate Training, Inc., n.d.). This Act not only undermined Indigenous governance but also impeded cultural expression, demonstrating the power of policy as a tool of oppression (Monkman, Lenard. 2017).

Other policies moved Indigenous Peoples from their Lands onto reserves, which limited access to their Territories, eroding cultural practices and connection to place. In some cases, selection of reserve lands (often on lands deemed less valuable by settlers) resulted in maladaptation to climate change: homes relocated onto floodplains under the Indian Act are at increased risk of flooding, as seen most recently during B.C.’s atmospheric river of 2021 (Chakraborty et al. 2021; Alderhill Planning Inc. 2022; Yellow Old Woman-Munro et al. 2021). 

Policies are tools by which people operationalize values, and are thus a pathway for Indigenous worldviews to help address climate issues.

While some governments and ministries are enhancing their approaches to establishing and managing relationships with Indigenous Peoples, Reed et al.’s (2021) analysis of Canadian climate plans shows that there is consistent failure to uphold Indigenous rights to self-determination; free, prior, and informed consent; or true Nation-to-Nation relationships. The B.C. First Nations Climate Leadership Agenda process is a case in point, although certainly not the only case: it allows for roughly two years of “meaningful engagement” with First Nations to inform a memorandum to federal Cabinet, which, once drafted, will likely undergo interdepartmental consultation (Government of Canada, 2020) before being presented to Cabinet for discussion and decision-making, a process that is shielded by confidentiality rules. Confidentiality supports the free expression of ministers, which promotes good governance (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2014), but it limits transparency in decisions that affect Indigenous Peoples. It also removes Indigenous rights and title holders from the decision-making table, degrading the collaborative intent of meaningful engagement and co-development. As a recent engagement participant shared, “Canada always falls short in its desire to be inclusive because of this Cabinet process. When Canada opens that door, it will be able to look at us as individuals and respect our rights” (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024b).

This exclusion marginalizes Indigenous worldviews, governance, and rights recognition, protection and, implementation—which together contain answers to questions that much current climate policy seeks to grapple with. To move towards a policy approach that benefits rather than harms Indigenous Peoples, and that meaningfully addresses climate issues, Indigenous Climate Action concludes, “policy making must center our own worldviews and our own diverse approaches to governance [which are] based on relationship to the Land, ancestral knowledge and concern for future generations” (ICA 2022). To address the governance challenge presented above, one incremental way to centre Indigenous Knowledges, governance, and ways of being in climate policy would be to ensure that climate policy development and implementation are rooted in and guided by Ceremony. 


A path through

“Ceremony focuses attention so that attention becomes intention. If you stand together and profess a thing before your community, it holds you accountable. Ceremonies transcend the boundaries of the individual and resonate beyond the human realm. These acts of reverence are powerfully pragmatic. These are ceremonies that magnify life.” — Robin Wall Kimmerer (2013)

The Knowledge Keepers at the Gathering emphasized that to address the climate crisis, we must uphold our responsibilities to each other and to Creation. Contextually appropriate Ceremony, conducted with proper protocols, provides access to a way of being that allows us to connect to all that is around us, and thus to better see, delegate, and uphold responsibilities.

The connective element of Ceremony reminds us of the nsyilxcen language (syilx okanagan), in which the word tmixʷ loosely translates to ‘all living things’, and the word tmxʷulaxʷ loosely translates to Land. According to Dr. Jeanette Armstrong, tmixʷ is literally translated as the life force, and tmxʷulaxʷ is the ‘life-force-place’. Humans are considered part of the life force “through Indigeneity as a social paradigm [that fosters] reciprocity in the regeneration of all life forms of a place” (Armstrong 2012).

For this reason, the governance Ceremony has a process orientation rather than one of results to ensure that people stay grounded in an embodied reverence for the Land and Creation. When individuals honour this way of life, their spirit and decisions are aligned with their purpose. Historically, as people contributed from their unique purpose, the group would work towards solutions only after all voices were heard.

Ceremony is an embodied connection to Indigenous identity—to individual and collective purpose in the life-force-place. Respecting Indigenous rights is respecting Ceremony because it promotes relationship with the Land and Creation. To do so properly, Indigenous and colonial institutions, governing bodies, and political, economic, and social structures and relationships need to be founded on Ceremony.

Knowing this, and returning to the first 13 lines of the Knowledge Keepers Mandate, each line is part of a bigger picture of climate solutions. Through Ceremony, the relationships between Mandate lines emerge as more important than any individual line. This is the case because, as elements of the life-force-place, we must all play our role as healthy contributors so that the entire system can be well. We are encouraged to transcend personal and structural barriers so we can grasp interconnectedness for the benefit of all beings.

Each community experiences different challenges on the Land and in their relationships. These challenges require tailored approaches to effectively address the complex relationship with Mother Earth. First Nations’ communities’ self-determining choices to act on—and governments’ support for—any of the Mandate lines constitute climate action, because impacts in one area reverberate to others. Patchwork approaches confined to colonial climate priorities do not meaningfully respect Indigenous rights. Ceremony reminds us why Indigenous-led approaches to climate action, rooted in Indigenous communities’ respective traditions and priorities and grounded in an underlying reverence for the Land, are needed. 

While the way forward may not always feel clear, we know we cannot do this work without Ceremony. By connecting humans and the Land, Ceremony can be climate policies’ foundation, and all of our grounding.

A critical element of Ceremony is the way it centres and reinforces both reciprocity and responsibility. In Ceremony, we are reminded of our place in Creation: Sacred and Natural Law tell us how to be in the world and hold us responsible and accountable. While the way forward may not always feel clear, we know we cannot do this work without Ceremony. By connecting humans and the Land, Ceremony can be climate policies’ foundation, and all of our grounding.


The way forward

Ceremony is a necessary component of adapting to and mitigating the climate crisis because it is a way to see ourselves in the context of Sacred and Natural Law and a way to align our actions to Mother Earth’s needs. Policy development processes need to be guided by Ceremony and Indigenous Knowledges. Ceremony, as it relates to climate policy, helps shine a light on a proposed policy’s shortcomings. It helps us find words for the way that we feel when we come up against systemic failures. You cannot heal what you do not acknowledge, and Ceremony shows some of the ways in which Canadian climate policy falls short, as assessed through Indigenous worldviews. 

Understanding this, effective climate policy development must be approached holistically, and through intentional grounding in place and Ceremony. Emerging from Naqsmist’s reflections on the Gathering, we offer the following recommendations for policy makers across cultures and within all orders of government: 

  1. Climate policy efforts must be founded on continued implementation of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)

In particular, the following articles apply to our recommendations: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 43, 44, and 45. Broadly, the UNDRIP Annex must guide implementation of these articles to ensure that the approach to respecting Indigenous rights is appropriate (United Nations, 2007).

  1. Federal and provincial governments must support and provide targeted resource capacity for First Nations to conduct Ceremony in culturally appropriate and self-determining ways.

First Nations and other Indigenous groups should continue to practice and promote Ceremony as a way of relationship building, both with others and with the Land. Furthermore, Ceremony must be an integral and consistent component of any co-development or engagement process between Canadian governments and First Nations. All involved in the policy making process should be active participants or observers of Ceremony, where appropriate. This must include funding Knowledge Keepers to attend policy-development processes, recognizing their Land-based and spiritual experiences as knowledge, and supporting communities to continue to foster coming-of-age ceremonies and practices, thereby creating new generations of Knowledge Keepers to maintain and strengthen humans’ connection to the Land. Care should be taken to avoid misrepresenting, pan-indigenizing, or diluting Ceremonial processes. Ceremony must not be tokenized and must be seen and implemented as an ongoing responsibility to follow Natural and Sacred Laws and protocols. 

  1. Federal and provincial governments must allow First Nations to set the table for Indigenous/non-Indigenous climate policy and law development. 

Letting First Nations set the table means ensuring equitable and enhanced rights-based participation that cultivates safer spaces for discussion led by First Nations teachers, guides, and spiritual leaders (Shallard and Wale 2023). Indigenous Peoples must exercise their right to free, prior, and informed consent when policies impact their rights to their lands, territories, and resources. Culturally and contextually-relevant Ceremony must be practiced in these settings from the outset. This could be supported by adding and sharing reflective components within policy development processes to ensure transparency around how Indigenous Knowledges have been valued and upheld, how they need to be further included, and whether and to what extent they are being considered in decision making. Furthermore, many First Nations and Indigenous groups have pre-existing national Laws (both Sacred and Natural Law and in some cases written traditions or other forms of law) that apply to climate initiatives. These laws must be upheld in collaborative governance processes between Indigenous groups and Canadian governments. While there are significant systemic barriers to true Nation-to-Nation climate policy development processes, including the federal Cabinet process, Ceremony opens space for Indigenous worldviews to frame and lead the discussions and provides opportunity for cross-cultural learning, promoting a heart and Land-centred approach that can support incremental changes over time. 

  1. Over time, federal and provincial governments must commit to a paradigm shift in climate policy-making to centre the well-being of the Land by respecting and incorporating Ceremony and Sacred and Natural Law into decision-making and implementation approaches. 

In other words, and in alignment with the fourteenth Mandate item, we must work together to forge a new relationship with Mother Earth. A paradigm shift is necessary to transition away from decisions and policy that centre people and profit at the expense of the Land, climate, and Sacred and Natural law. This shift is needed both in many colonial and Indigenous spaces—Ceremony helps all of us come together and live our lives in a good way. Ministries with conflicting mandates should be brought together to engage with Indigenous Peoples in good faith around issues of the natural world—which, as we have learned in this work, touch all ministries, since we humans are part of the natural world. Engaging in Ceremony is an act of good faith, and as Ceremony is included in more and more co-governance initiatives between Indigenous Peoples and Canadian governments, our hope is that small changes at the level of the individual stemming from participation in Ceremony can lead to larger systemic changes that benefit all humans and the Land. Additionally, funds for research initiatives on collaborations across Indigenous communities, academia, and governments could allow for a better understanding of how Ceremony and policy can work together to not only promote First Nations climate leadership but also to promote this paradigm shift. Slowly, we hope, the expansion of Ceremony in governance spaces will reduce the burden that Indigenous Peoples face by participating in siloed engagements that do not align with their worldviews and that lack transparency and accountability, and will promote improved relationships within and between First Nations, other Indigenous communities, and Canadian governments.

Artist: Michelyn Lepage, as shared in the Spiritual Knowledge Keepers Gathering on Climate Change What We Heard Report (Naqsmist and BCAFN 2024a).

Conclusion

Through the practice of Ceremony, we remember who we are.

We believe that if we follow the right protocols and practice Ceremony—even if it is not always clear how to do so or what the result will be—the necessary components to reform colonial climate policy and to begin to respond appropriately to the climate crisis will continue to emerge. This will happen because over time, through the practice of Ceremony, we remember who we are, and our actions will reflect this deeper understanding. 

Ultimately, the value of Ceremony does not come from thoughts or through logical analysis. It comes from experiences of connection that spur action. As Kukpi7 Fred Robbins said, “We must know our Territory—where the sun goes up and down, how the wind blows in the morning and evening. There is no ownership of the Land, only a sense of belonging” (Naqsmist and BCAFNa 2024). This feeling of belonging is what the Knowledge Keepers are challenging us to understand. Like in the Four Siblings Prophecy, this is the gift they are sharing. Will it bring us together again?


Footnotes

Fueling the oil and gas transition with Canada’s climate investment taxonomy

Achieving Canada’s climate targets requires transformational emissions reductions in its historically emissions-intensive sectors including oil and gas. Canada also needs to increase private and public investments in clean growth projects by $80 – $110 billion annually to meet its climate targets. In March 2023, the federally appointed Sustainable Finance Action Council recommended that Canadian governments establish a Climate Investment Taxonomy to help support the needed investments. In effect, the taxonomy would serve as a standardized framework to help financial markets assess which projects and investments can help reduce fossil fuel emissions from hard-to-decarbonize sectors in line with Canada’s climate goals and global 1.5°C scenarios.

How should Canada fuel the transition of oil and gas projects in its taxonomy? We looked at the taxonomy framework proposed in the SFAC’s Taxonomy Roadmap Report, and developed an approach to categorize emissions-reducing oil and gas projects.

How can oil and gas projects fit in Canada’s Climate Investment Taxonomy?

A big part of the taxonomy framework developed by the Canadian Climate Institute is about defining “green” investments and projects. Almost all of the 30+ countries that have developed or are developing taxonomies focus on defining this green label. It typically includes activities and projects that are already aligned with a net zero future such as renewable electricity, batteries and storage, electric vehicles, and low-carbon hydrogen. For these types of projects SFAC recommends mirroring the frameworks and leading practices from elsewhere, such as the European Union.

Unlike other countries and regions, the taxonomy framework developed by the Canadian Climate Institute establishes a “transition” category. The role of this label is to identify, and unlock funding for, credible pathways to rapidly decarbonize Canada’s emissions-intensive sectors including oil and gas. 

Why include oil and gas projects in a Climate Investment Taxonomy

Including any oil and gas activities in the taxonomy raises legitimate concerns about preserving the taxonomy’s credibility. Climate science is clear that the production and consumption of fossil fuels must decrease significantly and rapidly if the world is to keep global average temperature rise to below 1.5°C.

But it is exactly because of the oil and gas sector’s high emissions profile that it is essential to have a transition label that can evaluate oil and gas decarbonization projects. As global demand for fossil fuels starts to decrease this decade, large-scale investments to decarbonize the upstream production of oil and gas will be necessary to achieve Canada’s climate targets and maintain industry competitiveness. 

Figure 1 summarizes the specific requirements for projects to be eligible for the transition label category within SFAC’s taxonomy. Taken as a package, these requirements provide a credible path for determining which pollution-reducing projects in the oil and gas sector could qualify for the taxonomy’s transition label and therefore be eligible for preferential lending terms.

This image shows the specific requirements to be eligible for the transition label, alongside the general requirements and the do-no-significant-harm requirements.

Categorizing oil and gas investments in the taxonomy

To determine whether existing oil and gas projects are eligible for the proposed transition label in SFAC’s taxonomy, we focused on three main questions:

  1. When are downstream Scope 3 emissions from a particular project considered the dominant transition risk?
  2. What is the definition of new vs. existing oil and gas facilities? 
  3. How can the taxonomy determine whether project lifespans and emissions reductions align with 1.5°C pathways?
This figure represents the categorization framework from the SFAC Taxonomy Roadmap Report.

Fueling the transition outlines how these questions can be used to confirm which projects are eligible for the transition label. It details the strengths and challenges of this approach. 

Overall, this paper suggests setting a high bar for what types of oil and gas projects could become eligible for the taxonomy’s transition label with a focus on keeping Canada on a pathway to meet its climate targets. Using detailed criteria and metrics, the transition label strikes a balance between promoting transformative investments and preventing carbon lock-in. 

An effective and credible climate taxonomy must aim high and reach far. With the proposed transition label, Canada has a unique opportunity to become a global leader on Climate Investment Taxonomies. It is positioned to provide guidance to other countries on how a taxonomy can help to transition hard-to-abate sectors. It can also help position Canada’s economy to remain  competitive in a low-carbon world.

Turning the tide on flood risks

Improving flood risk transparency practices can drive equitable outcomes across Canada.

As climate change continues to increase the risk of floods, communities need support to build resilience to flooding. Improved flood risk transparency, which entails the mapping, disclosure, and pricing of flood risk, has a crucial role to play in Canada’s efforts to protect people and communities from flood risks. It can help individuals and communities decide how best to avoid, mitigate, or absorb damages and losses due to flooding. 

Table 1 shows different examples of flood risk mapping, disclosure, and pricing.

However, in many instances, flood risk transparency practices can have disproportionately negative impacts, especially on equity-deserving groups. These groups are more likely to live in flood prone areas and are less able to access flood risk information. Equity-deserving groups are also more likely to be disadvantaged by costs related to flood risk and are often unable to afford housing in less risky areas.

What can governments do to help ease the disproportionate and inequitable impacts of flood risk transparency on equity-deserving people?

Flood risk mapping

Flood risk maps are a critical tool for understanding and mitigating flood risk. They provide valuable data on current and future flood risks for a certain area which can then inform purchasing, investment, and adaptation decisions.

But flood risk maps are not widely available, particularly in areas where equity-deserving groups are overrepresented. When they do exist, they may be 25 years or more out of date, physically hard to access, or difficult to read for audiences without technical skills.

In 2020, the federal government announced it would begin updating available maps, and committed to updating flood maps nationwide in the National Adaptation Action Plan, under the Flood Hazard Identification and Mapping Program. That is a good step, but there is no indication that the updated maps will reflect the influence of climate change.

Inaccurate or unavailable flood risk maps are an issue for any community. Those where  equity-deserving groups are disproportionately represented can face a more difficult path to recovery if they are impacted by flooding. Individuals in these communities are generally less able to rely on savings to smooth over the impacts and tend to lose a greater share of their overall wealth.

​​To effectively build equity considerations into mapping, we need public engagement processes, including engagement with stakeholders and right holders to understand the local context and disproportionate impacts.

Flood risk disclosure

For flood mapping to support risk mitigation, property information must be disclosed in a timely, complete and accessible way.

The main mechanism for flood risk disclosure during real-estate transactions is the Property Disclosure Statement (or equivalent). It is a means for communicating to the buyer any risks related to the property. But the details of what needs to be communicated to buyers varies across jurisdictions. Inconsistencies can result in the inability for buyers to make educated decisions about the risks, including the flood risk.

Landlords in Canada are not currently required to disclose hazard or risk information about their properties during rental transactions. Renting a basement suite or in a neighbourhood with inadequate stormwater and wastewater infrastructure may be particularly risky given the higher likelihood of flooding. This significantly impacts equity-deserving communities, who are disproportionately represented among renters.

To date, property and tenant insurance transactions have yet to be used effectively to alert prospective buyers and renters about the flood risks associated with properties they plan to purchase or rent, with more severe impacts for equity-deserving communities who disproportionately live in flood-prone areas. As the flood insurance market grows, insurance agents should be required to inform their clients about the flood hazard and risk profiles of their properties. Local agencies responsible for flood management could also be supplied with flood models used by the insurance industry to underwrite flood coverage and become more active in informing residents of the potential impacts of flood hazards on their property and insurance.

Flood risk pricing

Flood risk pricing can affect real estate, insurance, and rental costs, all of which can disproportionately impact members of equity-deserving groups located. 

Insurers’ understanding of risk and competitive pricing shapes the cost of property insurance. As insurers better understand flood-related risks under worsening climate impacts, the cost of insurance is rising. Across Canada, home insurance premiums increased by 20 to 25 per cent between 2015-2019. More than half of this increase is attributable to flood damage. Absent government intervention, insurance coverage may become unaffordable for members of equity-deserving groups living in flood-prone areas.

For those who already own properties, flood risk disclosure can trigger changes in property values. Catastrophic floods can significantly drop the price of real estate and reduced home values can impact savings and retirement options. 

Flood risk pricing can also increase the cost of renting, as landlords pass the increased insurance cost to tenants. This disproportionately affects equity-deserving groups who are more likely to rent than others. Renters could be forced to either relocate away from their current communities or pay substantially higher rents. By reducing the relative cost of housing in flood-prone areas and increasing the cost in less flood-prone areas, flood risk pricing may lead to a cycle that disproportionately traps equity-deserving groups in higher-risk neighbourhoods. 

A transformational flood risk transparency approach

The federal government, as well as many provincial, territorial, and Indigenous governments, are investing in flood mapping programs, but major gaps remain.To address these gaps, programs and strategies should engage equity-deserving groups and reflect social vulnerability. A short-term step could be to create knowledge-sharing committees that would incorporate diverse perspectives in mapping initiatives. In the longer term, governments should move towards co-development of flood mapping programs. Meaningfully including members of equity-deserving groups in the design and implementation of flood mapping programs can help ensure that the values, concerns, and priorities reflect the diversity of the communities they map. 

Flood risk maps should also be designed to be accessible to the public, including equity-deserving groups. This includes making sure that the data is easy to understand so people can make informed decisions on how to prepare for and be more resilient to the impacts of flooding.

Finally, strengthening and standardizing flood-related real estate and rental disclosure requirements and guidelines could help address some of the disproportionate impacts of flood-related risks on equity-deserving communities.

Building resilience to flood risk

Building resilience to flood risk is an important step in protecting people in Canada from some of the increasingly severe impacts of climate change. A step in the right direction is better flood risk transparency so people and communities can make more informed decisions.

Read more about how policy responses can address some of the equity-related challenges related to flood risk transparency. 

Recommendations for a more practical Standardized Climate Scenario Exercise

The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) works to maintain confidence in Canada’s financial system. As part of its strategy for guarding against climate-related risks, OSFI has released a draft Standardized Climate Scenario Exercise (SCSE) for public comment. The SCSE looks at the financial consequences of transitioning to an economy powered by clean energy, known as transition risk, and the financial consequences of extreme weather and other physical effects of climate change, known as physical risk. The SCSE identifies four different ways these financial consequences will affect Canadian financial institutions: market financial risk, credit financial risk, physical financial exposure, and real estate financial exposure. In its submission to OSFI, the Canadian Climate Institute identifies the SCSE as an important step forward for aligning Canadian financial institutions with an accelerating clean energy transition and an increasingly volatile climate, and shares recommendations for better optimizing the SCSE’s approach to transition risk and physical risk.

Public submission from the Canadian Climate Institute

The Canadian Climate Institute is an independent research institute that informs and shapes climate change policy in Canada. We have previously analyzed the economic impacts of the global clean energy transition in Sink or Swim: Transforming Canada’s economy for a global low-carbon future and have analyzed the threat presented by a warming climate and the costs and benefits of adaptation in our The Costs of Climate Change series. We appreciate this opportunity to comment on the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI)’s proposed approach to climate-related risk management in its Standardized Climate Scenario Exercise (SCSE). 

Climate change threatens Canada’s financial health. Over 70 per cent of the country’s goods exports are vulnerable to transition-driven market disruptions. Meanwhile, the physical impacts of accelerating climate change between 2015 and 2025 alone will slow Canada’s economic growth by $25 billion annually, which is equal to 50 per cent of projected GDP growth. Overall, the SCSE is a positive and important step towards standardizing how federally regulated financial institutions respond to climate-related risk.

This comment letter shares several suggestions for how OSFI can better optimize the SCSE by being more upfront about its assumptions and limitations. While we appreciate that the Exercise is necessarily abstract and aggregated, more clarity is needed to avoid negative unintended consequences.

The SCSE would benefit from additional key assumptions and limitations

Although the SCSE’s existing list of assumptions and limitations is not meant to be exhaustive, it needs further clarifications to how it conceptualizes both transition risk from a changing economy and physical risk from a warming planet. Additional transition risk qualifiers should be acknowledged in the SCSE’s market and credit modules, while in its physical module, additional physical risk qualifiers should be recognized and actively addressed. The same goes for transition risk in the real estate module. We discuss each in turn.

The SCSE’s market and credit modules use an approach similar to the Canadian Climate Institute’s Sink or Swim report for analyzing transition risk. Assuming that OSFI will apply the same transition risk factors as used in the Bank of Canada/OSFI Pilot Project, we broadly support the proposed process. There are additional key assumptions and limitations that the Exercise should disclose, however. 

  • The SCSE should acknowledge that it does not actively analyze opportunities from the clean energy transition and only focuses on transition risk. While opportunities from the clean energy transition are more difficult to quantify than risks in these types of stress-testing analyses, they can give federally regulated financial institutions important insights on strategically managing risks in the transition. We addressed the same limitation in our own analysis of transition risk by complementing the Sink or Swim report with a study of opportunities at the provincial level
  • The SCSE should acknowledge that it does not account for regional differences within Canada. We assume that the SCSE will follow the Bank of Canada/OSFI Pilot Project, and not conduct analysis at the subnational or local level. This limitation is understandable, but its implications should be disclosed and assessed.
  • The SCSE should standardize more assumptions when it comes to mapping counterparties to sectors. The amount of autonomy currently devolved to federally regulated financial institutions may result in fragmented and inconsistent counterparty mapping, particularly for the mapping of “support” counterparties. Clarifying boundaries around the oil and gas sector and its supporting activities has been a major component of our work on Canada’s green and transition finance taxonomy. The European Union sustainable activities taxonomy similarly distinguishes and discloses criteria for activities that enable other activities.

Turning to the physical module, the SCSE may be interpreted as using physical risk to identify financial exposure. However, in its current form, the module only captures physical exposure to hazards, not physical risk. The SCSE should address several key assumptions and limitations to elevate its physical exposure analysis to physical risk analysis.

  • The SCSE should disclose challenges and limitations for translating Representative Carbon Pathways into physical hazards and physical exposure. Current publicly available data, such as that available from Climate Data Canada, is inadequate for assessing physical exposure to important physical hazards such as flooding and wildfires. Translating the warming and climate projections associated with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Representative Carbon Pathways into localized physical hazard and exposure data would be a significant improvement but a major undertaking.  The current limitations of physical hazard data and the challenges involved in conducting robust physical exposure analysis should be clearly explained. 
  • To capture physical risk, the SCSE would have to go beyond physical exposure by also incorporating physical vulnerability to physical hazards. Physical risk is determined by both the physical exposure of assets to physical hazards as well as the physical vulnerability of those assets to the physical hazards to which they are exposed. Currently the SCSE does not address the latter. In order to paint a useful picture of the physical risks facing financial institutions, the SCSE will need to provide guidance on how to analyze the vulnerability of exposed assets and how to incorporate that vulnerability in assessments of physical risk. 
  • The SCSE should pilot a risk assessment approach for a small number of highly material physical risks, rather than to require broad hazard exposure assessment with limited value. Investing in extensive physical hazard mapping and broadly assessing exposure to physical hazards may have little value, as described above. We recommend that the SCSE instead focus on assessing a small number of highly material risks or a single risk, such as that associated with flooding, with a methodology that also incorporates asset characteristics. This will be a challenging undertaking but the results will be much more valuable and there will be important lessons learned about how to, over time, design and implement an effective physical risk assessment methodology that addresses a broad spectrum of risks.

Finally, the SCSE’s real estate module aims to analyze transition risk, similar to the market and credit modules. It has a similar flaw to the physical module, however, as it also presents exposure as risk.

  • To capture transition risk, the SCSE should go beyond power sources and greenhouse gas emissions intensities. It is understandable why the SCSE would need to start with power sources and emissions intensities, given the lack of relevant granular real estate data available in Canada. However, we see these metrics more as fundamentals for having usable data, rather than as indicators of transition risk. The real estate module should at least include scenario pathways for power and building sector emissions (e.g. energy efficiency standards, carbon pricing increases).
  • The SCSE’s understanding of transition risk for real estate should incorporate climate policy as a whole. Policies that increase transition risk for real estate should be balanced against policies that mitigate risks, such as carbon pricing rebates and labour market retraining. This is particularly important for real estate assets because they are sensitive to domestic policy change as a transition risk driver. By contrast, assets that are more trade exposed tend to be more sensitive to transition risk drivers that alter competitiveness, like changes in global policy, technology, and consumer preferences.

Without more context, the SCSE could misrepresent climate-related risks

Focusing on the risks from the clean energy transition without an analysis of the opportunities can exaggerate anticipated harm from the shift. Commercial investments into activities like carbon capture, hydrogen, bioproducts, and mining may come with transition risk, but the risk may be contrasted with significant market growth. The exaggeration of harm would be more pronounced if the SCSE proceeded with only national-level data. The risks and opportunities in the clean energy transition vary widely among provinces, with British Columbia, Manitoba, and Quebec having a significant clean electricity headstart thanks to existing hydro resources.

Conversely, focusing on risks without accounting for the distribution of opportunities can underestimate harm to Canada’s competitiveness. The SCSE suggests that transition risk is negligible in its baseline current policy scenario because it assumes no new climate policies. This overlooks how technology and consumer preferences may continue to evolve towards cleaner energy sources, driving transition risk in markets. It also overlooks how the current policy environment may put other countries on trajectories to outcompete Canada in clean energy-related markets, even if no new policies were to be added.

Equating exposure with risk in the physical and real estate modules without clarifying the limitations of this assumption may also misrepresent risk. Without accounting for physical vulnerability to physical hazards, the SCSE may drastically mischaracterize physical risk. For example, an assessment of physical exposure alone might flag a commercial building in a flood zone as being at risk, but further investigation of physical vulnerability could reveal that the building is only exposed to a minor depth of flooding and has floodproofed to that depth, and therefore is not at risk of flood-related damage. In a similar vein, the Exercise may mischaracterize transition risk for real estate by basing it only on power sources and emissions intensities, which are more reflections of exposure than of risk. For instance, some emissions-intensive households may receive support to help them navigate the clean energy transition.

The SCSE should refine its approach towards transition risk and physical risk to avoid negative, unintended consequences for the financial system

We understand that OSFI will add more detail to the SCSE as it evolves; this letter is intended to draw attention to specific details that should be included in these future iterations. Ideally, the Exercise should provide a more sophisticated analysis of transition risk and physical risk. In the meantime, it should be careful not to overrepresent its current level of sophistication. 

Even though the SCSE cautions that it is not a sizing of climate-related risks, the way it frames these risks could still influence policy and capital allocation. Market and credit risk decision makers may use it to inform their climate-related analysis, without noting the importance of opportunities or subnational differences in the clean energy transition. The Exercise’s physical exposure analysis may also encourage physical risk decision making without adequate consideration of other factors that interact with physical exposure to determine risk level, including characteristics of the asset (e.g. presence or absence of a basement, building materials used) and measures already taken to mitigate risk. Similar concerns also apply to the SCSE’s real estate transition exposure analysis potentially being used to assess transition risk without a fuller accounting of risk factors.

The SCSE is ultimately an important step toward standardizing the identification and management of climate-related risks. It is also a step that would be expected from OSFI, as other financial regulators are taking similar actions. For instance, the European Banking Authority is in the process of developing templates and guidance for climate scenario analysis. As currently written, however, the SCSE is oversimplified, making its use a major undertaking without clear practical value for federally regulated financial institutions—particularly for institutions that already have experience with basic scenario analysis. Going forwards, we recommend that OSFI be clearer about the assumptions and limitations that its Exercise contains and how it intends to improve its accuracy and applicability over time.

Expediting clean energy facilities in Canada: A framework for new fast-track permitting 

Executive summary

Canada requires a massive transformation of its electricity systems to reach net zero electricity generation by 2035 and economy-wide net zero by 2050. Current forecasts show that more than 10 gigawatts of new zero-emission electricity will need to be added to the grid each and every year from now to 2050. 

Meeting this target requires a dramatic acceleration in the permitting, construction, and integration of clean electricity facilities – generation, transmission, distribution, and storage. This paper focuses on permitting. It proposes a two-track permitting framework for implementation by governments at every level. The first track would be the existing approvals track, which would remain in place for major facilities or facilities involving unproven technologies or large zones of impact. The new, second track would be an expedited permitting process for proven, small-scale, zero-emission facilities.

This paper sets out the policy framework for the new second track of expedited electricity facility approvals, encompassing eligible technologies, location, and timelines. 

All five orders of government authority in Canada—federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, and Indigenous—could implement this framework for expediting permitting. Based on this conclusion, this paper recommends that the most locally rooted authorities—municipal and Indigenous—have the opportunity to lead the fast-track approvals. This paper also recommends that Canada, the provinces, and perhaps the territorial governments, work together to develop a common framework for fast-track permitting, including acceptable technologies, permitting criteria, and timelines. Appendix B provides a preliminary framework for consideration.

Introduction 

Canada’s electricity system will require major reform to achieve the targets of net zero generation by 2035 and economy-wide net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 (Kanduth and Dion 2022; Lee et al. 2022). The further challenge is increasing the generation, storage, and transmission of clean electricity without adverse local impacts. 

Annual new build required to achieve the 2050 net zero target

A credible estimate is that, for every year from now to 2050, Canada will need to build over 10 gigawatts (10,000 megawatts) of new zero emission electricity generation facilities (Thomas and Green 2022). In concrete terms, this means Canada’s electricity generation capacity needs to grow up to six times faster than it did over the last decade (Lee al. 2022). This pace of growth makes clear the breadth and urgency of the challenge. The focus of this paper is on fast-tracking permitting for new clean electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and storage facilities. 

Beyond expedited permitting, other related challenges include ensuring that new facilities are financed speedily so that construction can proceed as soon as possible after permitting, and eliminating hurdles to the integration of the facility into the grid. Other nations, particularly Germany, have provided powerful examples of governments using novel regulatory tools to mobilize the private sector in financing massive construction of clean energy facilities. In particular, Germany provided an example of how feed-in tariffs can help accelerate the build-out of wind and solar facilities to contribute to major energy systems (Futurepolicy.org 2023). In 2010, Ontario adapted this international experience to implement its Green Energy Act reforms and a feed-in-tariff program. The essence of this program was to provide a rules-based approach for applicants to obtain a long-term electricity supply contract: if an applicant met the rules, it obtained a government contract to buy its clean energy at an agreed-upon rate for a 20-year period. Holding a long-term energy supply contract, applicants could obtain private financing to build and operate new clean energy generation facilities. Box 1, below, summarizes this very broad reform. 

Direct funding by governments can also help drive the construction of new electricity facilities and mobilize private capital. Federal policies and instruments like the Canada Infrastructure Bank, new federal investment tax credits, and the newly established Canada Growth Fund are designed to mobilize private capital for development of clean energy facilities and technologies (Beck et al. 2023). Some of these federal programs include financing support specifically for Indigenous governments to develop clean energy facilities. Provincial supports include Ontario’s Aboriginal Loan Guarantee Program and Alberta’s Indigenous Opportunities Corporation. While the permitting reforms proposed in this paper focus on reducing the constraints to permitting new facilities, both permitting and financing reforms are essential to drive the actions required to hit Canada’s net zero targets.

Given the scale of the required build-out for new facilities, every month saved or added to the time required to permit and build new facilities counts. 

Types of required facilities

Canada’s clean energy transition cannot be achieved without major reforms to how we approve permitting for all core aspects of our electricity systems—generation, transmission, distribution, and storage. 

Expediting permitting for zero-emission generation of electricity is by far the greatest requirement. It is also the greatest challenge.

Expediting permitting for electricity transmission systems is also necessary to advance Canada’s transition to clean energy. Improved intra-provincial transmission is essential to serve remote areas and connect areas with renewable energy potential to demand centres. In particular, connecting isolated Indigenous communities to the electricity grid will meet at least two needs: it will allow these communities to replace diesel generation with zero-emission electricity generation; and it will also potentially allow high-value wind energy sites in remote areas to connect to the grid—benefitting any nearby community and contributing to the national target (Natural Resources Canada 2023). An interprovincial electricity system is not strictly necessary to meet the target—Canada could meet the national target by the required timeline without expanding its interprovincial transmission lines. However, it will be a significant advantage and likely less costly to have greater interprovincial connections to move electricity around and realize complementarities between systems (Dolter and Rivers 2018).

Expediting permitting for energy storage facilities is required to support zero emission energy generation. For wind and solar facilities, natural forces beyond human control determine the time and duration of daily wind and solar inputs. These do not always overlap with the time and duration of community energy needs. To avoid losing electricity generated during off-peak hours, there is a need for facilities that store generated electricity. Electricity storage technologies are now viable. In particular, short duration, lithium-ion batteries are now a viable storage option (Lee et al. 2022). Over time, availability of viable storage technologies is expected to increase.

Existing law and policy to permit new clean energy facilities 

Every order of government in Canada has laws that govern the permitting of new electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and storage facilities (see Appendix C). The federal Impact Assessment Act addresses the permitting of major projects listed as designated projects as well as a wide range of projects on federal lands. While a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada in October 2023 will likely narrow the scope of designated projects that are subject to assessments under the Act (Langen et al. 2023), it has upheld its application to projects on federal lands (ss.81-91) and does not likely imperil its application to designated offshore clean energy projects (Reference re Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23). Federal laws also include sector-specific laws and effects-based federal approvals that govern or restrict the permitting of projects. 

Provincial governments, meanwhile, have laws governing the permitting of facilities on private lands and other laws for facilities on Crown lands. Indigenous governments have laws ranging from broad land claim agreements, particularly in northern Canada, and Land Laws under the First Nations Land Management Act or bylaws under the Indian Act. Municipalities address permitting through zoning bylaws.

Most of these laws have broad application. This breadth reflects the longstanding intent of most jurisdictions to subject energy generation projects to the same legal framework as other facilities in other sectors that may have environmental effects. As such, existing laws address a broad array of circumstances, including major and minor facilities, new and existing technologies, narrow and broad effects, limited and extensive affected areas, and general and sensitive locations. 

Many governments have also made efforts to set timelines for their approval processes. However, most of these timelines are partial, not comprehensive. No existing timelines encompass the time required to move from facility planning through permitting and construction to facility operation. 

In Canada, Ontario has recent experience with clean energy reforms that linked shortened timelines with an innovative approach to permitting and financing new facilities. 

Box 1: Ontario’s Green Energy Program (2009-2014)
In Canada, for the years 2010 to 2014, the Province of Ontario implemented the largest program of clean energy development in Canadian history under the Green Energy Act, 2009. This program illustrates the importance of providing an integrated approach to developing clean energy. The Ontario program had three main components: 

-A 20-year feed-in-tariff contract from the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) gave private sector investors security for financing;

-A Renewable Energy Approval from the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change gave proponents a single, consolidated approval and approval process; and

-A Grid Access Approval from the Ontario Electricity System Operator gave proponents access to Ontario’s transmission and distribution system.

The Green Energy Act also included provincial funding and a requests-for-proposals approach to expand Ontario’s transmission system.

In other ways, the Green Energy Act reform illustrates the challenges of seeking to implement major reform across a large jurisdiction. The feed-in-tariff provided above-market pricing of wind and solar facilities, and was later criticized for this cost to the public. In addition, the Renewable Energy Approval process took more time than anticipated because provincial efforts to consolidate approvals resulted in municipal and neighbourhood resistance. The Grid Access Approval process was complicated by the absence of adequate transmission capacity in many parts of Ontario, thereby delaying construction and implementation of new facilities. Furthermore, the Green Energy Act reform to exclude municipal decision-making for permitting approvals triggered a backlash against clean energy projects in rural Ontario that led, ultimately, to the repeal of this Act by a new provincial government in 2019. Despite this repeal, the policy has provided valuable information and experience to other jurisdictions. 

Building on Ontario’s experience, there is room to further expedite timelines to approve, build and operate new energy generation facilities where the facilities use proven technologies and have a limited zone and number of off-site effects.

Proposed framework to reform facility permitting 

The framework to establish a new fast-track permitting process for selected facilities has three components: technology, location, and timeline. 

Technology

A suitable technology for fast-track facility permitting should have five attributes: 

  1. It is a proven technology, not an experimental one;
  2. It has demonstrably few off-site environmental effects and no human health effects; 
  3. It has a demonstrably limited zone of off-site environmental effects;
  4. It is readily available to be procured for construction; and
  5. It has a demonstrably rapid path to construction and operation. 

At this time, wind and solar facilities are obvious candidates for fast-track permitting for electricity generation. Electricity transmission and distribution facilities are also obvious candidates for fast-track permitting. There are also viable energy storage options, for example, short duration lithium-ion batteries (Lee et al. 2022) Over time, perhaps quickly, other technologies will come to have these five attributes.

Proven technology

Zero emission technologies are evolving rapidly; however, a proven technology should be easier to approve than an experimental technology. Right now, no permitting regime recognizes this distinction, but, all else being equal, an unknown technology will involve more uncertainty about the range of effects and therefore require greater study and regulatory and public review than a well-established, proven technology. Thus, the preferred technology is one that is well established and commercially viable.

Demonstrably few environmental effects and no human health effects

 To be eligible for fast-track permitting, a given technology must of course generate or transmit electricity without emitting greenhouse gases. Yet one must also consider all other potential adverse effects, like other forms of pollution, harm to ecosystems, or the opportunity costs for land use (e.g., agriculture). To be considered for fast-track approval, the technology should have no serious effects on air, water, soil quality, or biodiversity. 

Demonstrably limited zone of off-site environmental effects

Where technology is well understood, it is possible to readily assess the zone of influence of possible off-site effects (that is, how far facility effects extend onto neighbouring properties). The smaller the zone of off-site effects, the less impact there will be on residents or wildlife. Thus, the preferred technology will have either no off-site effects or only a limited zone of off-site effects. Noise from a facility, for example, may not extend beyond the boundary of a site, or may only extend beyond a site boundary at low levels. This preference contrasts with technologies that may have adverse effects far from the site—for example, technologies emitting fine particulate matter.

Notably, the smaller the zone of off-site effects, the greater the number of potentially available sites.

Ready availability for construction

The preferred technology will be readily available for procurement and construction. All orders of governments certainly have the authority to assess the availability of a needed technology, but this challenge would also benefit from coordination among all or most orders of government and the private sector. Although some aspects of supply are beyond Canada’s control, a delay in technology delivery at the end of a permitting process is just as problematic as delay at the start of the process. 

Demonstrably rapid path to construction and operation 

The technology must enable rapid construction. Construction times are as important as approval timelines. Months gained or lost in construction are significant. Eligible technologies will be those that use an easily replicable design, and few site-specific accommodations. 

Location 

Canada’s current permitting processes are inclusive: they apply to a broad range of possible facilities. For example, in the energy sector, legislation and regulations within each major jurisdiction in Canada prescribe that jurisdiction’s permitting processes, such as environmental or impact assessment. These existing permitting processes have general application across the jurisdiction and are designed to respond to every type and scale of facility that provides energy—including the full range of possible energy generation technologies. For instance, the 2019 federal Impact Assessment Act provides a clear example of a broadly applicable assessment process, as illustrated through the list of “designated projects” set out in its Physical Activities Regulations (Physical Activities Regulations 2019). Notably, this aspect of this Act was not considered unconstitutional in the recent 2023 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The inclusive nature of current permitting processes means that they are complex and lengthy. Each time they are triggered, there must be time, expertise, and resources available to understand initial facility details, and the type and range of effects, and then craft a facility-specific regulatory process. For example, current permitting processes under the Impact Assessment Act include an early scoping component to identify and assess the full range of effects (s.18(1)). While early scoping is intended to narrow issues and therefore shorten the overall process and render it more predictable, scoping itself adds time and unpredictability to the front-end of the approvals process. Similarly, where a proposed facility uses an unproven technology, the permitting process requires additional time for government and participant experts to fully understand and evaluate the innovations, and the range of possible effects on and off the facility site. All of these location-specific issues are necessary in existing processes to fully address the type and geographic extent of potential effects on air and water quality, sensitive ecological features, human health, and community well-being. 

Some zero emission technologies may still cause serious adverse environmental effects related to their location. These technologies should remain subject to existing provisions for environmental or impact assessment. 

Existing permitting processes also give rise to further location-specific issues by using different criteria to guide the location-specific effects that must be studied compared to the location-specific effects that govern decision making. For example, considering existing environmental assessment processes, the model of environmental assessment that has prevailed in Ontario for almost 50 years under its Environmental Assessment Act has required the study of alternatives and relied on criteria to first screen out and then evaluate alternatives, but its decision-making test makes no reference to alternatives (see sections 6.1 and 9). Similarly, the federal Impact Assessment Act requires study of 19 factors as part of information gathering for the impact assessment of a designated project (s.22), but identifies only five factors to consider in the decision about whether a project is in the public interest and should therefore be approved (Impact Assessment Act 2019, s.63). Importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent Reference Decision on the Impact Assessment Act distinguishes between these two different sets of factors. The Court did not criticize the factors within information gathering (i.e., s.19), but did criticize the factors within decision making (s.63). Needless to say, use of different criteria and broad discretion for information-gathering and decision-making does not provide an efficient process or predictable results.

An innovative approach to permitting is to be focused, not inclusive. The first point of focus was addressed above: facilities that propose use of eligible technologies—those technologies that satisfy the five criteria set out above—should trigger the fast-track permitting process. Notably, several attributes of eligible technologies directly limit the type and geographic extent of adverse effects. This should enable a second point of focus – these facilities should require only a focused study of their location effects. 

Here, focus can enable streamlining. Streamlining occurs at the front end of the fast-track permitting process by focusing on eligible technologies. Additional streamlining may also occur throughout the permitting process because the eligible technologies will have limited location effects.

In particular, where a proposed facility uses an eligible technology, the location of this facility can be guided by a limited number of clear and binding criteria. These criteria should meet three demands: 

  1. Binding rules: Every criterion to be applied should be set out as a binding rule. 
  2. Yes/no answers: The rules must be yes/no rules. No discretion1.
  3. Objective application: The rules must have objective application. No subjective standards.

If a facility meets all the rules, it gets approved. Permitting approval alone may not be sufficient to start construction, but this would be desirable; regardless, meeting all permitting criteria must be necessary—universally. 

Here are examples of good and bad permitting criteria:

Good: Noise level must be lower than 40 dBA at property line.

Bad: Noise levels must avoid adverse impacts on neighbours.

The number of required criteria should also be limited. Based on the location issues eliminated or narrowed by the attributes of eligible technologies, it should be possible to simplify the number of required permitting criteria to address three core questions: 

  1. Community impact: Does the facility have the support of local government? 
  2. On-site impacts: Does the facility avoid harm to key ecological features? 
  3. Off-site impacts: Does the facility avoid adverse impact on nearby uncompensated residents? 

1. Community impact: Does the facility have the support of local government?

Current permitting regimes for new energy facilities assign a lead role to federal or provincial approvals. The framework outlined in this paper for a new fast-track approach to projects does not propose to amend existing permitting regimes. These would remain in place for clean energy projects that do not meet the fast-track criteria. 

For proposed facilities to be subject to fast-track approval, however, local municipal and Indigenous governments would play crucial roles. In particular, local governments will need to champion clean energy facilities. 

The need for new clean electricity facilities applies to virtually every community across Canada. This paper recommends that fast-track permitting focus on communities where there is local government support. Recent experience shows that new facilities that lack local government support give rise to long-term problems, including public backlash and litigation (Cleland et al. 2016). Stated bluntly, Canada will not meet the net zero challenge where, for example, approvals create or foment a rural-urban divide or violate Indigenous treaty and inherent rights. Empowering and resourcing supportive local and Indigenous governments to meet the net zero challenge is ultimately the best remedy for softening or sidestepping local resistance.

Basic support from municipal and Indigenous governments not only presents the greatest opportunity for long-term clean electricity benefits, it present similar long-term benefits for local democracy and promotion of Indigenous rights.

For many municipal governments, the powers and processes to approve new facilities are generally well-established in municipal laws. Here, the reforms to provide fast-track permitting may not be significant, but there must be clear attention paid to achieving local support—locality by locality. Each local government may require different reforms to attract and maintain support.

Indigenous governments may in some cases have well-established laws and procedures to support and provide fast-track permitting; however, many such governments may not have established laws or permitting processes. Respect for Indigenous traditions and rights is an essential starting point for any of the permitting reforms proposed in this paper. There may also be some benefit to communities and Indigenous organizations getting together and strategizing about sharing and building upon best practices that align with community and cultural values. 

The scale of what is required means that many if not most local governments engaged in this net zero challenge will be very active, processing multiple applications year after year. This will require new dedicated staffing and expertise to apply the fast-tracking criteria consistently across the local territory.

Supportive local governments will also require additional resources to set and administer the appropriate array of (a) incentives to maximize direct employment in construction and maintenance and indirect spinoff employment, and (b) compensation to affected but non-participating landowners through, for example, discounts in electricity rates and/or property taxes. Within every community, there will be overall benefit if these aspects of approval are standardized, not individually negotiated. Otherwise, there are likely to be bottlenecks at the approvals process. Every facility proponent will hold up approval processes to seek the best deal for their facility. Among different local authorities, there should be some authority to vary some measures, but there should be care taken to ensure that any variance is applied consistently. 

The importance of community engagement cannot be overstated, but facilities that meet the fast-track criteria outlined here should be able to earn community support. The use of the right technology should allow all members of a community to accept that the new facility involves no serious adverse effects on the environment or human health. The use of clear and binding permitting criteria should allow a community to understand the limited impacts the facility will entail. Where the local government also provides clear terms for local benefits to support community acceptance, facilities that meet these terms should be readily approved at the local level. 

There is a role for every jurisdiction to develop and apply its own specific criteria so long as the criteria are consistent with the general framework. For example, there may be a certain ecological feature or species of flora and fauna that merits explicit attention because of its rarity and/or cultural importance. So long as the local jurisdiction ensures that every facility is subject to the same decision-making criteria, this kind of adaptation should increase, not diminish community support. 

Taken together, the fast-track permitting reforms to address eligible technologies and facility siting should allow community engagement on a specific facility to be uncontroversial. For every facility, there must be clear notice to any affected resident and provision for notice to any interested resident. There must also be opportunity for the public to provide additional information that challenges the application of any permitting criteria. However, such challenges should be rare and easily resolved: if the additional information is relevant to applying any of the criteria, it should be used and the criteria applied anew to ensure that decision making is consistent with all criteria. 

2. On-site impacts: Does the facility avoid harm to key ecological features? 

This criterion addresses the facility site. Its purpose is to identify the ideal on-site conditions. Ideally, establishing a new zero emission facility will have no serious negative impacts on-site and only trigger a limited number of negative physical changes. 

Based on recent experience, the most important topic to consider for on-site impacts is natural heritage. In Ontario, wind farms and solar farms triggered issues with on-site endangered species (Semeniuk and Stueck 2023). Many orders of government have authority over endangered species and/or their habitat, led by different provincial and federal laws that apply according to ownership or jurisdiction over the lands where species are located (Kauffman 2023). The climate crisis is no excuse to worsen the biodiversity crisis. Canada’s natural heritage needs greater protection, not increasing harm. 

Many jurisdictions currently protect natural heritage by avoiding harm to key ecological features. The proposed fast-track criterion for this topic is to require explicit consideration and protection of natural heritage features and functions. The focus will be on key ecological features as some features and impacts have greater ecological significance than others. Thus, for example, highest priority must be given to avoiding harm to endangered species and their critical habitat. 

Ontario’s Green Energy Act reform illustrates the problem with allowing endangered species issues to be regulated separately from renewable energy facility approvals. Although Ontario sought to make its renewable energy approval a consolidated approval, it failed to consolidate endangered species issues into this approval. The Renewable Energy Approval process mandated more than one dozen reports, but none required express avoidance or even consideration of endangered species habitat. However, in decision-making, Ontario provided that statutory appeals to a tribunal would be successful if an opponent established “serious and irreversible harm to plant life, animal life or the natural environment” (Environmental Protection Act 1990, s.145.2.1). This test did not reference, but clearly encompassed endangered species issues. Thus, Ontario had a disconnect between the information required to obtain approval and the impacts that could overturn an approval. This disconnect became prominent in wind farm litigation that involved an endangered species—the Blanding’s Turtle—and its habitat (Prince Edward County Field Naturalists v. Ostrander Point GP Inc. 2015 ONCA 269). The result was a tribunal overturning a Renewable Energy Approval on appeal and, after court litigation, the Court upholding the Tribunal result. Ultimately, the Approval was remanded to the Tribunal for a further hearing where the Tribunal affirmed its initial conclusion to set aside the Approval. 

Overall, serious efforts should be undertaken by each order of government that implements expedited permitting to make clear where and how to site new facilities to avoid key natural heritage features, particularly endangered species and habitat.

Current experience also suggests that the term key ecological feature should have specific definition and application. For example, Ontario’s Greenbelt Plan (2017) identifies 12 types of key natural heritage features and 4 types of key hydrologic features: (Government of Ontario 2017). There should be provision for some variation in the types of key features. This provision would provide room to reflect provincial or local circumstances. On the other hand, there should be a core list of key features that cannot be ignored, i.e., the critical habitat of endangered species. 

Additionally, there must be regulatory checks to ensure that the information on this habitat remains current. Current experience shows a patchwork of largely unsatisfactory efforts to ensure that current natural heritage information is readily available. For its Renewable Energy Approvals under the Green Energy Act reforms, Ontario sought to address an existing patchwork of inconsistent information by requiring that facility proponents carry out site-specific investigations to identify existing information and supplement this information as required. This approach is expensive and time-consuming. It would be preferable for local authorities to have the resources to gather most of the required information and then map and make available such information in electronic form. This preferred approach will likely require financial and/or technical support from federal or provincial governments to local governments to ensure that all participating orders of government have the most current information relevant to assessing key ecological features. 

3. Off-site impacts: Does the facility avoid adverse impact on nearby uncompensated residents?

This criterion would not apply to every proposed facility. The ideal facility location will have no residents within the zone of off-site impacts or, alternatively, no residents within the zone of off-site impacts who do not support the facility. Indeed, many or most of the technologies suitable for fast-tracking produce little to no off-site impacts.

Thus, this criterion would apply only where there are residents within the zone of off-site impacts for a proposed facility and the impacted residents do not support the facility.

Where it does apply, this third criterion has three required components. These arise from recent experience with clean energy facilities. This experience highlights the importance of addressing social impacts. Problems with long-term community support arise where neighbours have impacts imposed on them without any identified benefit. This problem was particularly apparent regarding wind farms where a patchwork of turbine locations created a patchwork of participating and non-participating landowners. In this context, a participating landowner was a landowner that received some economic benefit from the facility and thus supported it—usually, the economic benefit arose from having a component of a proposed facility on that landowner’s land. This patchwork created neighbourhood conflict as the non-participating landowners believed they were burdened with one or more impacts (e.g., noise, visual) without any benefit (Comeau et al. 2022). 

The first required component of this criterion is to define an impact zone around a facility or a specific component of a facility (e.g., a wind turbine). The size of the zone will vary according to the technology involved. Different sizes of wind turbine, for example, will have different zones of impact. Based on existing experience, it is essential to provide clear guidance on this topic for all permitting decisions. The requirements that govern applicable technologies should mean that impact zones can be defined for each relevant typeof technology and scale of facility. 

The second required component is to address negative impacts according to their intensity. For example, it should be possible to require that no facility will produce noise at the property line for any residential neighbour that is greater than 40 dBA or existing levels. The basis for this precise technical standard of a 40dBA limit is an international World Health Organization standard for night-time noise.

Once there is information on the applicable zone of impact and the intensity of the impact, it should also be straightforward to determine whether the third component applies to a given facility. Where compensation for adverse impacts is warranted, this will involve a government—any order of government—or a proponent providing some monetary benefit to any landowner within the zone of impact who is not leasing land or otherwise benefiting from the facility. 

These community benefits can be shared in multiple ways. One way is for local municipal governments to reduce assessed local property taxes or utility bill rebates for a non-participating but affected landowner (Comeau et al., p. 36). Recent regulatory reforms in New York State and California, for example, require all new renewable energy facilities to provide a benefit package for the host community of the facility, which can include utility bill credits (Arnold and Beck 2023). A second way is the availability of a renewable energy credit for sale to local residents only (Comeau et al., p. 20). A third is to distribute a portion of annual revenues to the local community for re-investment (Comeau et al., p.29). Here again, reforms in New York State and California show how Canadian jurisdictions can include these types of provisions within community benefit packages.

Whatever the details of these components, this third criterion on off-site impacts must adhere to the three tests for criteria set out above, namely a binding rule, in yes/no terms, that has objective application. 

Appendix A provides examples of proposed permitting criteria.

Timelines 

To reach Canada’s net zero goal by 2020, each clean energy facility that meets the fast-track criteria should have an expedited timeline for permitting and getting the facility constructed and operating. 

Coupling a commitment to new energy output with an expedited timeline is not new. Within established permitting processes, such as federal and provincial environmental assessments, there is a well-recognized trade-off between the size of a facility and the time required for approvals: the larger the facility, the longer the timeline. Unfortunately, despite best efforts, the existence of a regulatory timeline does not guarantee a predictable date of facility operation. Canada has several on-going examples of major energy generation projects exceeding their predicted timelines significantly—by factors, not percentages. For example, the actual timelines of major hydroelectric dam projects in British Columbia (Site C) and Labrador (Lower Churchill) were more than double the predicted time frame (BC Hydro 2023). Furthermore, time is money: these timeframe exceedances have also resulted in major budget overruns (CBC News 2022). These examples point to the importance of limiting the types of technologies and scales of facility that are suitable for rapid permitting. 

It may also be appropriate to include time limits for each crucial step in facility development. Every month counts. Examples of crucial steps include: (1) the time from initial notice of interest from a proponent to filing of a complete application; (2) the time for all regulators to review and decide whether or not to approve the application; (3) the time from facility approval to the commencement of facility construction; (4) the time required to complete all facility construction; (5) the time from the completion of construction to facility operation; and (6) the time from facility approval to grid connection.

There are many means to make a time limit enforceable. They can be made enforceable by governments against proponents and also by proponents against governments and third-party suppliers and contractors. For example, in Ontario, overall timelines were set out under the feed-in-tariff terms and conditions (see, for example, Ontario’s Feed-In-Tariff FIT 2.0 released in August 2012). These set out a required date for commencement of operations that was binding absent a specific waiver agreement. Similarly, the reforms in New York State now establish statutory time limits for issuing building permits, ranging from a maximum of six months for projects located on pre-approved brownfield sites to one year for all other projects (Arnold and Beck 2023).

Who can do what to implement the proposed reforms 

Canada’s Constitution and legal framework gives rise to five orders of government authority with jurisdiction to pass laws governing facility permitting: federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, and Indigenous. When looking at what each authority can do to achieve net zero emissions, there are two sources of legal authority: (1) existing laws, and (2) legal and constitutional powers to amend existing laws or pass new laws. 

Appendix C examines each of these five orders of government authority to assess their jurisdiction and opportunity to implement reforms to permit new clean energy facilities. It concludes that all orders of government—federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and Indigenous—could implement all aspects of expedited facility approvals. 

Building on this legal conclusion that all orders of government could implement all aspects of the fast-track permitting proposed in this paper, this paper advances two policy recommendations. 

First, this paper recommends that the most locally rooted authorities—municipal and Indigenous—lead project decisions for fast-track approvals. 

Second, this paper recommends that the Federal Government and the provinces work with other orders of government to develop a common framework to implement fast track approvals. This common framework should specify eligible technologies, permitting criteria, qualifications for local reviewers, and timelines. Appendix B describes this common framework. 

Imagining the future—permitting reforms in action 

To assist understanding, this paper provides two hypothetical examples of how proponents and local governments could act to advance clean energy facilities if the proposed reforms were implemented. 

Example 1: Solar farm in rural municipality

Saul R. Plexis owns a 100-hectare parcel of farmland in rural Ontario and is interested in using some of that land to generate electricity as a new income stream. Saul was aware that his local municipality had taken an active role in promoting solar farms. His town council did so to seek the annual rate subsidy available to its local utility for all ratepayers, gain new tax revenues from constructing and operating the new facility, and obtain the complete rebate available to local governments who had developed a long-term energy plan setting out annual targets for constructing new facilities by 2035 and 2050. 

Using a model program developed by the province, municipal staff had loaded their existing GPS information on a new website and quickly retained a local consultant to address a small number of gaps in the local data. On completion, the website enabled any interested landowner to determine immediately if their land was eligible for consideration as a future solar farm of between 1 and 15 megawatts. This determination would involve review of the three criteria on facility location and consideration of where the site fits under the local utility’s connection capacity across the municipality, as set out in the municipality’s long-term energy plan.

Saul went on the municipal website and quickly determined that a 30-hectare parcel on his lands met the three permitting criteria and was within the 5-year capacity of the energy plan for utility connection. He then went onto the municipal register to place his lands in the first tier of the public queue for immediate consideration by the municipality. As a first-tier site, the municipality and local utility would act in the next 30 days to visit his site to verify permitting criteria and connection capacity, commission a survey, and move it up to the second tier in the municipal register—which would be visible on public-facing elements of the municipal site and trigger municipal notice to all property owners abutting Saul’s site or within 120 metres along road access. The utility would also send to Saul a feed-in-tariff contract and construction agreement and schedule. As soon as Saul completed these contracts, his site would be listed on the third and final tier in the municipal register. This would complete the planning phase of the facility. The municipal register also contained further listings to identify completion of construction and utility connection. Once the facility was built and operating, the municipality would update its energy plan on its annual and long-term targets. 

Example 2: Wind farm on Reserve Lands

A First Nation in a remote area of western Canada relies on diesel generators for its electricity. Recently, seeking energy independence from costly diesel fuel imports, the Council of this First Nation completed the steps to allow it to pass laws, lease lands and enter contracts under the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land ManagementAct redressing the constraints of the Indian Act. 

The Band Council identified that its current and future energy needs could be met by a two-megawatt, zero-emission electricity generating facility. Recognizing that the Reserve includes highlands of barren Canadian Shield, the Band Council created a new staff position to explore wind energy options. Band staff then retained consultants to take wind measurements and assess the area’s wind energy potential. This work identified that the area had potential to generate up to 100 megawatts of wind energy. This led Band staff to go to the Canadian Energy Regulator website to identify potential energy options. The site informed the Band about the option to develop a long-term energy plan setting out annual targets for constructing new facilities and connecting to the electricity grid. 

To develop an energy plan for new generation facilities, Band staff used a model program developed by the province with Indigenous government input. Band staff trained on use of GPS technology downloaded available digital mapping information to apply the newly established Canada-wide permitting criteria to identify the best possible turbine locations and configurations. Band staff identified gaps in the existing information, but took advantage of the new Canadian Energy Regulator program to fund the required GPS work. Staff retained a team of Band members who had obtained the required training. Band staff also created a new dedicated web site so that all members of the First Nation could access existing information and add their local and traditional knowledge. Staff quickly determined that at least three blocks of Reserve lands met the three permitting criteria. Under its new program, the Canadian Energy Regulator provided guidance on passing a land law that would incorporate the permitting criteria into a Band Council approval process that included community-wide consultation. Once Band Council approved its land law and confirmed that Band staff had completed the initial steps of required consultation, Band Council authorized staff to go onto the Canadian Energy Regulator register to place all three blocks in the first tier of the queue for immediate consideration by this Regulator. 

To address connection issues required for the long-term energy plan, Band staff went to the Canadian Energy Regulator web site to obtain required information on the proximity of each site to the nearest transmission line. Using GPS tools and digital mapping, Band staff identified that their Reserve was more than 100 kilometres from the nearest transmission line. Plugging this information into the Canadian Energy Regulator website, Band staff saw that the Canadian Energy Regulator made provision to approve new transmission lines to remote communities in two circumstances—where the energy generated could produce energy for the grid greater than 10 megawatts per 20 kilometre distance or where a new line might connect more than one remote community that was on diesel fuel. The Band Council liked both options and reached out to two other remote communities to identify possible interest in making a joint application to the Canadian Energy Regulator.

For each first-tier site in a remote Indigenous community that completed the transmission line information, the Canadian Energy Regulator would act in the next 30 days to visit each site to verify permitting criteria, commission a survey, and move each verified block up to the second tier in its register—which would be visible on public-facing elements of the federal website and trigger public notice. The Canadian Energy Regulator also required that the Band confirm issuance of community notice to all residents of the Reserve. 

The next step required the Canadian Energy Regulator to work with the Band and any other identified community to address a transmission line connection plan including the proposed location of the on-Reserve portion of the transmission line and the proposed location of the off-Reserve portion of the line. Within 60 days of Band sites obtaining second-tier status, the Canadian Energy Regulator completed a transmission line plan. 

By the terms of the Regulator’s mandate, the completion of a transmission plan required further actions by the Band Council. First, the Band Council confirmed that its staff had completed required community consultation on the transmission line plan. Next, the Band Council passed a second Land Law that acknowledged the completion of its long-term energy plan and accepted the location and timing details of the Canadian Energy Regulator transmission line plan. This Land Law approved the plan to connect the community to the grid within two years for the first site for 10 megawatts and committed the Band to support future development of the other two sites that would add 40 megawatts to the grid within five years. 

Conclusions 

This scoping paper sets out a framework to reform Canada’s permitting processes by establishing a two-track framework including a new fast track permitting process to provide expedited approval for new clean energy facilities. There is opportunity for participation by all Canadian jurisdictions—federal, Indigenous, provincial, territorial, and municipal—and all residents of local communities, however urban or remote. 

The scale of this needed build-out has no precedent. This need is long-term—from now to 2050. Short-term reforms will not be sufficient. Reforms must be sustainable financially and able to be implemented in communities across Canada.

Appendix A: Applying the proposed permitting criteria

1. Electricity generation facilities

Applying the three location criteria set out in the Paper:

Support by the local government. The basic standard may be stated as follows:

  • Facility location is supported by the Council of the local municipal or Indigenous government.

Avoid harm to key natural heritage features. The basic standard may be stated as follows:

  • Facility will avoid key natural heritage features. 

Provide no uncompensated impact on nearby residences. The basic standard will need to include several components, as set out in the following:

  • Facility will provide no uncompensated impact on nearby residents by
    • Clearly identifying the designated zone of impact of the facility;
    • Providing monetary benefit (tax rebate, rate rebate) to all non-participating property owners within the designated zone of impact; and
    • Ensuring that no existing residence is subject to noise emissions above background levels or recognized standard. 

2. Electricity transmission lines

The permitting criteria that apply to electricity transmission should be very similar to the general criteria. Two of three permitting criteria are relevant:

  • Facility will avoid key natural heritage features. 
  • Facility will provide no uncompensated impact on nearby residences.

The third criterion, local council support, can be applicable where the transmission line is entirely within the boundary of a local municipality or the lands of a single Indigenous government; however, this situation seems unlikely for most transmission lines that cross provincial boundaries. The long-term nature of what is required means that precedents should move beyond constitutional authority to proceed unilaterally and instead make every effort to obtain the support of local governments. 

Regarding the situation of multiple local governments—which seems likely in the case of transmission lines—it may better promote cooperation to relate the scale of benefits to the scale of local impact. As such, a local municipal or Indigenous government affected by 50 kilometres of proposed facility gets greater recognition than a local government affected by 2 kilometres. Also, the benefits identified above as part of obtaining local support appear relevant here—e.g., employment (construction, maintenance, spin-off) and financial (electricity rates, taxes).

Proposed criterion:

  • Transmission line will provide no uncompensated impact on affected local governments.

3. Electricity storage facilities

There are now viable electricity storage technologies, and the number of suitable storage technologies is clearly going to increase. 

Consistent with the overall clean energy transition, there needs to be a focused effort to ensure that any electricity storage facility meets the requirements for available technologies. 

For such facilities, the three criteria set out in the paper for energy generation facilities should be applicable: 

Support by the local government. The basic standard may be stated as follows:

  • Facility location is supported by the Council of the local government.

Avoid harm to key natural heritage features. The basic standard may be stated as follows:

  • Facility will avoid key natural heritage features. 

Provide no uncompensated impact on nearby residences. Depending on the technology, it seems likely that future zero emission storage facilities will have zero or only a minimal number of off-site effects and zero or small zones of off-site impact. This may allow easy application of this third criterion: 

  • Facility will provide overall benefit, not negative/adverse impact, on nearby residents by
    • Clearly identifying the designated zone of impact of the facility;
    • Providing monetary benefit (tax rebate, rate rebate) to all non-participating property owners within the designated zone of impact; and
    • Ensuring that no existing residence is subject to noise emissions above background levels or recognized standard.

Appendix B: Role of each jurisdiction to implement the fast-track approvals regime

1. Federal government role

(1) Federal government implements the new Clean Electricity System Act, having six components:

  1. Part 1 setting out the federal Program to meet Canada’s zero-emission electricity targets, including
    1. Requirements for the Minister of Environment and Climate Change to prepare for submission to Parliament (a) a science-based summary of current climate crisis threats to rights protected under Canada’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (b) a summary of Canada’s current international commitments to address the climate crisis and measurable indicators of Canada’s progress in meeting these commitments, and (c) Canada’s progress in meeting its zero-emission electricity generation commitments; 
    2. Requirement that the Parliamentary Budget Office prepare a summary of the requirement for federal funding, from the present to the year 2050, and 
    3. Minimum national standards for Feed-In Tariff contracts, Zero Emission Approvals, and Connecting Transmission Line Approvals.
  1. Part 2 containing amendments to Part 4 of the Canadian Energy Regulator Act to give the Canadian Energy Regulator exclusive authority over 

(A) (i) Class 1 transmission lines connecting one or more provinces, and

(ii) Class 2 transmission lines connecting transmission lines connecting zero emissions facilities on federal lands to existing transmission systems; and 

(B) administration of a new Federal Connecting Transmission Line Approval (CTLA) regime that 

(i) distinguishes between two classes of lines on the basis of voltage, including for each class (a) permitting criteria, (b) information required to address permitting criteria, and (c) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria; and 

(ii) declares all CTLA Class 1 transmission lines to be works for the general advantage of Canada; and

(iii) authorizes the implementation of tolls and tariffs for all electricity transmission lines subject to the CTLA.

  1. Part 3 adding a new Part 4.1 to the Canadian Energy Regulator Act to address Zero Emission Electricity Generation Facilities that covers wind and solar facilities and other designated facilities, including 

(A) provision for the Canadian Energy Regulator to administer a new Federal Zero Emission Approval regime, distinguishing between two classes of facility on the basis of required hectares, including for each class (a) permitting criteria, (b) information required to address permitting criteria, and (c) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria; and 

(B) a declaration that all facilities subject to a Zero Emission Approval are works for the general advantage of Canada. 

  1. Part 4 adding a new Part 4.2 to the Canadian Energy Regulator Act to: 

(A) authorize the Canadian Energy Regulator to recognize regimes of other jurisdictions to address one of more requirements of Parts 4 and 4.1 of the Canadian Energy Regulator Act

(B) authorize the Canadian Energy Regulator to recognize plans of other jurisdictions that address that jurisdiction’s implementation of zero emission targets; 

(C) require that the Canadian Energy Regulator prepare an annual report of the effectiveness of the reforms provided by this new regime to provide the required facilities to address the climate crisis by (i) 2035, and (ii) 2050; and 

(D) provide the Canadian Energy Regulator with powers to gather information and redress any shortcomings with providing needed facilities, including shortcomings by other jurisdictions to implement their 5-year plans.

  1. Part 5 amending the federal Impact Assessment Act to exempt from this Act any facility that is subject to the Canadian Energy Regulator Act, Parts 4 or 4.1. 
  1. Part 6 amending the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management Act or the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management to authorize participating First Nations to pass Land Laws addressing the location and approval of new zero emission electricity generation facilities and on-Reserve transmission and distribution lines for all Reserve needs. 

(2) Consultation with Indigenous governments on all relevant aspects of the new Act, particularly regarding the means to facilitate the participation of Indigenous Peoples and future approval of zero emission electricity generation facilities on Indigenous lands and the connection of remote communities to the electricity grid. 

(3) Consultation with all interested jurisdictions in all relevant aspects of the new Act, particularly regarding the components of minimum national standards for Feed-In Tariff contracts, Zero Emission Approvals, and Connecting Transmission Line Approvals.

2. Indigenous government role

(1) Indigenous Government Council passes a new Land Law pursuant to the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management Act to implement the First Nation Zero Emission Response to the climate crisis, having three components:

  1. Part 1 to approve Zero Emission Electricity Generation Facilities to include wind and solar facilities and other designated facilities, including for each class of facility 

(a) permitting criteria, 

(b) information required to address permitting criteria, and 

(c) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria.

  1. Part 2 to approve new transmission and distribution lines on the Reserve, including for both types of line

(a) permitting criteria, 

(b) information required to address permitting criteria, and 

(c) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria.

  1. Part 3 to require staff to prepare for submission to Council an annual summary of progress under the Land Law to meeting First Nation targets for zero-emission facilities on the Reserve.

3. Provincial government role

(1) Province implements a new Provincial Zero Emissions Electricity System Act, having five components:

  1. Part 1 to provide for the provincial electricity regulator or utility to (a) administer a provincial feed-in-tariff contract for all new wind and solar energy facilities located in the province, and (b) prepare a summary of requirements and options for provincial and/or utility funding, from the present to the year 2050.
  1. Part 2 to require the appropriate Minister to administer a new Provincial Zero Emission Approval regime, distinguishing between two classes of facility on the basis of required hectares, including for each class (i) permitting criteria, (ii) information required to address permitting criteria, and (iii) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria. 
  1. Part 3 to amend the existing Municipal Act or equivalent legislation to enable municipal governments to establish local approvals for new zero emission facilities.
  1. Part 4 to amend the existing provincial laws for electricity subsidies and/or utility rate-setting to make provision for a new program for zero emission electricity generation facilities and/or transmission lines related to bringing net zero facilities into the electricity grid.
  1. Part 5 to require the appropriate Minister to prepare for annual submission to the Legislature a detailed summary of the province’s progress in meeting the Zero Emission Targets for that province.

(2) Consultation with Indigenous and municipal governments on all relevant aspects of the new Act, particularly the distribution of benefits to affected landowners. 

4. Municipal government role

  1. Municipal Council passes new Bylaw to Implement the Municipal Zero Emission Response to the climate crisis, having two components:
  1. Part 1 to approve Zero Emission Electricity Generation Facilities that covers wind and solar facilities and other designated facilities, including for each class of facility 

(a) permitting criteria, 

(b) information required to address permitting criteria, and 

(c) a test for approval based on meeting permitting criteria.

  1. Part 2 to require staff to prepare for submission to Council an annual summary of progress under the Bylaw to meeting municipal targets for zero-emission facilities in the municipality.

Appendix C: Legal authority to carry out fast-track permitting across Canada

Canada’s federal Constitution divides the power to pass laws between the federal and provincial governments (Constitution Act 1867). These powers govern every law passed by Parliament and provincial legislatures, although land claim agreements rely on a more complex constitutional structure involving Parliament and Indigenous Peoples.

These powers also govern the laws passed by all local governments, such as the laws and by-laws passed by elected territorial, municipal, and band councils. 

This framework provides the starting point to examine the law-making powers that have the potential to provide fast track permitting. This Appendix focuses upon the constitutional authority of each order of government to expand existing laws or pass new laws that are within these powers. It pays particular attention to existing constitutional powers that are currently unappreciated or underused, such that they may authorize expanded laws or new laws required to meet net zero.

It then examines existing laws for their potential authority to implement reforms required to achieve net zero emissions. Across all orders of government—federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and Indigenous—there are examples of existing laws that provide some authority to advance the building of clean energy facilities. Nationally, for example, the 2019 Impact Assessment Act provides authority to authorize the location and construction of clean energy facilities on federal lands (Impact Assessment Act ss.82, 88), and major wind farms on Canada’s marine lands offshore (see Physical Activities Regulations, SOR/2019-285, and its Schedule at sections 44 and 45). 

Existing laws often also contain powers for cabinets and ministers to pass regulations relevant to achieving net zero emissions. Across Canada, there are many examples of existing provincial laws and regulations that support the location and construction of clean electricity generation, transmission, distribution, and storage facilities.

Nevertheless, existing laws do not establish the scope of legal jurisdiction to implement legal reforms such as those required to achieve net zero emissions. It is also essential to examine Canada’s constitutional framework. 

To address this challenge, this Appendix concludes that all orders of government could implement all key aspects of fast-track approvals for clean energy facilities. 

1. Federal powers to act—including underused, unappreciated federal powers

Parliament has multiple constitutional powers relevant to expediting approval of clean energy facilities, including: (1) federal lands, (2) federal spending, (3) interprovincial works and undertakings, (4) declared works for the general advantage of Canada, (5) “Lands reserved for Indians,” (6) peace, order and good government, (7) trade and commerce, (8) fisheries, and (9) interprovincial or international effects.

These different constitutional powers apply to different aspects of the clean energy challenge. For example, the power over federal lands is particularly relevant to determining where clean electricity generation facilities could be located, while the power over interprovincial works and undertakings is particularly relevant to expanding inter-provincial electricity transmission facilities, and the power to declare works for the general advantage of Canada is particularly relevant to connecting remote areas to the electricity grid.

(i) Federal power to approve and regulate projects on federal lands

Parliament has exclusive authority to pass legislation governing the use of federal Crown land. Federal Crown land includes ports, airports, national parks, ports, Indian reserves, lands in northern Canada (i.e., outside any province), and lands on Canada’s continental shelf in three oceans (Arctic, Atlantic and Pacific). 

Federal Crown lands are subject to at least two laws of general application relevant to permitting clean energy facilities. The federal Species at Risk Act applies to any facility on federal lands that may affect endangered species, the residences of individual species, or the species’ critical habitat (Species at Risk Act (SARA), sections 73). The Act has application beyond federal lands through, for example, agreements and permits under other federal acts (sections 74-77) and project reviews (section 79). The Impact Assessment Act applies broadly to any project proposed on federal lands (Impact Assessment Act ss.81-91). This Act also provides options to exempt physical activities on federal lands from its requirements, including projects on Indian reserves and subject to land claims.

This power to regulate federal property provides a range of options for permitting new clean energy facilities, including the marine offshore, federal lands assigned to Indigenous Peoples, airports, and defence bases. 

(ii) Federal power to spend money and provide tax breaks to expedite approval and operation of clean energy facilities

The federal power to spend money has no legal limits. However, the spending power is now subject to political limits where the federal government seeks to spend money in matters managed by the provinces, such as health care and education.

The federal spending power provides a range of options and incentives to support local decision-making—such as employment and financial benefits. Employment benefits can include training and hiring incentives, while financial benefits can include tax incentives, connection subsidies, and electricity rate reductions (where they are federally regulated). The spending power may also support the financing of required distribution lines to remote communities.

(iii) Federal power to regulate interprovincial works and undertakings and declare local works to be for the general advantage of Canada

Canada regulates interprovincial works and undertakings in the energy sector through the Canadian Energy Regulator Act (CERA) and the Impact Assessment Act

This constitutional power is underused by existing laws. In particular, the CERA sets out a very different and much broader approach to regulating oil and gas pipelines in comparison to electricity transmission lines. The federal regulation of interprovincial oil and gas pipelines is broad and exclusive, and includes the setting of tariffs. By contrast, the federal regulation of interprovincial transmission lines is narrow, subject to provincial regulation, and does not include tariffs. There is no constitutional basis for the different breadth. 

Achieving net zero goals is likely to require the establishment of new interprovincial electricity transmission lines. As such, the Canadian Energy Regulator Act could be amended to make the federal regime for transmission lines similar to the longstanding federal regime for pipelines (i.e., a regime that facilitates the building and financing of new interprovincial electricity transmission lines). 

Similarly, though regulating different energy markets, the Canadian Energy Regulator has provided decades of experience with national regulation of the long-term supply of oil and gas across Canada and demonstrated that there is capacity for a Canadian regulator to play a significant role in expediting and sustaining new energy facilities across Canada. Thus, the Canadian Energy Regulator Act is a potential legislative source for all federal aspects of the energy permitting reforms, including national standards for generation, transmission, distribution, and storage.

A further constitutional power that has existed since Confederation is the federal power to declare a specific work or class of a work that is, factually, local or provincial to be for the general advantage of Canada (Constitution Act 1867). This power exists today and applies to works such as grain elevators and silos under the Canada Grain Act and facilities using nuclear energy under the Nuclear Safety and Control Act. 

The purpose of this power is to specify that one or many “local” works is declared to be “federal.” Such a declaration has two major implications. First, it means that the specified works are removed from their legal status as local works. This changes the laws applicable to such works from principally being local laws to expressly engage federal laws applicable to federal works. Second, by virtue of having federal legal status, the declared works that are subject to federal regulation will be able to rely on federal paramountcy in the event of conflict with any provincial or local laws. 

Importantly, a federal s.92(10(c) declaration applies to the works, but provides no blanket exemption from local regulation, particularly local regulation of adverse effects from the works. A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada has never endorsed the federal “enclave” theory whereby federal lands or works are subject to complete exemption from local control (R. v. Francis 1988). 

Though sometimes controversial, this declaratory power is relevant to the clean energy challenge. It could allow the federal government to directly enable timely construction of a particularly important new facility—energy generation, transmission, distribution, or storage. One example could be a new transmission line to connect new, small-scale, clean electricity generation facilities in remote areas to the existing electricity grid. 

Use of this declaratory power could be carried out by adding one or more new provisions to the Canadian Energy Regulator Act.

(iv) Federal power to regulate interprovincial and international trade and commerce

The federal government has power to regulate national and international trade and commerce. This power is subject to longstanding limits, but it may be possible to rely on this federal power to set national standards to govern the suitable technologies and permitting criteria for clean energy facilities. 

The Canadian Energy Regulator Act is a potential legislative source for all federal aspects of the energy permitting reforms, including the setting of national standards for all required facilities—generation, transmission, distribution, and storage.

Importantly, there are longstanding examples of Canada-wide standards established cooperatively with provincial governments. A cooperative way to proceed with Canada’s net zero targets seems both possible and preferable.

(v) Federal power to regulate Indigenous reserve lands 

The Constitution provides Indigenous governments with law-making powers under unique Land Claim Agreements and the power to enact laws respecting “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” (Constitution Act 1867). 

This Appendix addresses this topic more fully under Section 2, Indigenous Powers to Act. 

(v) Federal power to pass laws for peace, order and good government 

The federal government’s power to pass laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada is a collection of federal powers to address emergencies, residual matters not assigned to either senior order of government, and matters of national concern. Different tests apply to each type of power. 

The most recent example of a federal law relying on the national concern power arose in relation to federal pricing for greenhouse gas emissions. In 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada upheld the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2021 under this power (References re Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act 2021 SCC 11). To qualify, (1) the matter must be of sufficient concern to the country as a whole to warrant consideration as a national concern; (2) the matter must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility; and (3) the proposed impact on provincial jurisdiction must be reconcilable with the division of powers.

The current test to invoke this power for any future matter has three parts. First, the federal government must establish that the matter is of sufficient concern to the country as a whole to be a matter of national concern. Second, the matter must have a singleness, distinctiveness and indivisibility from other matters. Third, the matter must have a scale of impact on provincial jurisdiction that is reconcilable with the division of powers. Overall, the purpose of the national concern test is to identify matters which, by their nature, transcend the provinces.

Given the scale of legal controversy over the use of this power respecting the federal Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, it does not seem advisable at this time to rely on this power to address the zero-emission electricity challenge.

(vi) Federal power to regulate fisheries, fish, and fish habitat

The federal power over fisheries is broad, including powers to conserve fish and fish habitat, and most recently, aquatic endangered species in Canada’s internal or marine waters. These powers are relevant to permitting new clean energy facilities as they can prohibit or delay construction wherever they apply. It is therefore prudent to locate new clean energy facilities in places that avoid fisheries issues. 

(vii) Federal power to regulate interprovincial and international effects 

The federal power to address interprovincial and international effects is not stated in the Constitution Act, 1867, but arises through multiple cases, led by the 1976 Supreme Court of Canada case of Interprovincial Co-operatives v. The Queen [1976] 1 SCR 477. The majority of the Court in this case concluded that the matter of regulating “interprovincial effects”—in this case, effects of water pollution—was within exclusive federal authority through the Constitution’s assignment to it of residual power over matters not specifically allocated to either federal or provincial authority. This federal power may also regulate international effects, such as the protection of migratory birds. The federal Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994 has broad application to migratory birds. To date, this Act prohibits harm to migratory birds and their nests; however, this Act does not regulate the habitat of migratory birds. 

Both aspects of this federal power are relevant to permitting clean energy facilities. It is prudent to address the location of clean energy facilities to avoid locations near any interprovincial or international border. It is also prudent to locate clean energy facilities in places that avoid or minimize effects on migratory birds or their nests. 

2. Indigenous powers to act 

Among Canada’s hundreds of Indigenous governments, many are already pursuing the development of zero-emission electricity generation on their lands. Furthermore, given the scale of the net zero challenge, there is obvious national benefit to supporting interested Indigenous governments to site new clean energy facilities on their lands. 

For most Indigenous lands, federal laws are broadly applicable as Canadian federalism imposes some constraints on the applicability of provincial or municipal laws to Indigenous Reserve lands (Surrey v. Peace Arch Enterprises Ltd. (1970), 74 WWR (ns) 380 (BCCA). 

There are now many categories of lands held by Indigenous governments. There are of course lands set out in modern land claims agreements and ratified in federal laws. Under these laws, Indigenous governments have a large if not lead role over many facilities on their lands. Indigenous lands set out in a land claims agreement would be well-suited to reforms that implement fast track permitting; however, some of these lands are extremely remote and may thereby be isolated for the near term until there is transmission line access.

By statute, the federal government provides Indigenous governments with two Canada-wide sources of legal authority to pass laws governing federal Indigenous Reserves. Under the Indian Act, band councils have narrow authority to pass laws governing the use of reserve lands, and no authority to pass laws on or even agree to lease reserve lands. Thus, absent reform of the Act, this regime seems an unlikely source of authority for Indigenous governments to approve new clean energy facilities on reserve lands, though it may be possible to advance aspects of this reform through new regulations under this Act.

The federal regime best positioned to address fast track permitting is the Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management Act, S.C. 2022, c.19, s.121 (the “Framework Agreement Act“). It applies to any First Nation government on a Reserve anywhere in Canada that reaches agreement with the federal government to meet this Act’s required terms. This Act currently applies to several dozen First Nation governments in close proximity to existing electricity grids. Further, this Act provides First Nation governments with the independent power to pass laws, make decisions, and implement energy facilities on their lands. These law-making powers for First Nation governments contrast fundamentally with the Indian Act whereby all band leases require federal approval. 

As set out in Box 2 below, an earlier version of the Framework Agreement Act authorized the Henvey Inlet First Nation to pass laws to govern Ontario’s largest wind farm—a 300 megawatt wind farm on Henvey Inlet First Nation Reserve lands on the shore of Georgian Bay north of Parry Sound. 

This power in the Framework Agreement Act is relevant to applying the clean energy permitting reforms to lands reserved for Indigenous peoples across Canada. The fast track permitting reform should thus engage forthwith those Indigenous governments that have independent law-making and contractual powers through the Framework Agreement Act. On the other hand, there should be regulatory reforms to exempt from the new federal Impact Assessment Act any small-scale energy generation facility governed by laws established by a First Nation under the Framework Agreement Act.

Box 2: Henvey Inlet First Nation Wind Farm
Under Ontario’s Green Energy Act reforms described above, the Henvey Inlet First Nation obtained a Feed-In-Tariff contract to establish Ontario’s largest wind farm on a remote Reserve that required a significant transmission line to connect to the Ontario electricity grid. Initially, the First Nation Council sought to establish the wind farm using a lease under the Indian Act; however, after progress was slow in this approach, Council elected to follow the lead of dozens of other First Nations across Canada and sign the Framework Agreement to trigger the application of the First Nations Lands Management Act, S.C. 1999, c.24. Following the process set out under this Act, the First Nation Council obtained law-making powers over environmental assessment, protection and management on its Reserve lands. 
The Band Council then passed a number of laws to address its legal needs. These laws included:An Environmental Assessment and Permitting Land Law; An Environmental Protection Land Law; and An Environmental Permit Land Law.

On-site, further approval was required to address the federal Species at Risk Act, as SARA applies to federal lands such as First Nation Reserves. 

Off-site, further approvals were required to provide the required transmission line connection to Ontario’s electricity grid. The extensive 104 kilometre distance required for this connection crosses the Reserve lands of the Magnetawan and Shawinaga First Nations. Both of these First Nation Reserves also relied on the 1999 First Nations Land Management Act to pass laws regulating the transmission line. Ultimately, the Project was constructed and became operational in 2019.  

Under these new federal regimes, Indigenous governments may have the lead role over many if not all facilites on their lands. 

Notably, the present paper focuses on small facilities, not the major project enacted by the Henvey Inlet First Nation. However, as the Henvey Project involved 90 major turbines and a lengthy 104-kilometre transmission line, it should be readily possible to use the Framework Agreement Act to establish the smaller clean electricity facilities addressed in the present paper.

3. Provincial powers to act

The Constitution provides provincial governments with at least five powers relevant to permitting clean energy facilities: (1) public lands and property, (2) local works and undertakings, (3) property and civil rights; (4) municipal institutions; and (5) matters of a local or private nature. 

(i) Provincial power to establish fast track approvals for clean energy facilities on public and private lands

Provinces have broad authority over lands within their boundaries, including provincial Crown lands, municipal lands, and private lands. 

Additionally, the Constitution presumes that all works and undertakings in a province are local except those located on federal lands (described above) or connect with another province or another country (Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters 2009 SCC 53). 

Therefore, every Province has broad regulatory authority to establish fast-track permitting for clean energy facilities across its boundaries, on public and private lands (though not on federal lands). 

Public lands and property

Provinces have broad authority over their property, with property including provincial financial resources. Thus, provinces have broad power to spend all monies they raise by taxes or otherwise receive through transfers from the federal government. 

As described above, Ontario provides an important example of provincial spending in support of energy facilities through its 2009 Green Energy Act reform and feed-in tariffs program. 

(ii) Provincial power to fund clean energy facilities

Every province has broad power to set laws regarding property and civil rights. Thus, a province may set the terms of property division and sale, and contracts, including contractual terms and conditions. Property in this context also includes financial resources. Provinces have broad power to spend all monies they raise by taxes or otherwise receive through transfers from the federal government. 

(iii) Provincial power to regulate private property and civil rights 

Every province has broad power to set laws regarding property and civil rights. Thus, a province may set the terms of property division and sale, and contracts, including contractual terms and conditions.

This power can authorize the development of any required contracts and property rights to implement required zero-emission facilities, including for example a future feed-in-tariff program such as the program described above that was implemented by Ontario under the Green Energy Act. 

(iv) Provincial power over municipalities

Provinces have constitutional authority over municipal institutions and governments. Additionally, every province has broad constitutional authority over all local works and property and civil rights. These general powers allow a province to establish the broader terms of municipal laws over any kind of facility. For some time, provinces have assigned law-making powers to municipalities through laws that authorize municipal councils to pass local by-laws. 

Municipal powers to act are reviewed in greater detail in Part 4, below. 

(v) Provincial powers over local or private matters 

This provincial power is aligned with several other provincial powers (e.g., local works and undertakings). It authorizes a province to address local matters beyond local works and undertakings.

4. Municipal powers to act

Provinces assign law-making powers to municipalities through legislation that authorizes municipal bylaws. Using the example of Ontario, this Province authorizes municipalities to pass a broad range of bylaws through numerous statutes, principally the Municipal Act, 2001 S.O. 2001, c.25 (“Municipal Act”) and the Planning Act. Ontario modernized the Municipal Act in several stages from 2001 to 2006. The result is a Municipal Act that provides municipal councils with broad powers to pass bylaws through both general “spheres of jurisdiction” and specific provisions (Municipal Act, ss.10, 11). The Planning Act is a specialized statute to address proposed changes to existing land use, including the broad power of municipalities to restrict or permit specific uses of property through zoning bylaws (Planning Act R.S.O. 1990, c.P.13, s.34).

Since 2001, the scope of municipal authority to pass laws relevant to facility approvals has been guided by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d’arrosage) v. Hudson (Town) [2001] 2 SCR 241. This decision modernized the judicial review of municipal bylaws. The decision focused on a municipal bylaw passed under other municipal legislation that restricted the use of pesticides for a local facility. This case established that a municipal bylaw can be valid and enforceable even where there are applicable provincial or federal laws and even approvals, so long as the bylaw does not conflict with the other laws. The Court also read the text of conflict narrowly, consistent with modern principles of federalism governing federal-provincial conflict set out in the 1982 case of Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon [1982] 2 SCR 161. Thus, there is conflict where it is not possible to comply with all applicable laws at the same time—noting that a more restrictive law does not create conflict as it is possible to comply with the less restrictive and the more restrictive law by meeting the requirements of the more restrictive law. There is also conflict where a law frustrates the purpose of another law, but courts have set out parameters that make this a difficult test to meet. 

(i) Municipal zoning powers to locate and approve clean energy facilities

Fast-track permitting reform is likely to be available to municipalities in one of two ways. First, in provinces such as Ontario where municipalities have broad authority to pass bylaws so long as the bylaw is within at least one sphere of municipal jurisdiction, a municipality is likely to have broad powers to implement fast track permitting solely on its own initiative or on the basis of implementing provincial (and/or national) guidance on permitting criteria for new clean energy facilities. 

Second, in provinces where municipal law-making powers are limited to more traditional approaches, municipalities will have some power to implement fast track permitting through zoning or similar land use bylaws. Today, municipal zoning bylaws in some form or another regulate the vast majority of land uses within a municipality. The general approach of zoning bylaws is to prohibit all uses except those that are expressly permitted. Nevertheless, a municipality may choose different ways to make lands available for clean energy facilities. For example, a zoning bylaw could make provision for clean energy facilities in several specific zones and then also provide setback requirements from key natural heritage features and/or residential property lines.

Contrary to broad municipal authority, there are also examples of a province choosing to take overarching control over specific classes of facilities subject to municipal zoning. However, the recent example of Ontario’s Green Energy Act reforms illustrates two of the many problems that arise where a province seeks to apply its overarching authority to restrict municipal authority over zoning. In this example, one problem arose from Ontario amending provincial laws to exempt green energy facilities from municipal bylaws, including zoning bylaws. This aspect of the Ontario reforms created broad rural backlash and triggered the opposition of Councils of numerous municipalities. This opposition led to extensive municipal council efforts to get around these restrictions and extensive litigation over the bylaws passed by municipal council (Suncor Energy Products v. Town of Plympton-Wyoming, 2014 ONSC 2934). 

The second problem that arose with this Ontario reform is that this Province sought but failed to be comprehensive in prescribing the effects to be studied. Though the reform covered the vast majority of effects, it failed to encompass effects on endangered species, requiring that endangered species issues be regulated separately from the broad, renewable energy facility approval. Thus, the Renewable Energy Approval (REA) process mandated more than one dozen reports, but none required avoidance or even consideration of endangered species habitat. Yet Ontario created a statutory test for appeals to a tribunal that such appeals would be successful if an opponent established “serious and irreversible harm to plant life, animal life or the natural environment” (Environmental Protection Act s.142.1(3)). One opponent then relied on this disconnect between what was studied and the test on appeal to successfully appeal an approval that failed to consider endangered species issues (Prince Edward County Field Naturalists v. Ostrander Point GP Inc., 2015 ONCA 269). 

Ultimately, within a decade, this generally successful but flawed provincial approach resulted in a new Ontario government repealing the core of the Green Energy Act and restoring municipal powers.

Learning from this experience in Ontario, it is clearly desirable to consider all reasonable reforms that are likely to provide communities with long-term benefits or incentives to site clean energy facilities so that there is local support, not opposition. A provincial override of local decision-making should thus occur only exceptionally, not as a general policy. 

(ii) Municipal power to regulate local effects 

There are many reasons why a local municipality may be expected to support new clean energy facilities according to the criteria set out in this paper. Municipalities may standardize their approach to facility support by passing municipal bylaws that address the conditions of support—financial or otherwise—that the neighbours of such facilities share the municipal view of overall benefit to burden.
On the other hand, municipalities may wish to ensure that all clean energy facilities in their territory avoid local features of special significance in the municipality. This paper suggests that municipalities may do this by expanding the meaning of key environmental features within the municipality; however, as noted above in this section, it is essential that any bylaw seeking to depart from broadly applicable national or provincial criteria not frustrate the purpose of a fast track permitting by significantly restricting the locations of clean energy facilities in that municipality.

References

Arnold, Jonathan, and Marisa Beck. 2023. “Permitting Reform for Clean Energy Projects in New York and California.” Canadian Climate Institute.

Beck, Marisa, Dale Beugin, and Calvin Trottier-Chi. 2023. Seven recommendations to leverage public investment to help Canada compete in the global energy transition: A made-in-Canada approach to clean growth. Canadian Climate Institute. 

BC Hydro. 2023. “Site C Clean Energy Project—Project Status Dashboard” (2023).

Canada Grain Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. G-10, as amended.

CBC News. 2022. “Final Muskrat commissioning delayed until spring as GE struggles to perfect transmission software.” January 26.

Cleland, Michael, et al. 2016. “A Matter of Trust: The Role of Communities in Energy Decision-Making.” University of Ottawa, Positive Energy Program.

Comeau, Louise, Elizabeth Gresch, and Louis-Charles Vaillancourt. 2022. Why Do Wind Energy Projects Fail? Conservation Council of New Brunswick.

Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western Canada Council of Teamsters, 2009 SCC 53 (2009).

Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. 1867, c. 3 (2023).

Dolter, Brett, and Nicholas Rivers. 2018. “The cost of decarbonizing the Canadian electricity system.” Energy Policy 113, 135-148. 

Environmental Protection Act of 1990, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.19 (2023).

First Nations Lands Management Act, S.C. 1999, c.24.

Framework Agreement on First Nation Land Management Act, S.C. 2022, c. 19, as amended.

Futurepolicy.org. 2023. “The German Feed-in Tariff” (2023).

Government of Ontario. 2017. Greenbelt Plan.

Impact Assessment Act of 2019, S.C. 2019, c. 28 (2023).

Interprovincial Co-Ops. v. The Queen [1976] 1 SCR 477 (1976).

Kanduth, Anna and Jason Dion. 2022. Electric Federalism: Policy for aligning Canadian electricity systems with net zero. Canadian Climate Institute.

Kauffman, Rebecca. 2023. “Threatened Jurisdiction: Species at Risk and the Constitution.” Environmental Law Centre.

Lee, Caroline, Jason Dion, and Christiana Guertin. 2022. Bigger, Cleaner, Smarter: Pathways for aligning Canadian electricity systems with net zero. Canadian Climate Institute. 

Migratory Birds Convention Act, 1994, S.C. 1994, c. 22, as amended.

Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25, as amended.

Natural Resources Canada. 2023. Powering Canada Forward: Building a clean, affordable and reliable electricity system for every region of Canada.

Nuclear and Safety Control Act, S.C. 1997, c. 9, as amended.

Physical Activities Regulations. 2019. Impact Assessment Act. SOR/2019-285 (2023).

Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P13, as amended.

Prince Edward County Field Naturalists v. Ostrander Point GP Inc., 2015 ONCA 269 (2015).

R. v. Francis, [1988] 1 SCR 1025 (1988).

References re. Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, 2021 SCC 11 (2021).

Reference re. Impact Assessment Act, 2023 SCC 23 (2023).

Semeniuk, Ivan, and Wendy Stueck. 2023. “Three bat species at risk of becoming endangered as wind turbines take heavy toll on wildlife.” The Globe and Mail, May 11. 

Suncor Energy Products v. Town of Plympton-Wyoming, 2014 ONSC 2934 (2014).

Surrey (City) v. Peace Arch Enterprises Ltd., (1970), 74 WWR (ns) 380 (BCCA). 

Thomas, Stephen, and Tom Green. 2022. Shifting Power: Zero Emissions Across Canada by 2035. David Suzuki Foundation. 

Venkatachalam, Ven, and Lennie Kaplan. 2023. Canada’s trade in renewable energy products. Canadian Energy Centre.


Streamlining clean growth project approvals with strategic assessments

Introduction

Canada needs a better strategy for building clean electricity projects, industrial decarbonization projects, and critical mineral mining projects at the necessary speed and scale for the net zero transition. As industry and government search for ways to streamline the country’s regulations (Chalmers 2023; Thurton 2022; Crawley 2023), strategic assessments represent an important but neglected tool that the federal government can and should put to greater use.

It is abundantly clear that changes to regulatory review must be done carefully. The federal 2019 Impact Assessment Act overhauled Canada’s regulatory regime in an attempt to make it more holistic and responsive to the public interest, and the main instrument it relies on is project-level impact assessment (Wright 2021). Each impact assessment examines a project at risk of significantly impacting sustainability and has the power to stop the project if necessary.

However, in October 2023, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the Act is largely unconstitutional. The Court’s argument was that the impact assessment process currently allows the federal government to examine and stop projects for reasons outside of federal jurisdiction (Supreme Court of Canada 2023). Until the Act’s constitutionality is resolved, projects will face greater uncertainty during their regulatory reviews.

This is where strategic assessments could play a role. They are a way for regulators to add strategic-level analysis, where what’s being assessed are policies and systemic issues rather than individual projects. By adding strategic analysis, regulators can accelerate and strengthen Canada’s predominantly project-level regulatory system. Moreover, although the Impact Assessment Act defines strategic assessments, that part of the Act was left untouched in the October 2023 Supreme Court ruling. Canada has yet to complete a strategic assessment under the Act, but variations have been used by provinces, territories, and the federal cabinet (Gibson et al. 2020; Noble 2008; Noble 2021). The federal Strategic Assessment of Climate Change also closely followed the Act’s process (Government of Canada 2020).

Specifically, strategic assessments are a way for regulators to address the impacts of multiple projects at once. They are meant for examining and advising on overarching policies and systemic issues that may be contributing to project-level impacts. For example, a regulator could use a strategic assessment to assess the Canadian Critical Minerals Strategy and note that the strategy might contribute to impacts on waterways and Indigenous governance. As part of the strategic assessment process, the regulator could then recommend general approaches for assessing a mine’s pollution and how it shares benefits with communities. These approaches could be used to inform policy and also save future impact assessments from having to build their own approaches from scratch.

Strategic assessments are a way for regulators to address the impacts of multiple projects at once

Strategic assessments are unlikely to provoke constitutional challenges in the same way impact assessments have. By being a way to advise the federal government on strategy, strategic assessments under the Impact Assessment Act are a step removed from project approval and exist more squarely within federal jurisdiction. Conversely, though, their influence over projects depends entirely on how the federal government chooses to implement their advice.

Despite—or perhaps because of—the current uncertainty surrounding regulatory review, it is worth investigating how strategic assessments can be used to streamline the process for clean growth projects. We define clean growth projects as those that contribute to making Canada’s economy stronger, less polluting, more inclusive, and more resilient.  A great many such projects will be needed for Canada to meet its climate and economic goals. This paper explores how regulators have used strategic assessments before to make regulatory review more effective and efficient for projects, and the resulting lessons for Canada.

We define clean growth projects as those that contribute to making Canada’s economy stronger, less polluting, more inclusive, and more resilient.

Locating strategic assessments within Canada’s regulatory system

The Impact Assessment Act establishes strategic assessments as a tool for informing impact assessments. This could help streamline regulatory reviews and would be an historically novel use of the instrument. Other jurisdictions—including Canadian jurisdictions—have used strategic assessments before, but rarely in the same way as the Act intends to. For instance, the federal cabinet has its own directive to conduct strategic assessments, but for the narrower purpose of rejecting environmentally harmful policies rather than for generating strategic advice. The federal government also conducted a Strategic Assessment of Climate Change, but mainly used it to identify climate impacts rather than evaluate them (Box 1). The federal government has provided some guidance on how it plans to use strategic assessments under the Impact Assessment Act, although much of the process remains undefined.

Strategic assessments are one of three types of assessments established by the Impact Assessment Act:

  1. Impact assessments examine individual projects, assessing their direct impacts and cumulative impacts.
  2. Regional assessments examine all projects within a geographic region, and assess cumulative impacts.
  3. Strategic assessments examine policies or issues that are relevant to impact assessments, and assess cumulative impacts.

Specifically, the Act says that strategic assessments can examine:

“(a) any Government of Canada policy, plan or program—proposed or existing—that is relevant to conducting impact assessments; or

(b) any issue that is relevant to conducting impact assessments of designated projects or of a class of designated projects,” (Impact Assessment Act 2019).

There are practically no limitations on what might be considered a relevant policy or issue. Some examples of relevant policies (or plans or programs) might be policies for developing an environmentally vulnerable area, policies for installing a series of large projects, and policies for creating a supply chain for a product with significant pollution concerns. Relevant issues, meanwhile, might include environmental issues, health issues, local economy issues, and Indigenous rights and title issues frequently caused by projects.

Canada’s definition of strategic assessment is broader than other countries’ in three important ways. First, Canada uses the term strategic assessment rather than the much more common strategic environmental assessment used in the United States and elsewhere (Arnold and Beck 2023). The term reflects how, in its current form, the Act intends to holistically consider non-environmental impacts including social, health, and economic impacts.

Second, few countries recognize regional assessments as distinct from strategic assessments. Instead, if they are recognized at all, regional assessments are usually seen as a subtype of strategic assessments that happen to correspond with regional boundaries (Partidário 2003; Arnold et al. 2022). This paper focuses on strategic assessments with the understanding that many lessons are also applicable to regional assessments. Distinct regional assessments are important for Canada, given its regional differences and the place-based connections held by Indigenous Peoples.

Third, in most other countries, strategic assessments are used to assess policies (or plans or programs) and are not directly linked to impact assessments. Under Canada’s Impact Assessment Act, however, strategic assessments can only examine policies and issues relevant to impact assessments (Noble 2021; Impact Assessment Act 2019). This phrasing gives Canadian strategic assessments greater potential to proactively examine areas where impact assessments are being conducted but policies are lacking or are in development. For example, Canada could strategically assess how projects reuse building materials, even though the government is still in the process of developing regulations for reusing materials (Cundiff et al. 2023).

However they are defined, all types of assessments follow the same basic process: they start with a trigger, then are used to identify and evaluate impacts, and are wrapped up with a decision or recommendations around the impacts. Strategic assessments have not been formalized much beyond this in Canada, meaning that their process is still largely undefined.

Without clear triggers, the Impact Assessment Act’s strategic assessments lack formalization from the start. Whereas the size or location of a project can trigger impact assessments, strategic assessments are only initiated at the discretion of the federal Minister of Environment and Climate Change. The Impact Assessment Agency of Canada serves as the federal authority on assessments and can recommend that the minister initiates a strategic assessment. Anyone—including members of the public, the private sector, and other jurisdictions—can also send the Agency requests for a strategic assessment. Ultimately though, the power to initiate strategic assessments rests in the hands of the Minister.

Furthermore, there is little indication of the Minister’s or the Agency’s priorities for strategic assessment, other than the rudimentary criteria listed in the Policy Framework for Strategic Assessment. According to the framework, the Agency’s recommendations on whether to strategically assess a particular subject are based on whether doing so would be relevant, within federal jurisdiction, and in the public interest, as well as whether the assessment could adequately inform, improve, and assist with the impacts (IAAC 2022). It is difficult to imagine the Agency recommending a strategic assessment that does not meet these criteria.

Once triggered, strategic assessments also lack formalization on how they can be used to identify and evaluate impacts. The Impact Assessment Agency only provides general steps, leaving the details to be determined on a case-by-case basis (IAAC 2022):

  1. Deciding to conduct the assessment
  2. Planning informed by early engagement
  3. Drafting the assessment’s terms of reference
  4. Finalizing the assessment’s terms of reference
  5. Conducting the assessment
  6. Drafting a strategic assessment report
  7. Finalizing a strategic assessment report

When a strategic assessment is completed, the process of arranging it to inform impact assessments likewise lacks formalization. Impact assessments are currently mandated to factor in relevant strategic assessments at various stages, but the Agency has not published guidance on what “factoring in” or “relevance” look like.

Some guidance can be found that predates the Impact Assessment Act. In 2009, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment proposed a detailed process for the strategic assessment of policies (CCME 2009). If the guidance were to be followed, there would be three phases for strategic assessment: i) measurement and identification, ii) projection and evaluation, and iii) implementation and monitoring.

According to the 2009 guidance, the Impact Assessment Agency should develop terms of reference and identify key impact data in the first phase of strategic assessment, and also identify particularly important baselines and trends. In the second phase, the Agency should evaluate alternative scenarios with an eye towards cumulative impacts. For example, the Agency might collate scenarios representing alternative policy choices, activity intensities, and technology mixes, and then select the scenario with the most preferential outcomes. In the third phase, the Agency should make recommendations to align with its preferred scenario, which may include new regulatory requirements, and should establish follow-up monitoring and evaluation. Further, the guidance recommends that strategic assessments should be validated through public engagement (CCME 2009).

The Council’s guidance did not visibly shape Canada’s regulatory development in the following years, and it is unclear whether strategic assessments under the Impact Assessment Act will draw on it. It is also unclear how the federal government will amend the Impact Assessment Act in response to the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling (Supreme Court of Canada 2023). The ruling was mainly concerned with unconstitutional federal overreach during impact assessments; strategic assessments were not directly implicated. Any amendments to impact assessments could indirectly affect strategic assessments, though, because strategic assessments are required to have relevance to impact assessments. If impact assessments get scaled back in scope, strategic assessments may have a more limited range of subjects for assessment.

The Impact Assessment Agency recognizes that strategic assessments can streamline the regulatory review process for projects by sharing new information (IAAC 2022). For strategic assessments to live up to their streamlining potential, though, Canada needs to adopt a more formalized process, something other jurisdictions can shed light on.

Box 1: A short summation of strategic assessments in Canada Strategic assessments have a long but fragmented history in Canada. Since the 1990s the federal cabinet has had a mandate to strategically assess policy proposals at risk of causing significant environmental effects (PCO and CEAA 2010). However, cabinet has only recently started complying with that mandate. Moreover, cabinet uses strategic assessments more as a final safeguard against harmful policies rather than as a source of information for regulatory review (Noble 2021).

Provincial governments have also conducted variations of strategic assessments, although in different ways (Gibson 2020). Ontario has done environmental assessments of subjects that lend themselves to strategic-level approaches, such as timber management, hydro-electricity planning, and hazardous waste (Gibson et al. 2020). Saskatchewan also conducted a regional environmental study of the Great Sand Hills which informed the guidance on strategic assessment produced by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (Noble 2008; CCME 2009). The guidance itself was further used by Parks Canada to conduct a strategic assessment of activities within Wood Buffalo National Park (Public Services and Procurement Canada 2016).

The 2019 Impact Assessment Act is Canada’s first federally legislated provision for strategic assessments. The Act breaks from previous usage by directly relating strategic assessments to impact assessments. So far, two strategic assessments have been associated with the Act, neither of which was fully completed under it. The first was the Strategic Assessment of Thermal Coal Mining, which was triggered under the Act but was cancelled due to perceived irrelevance, as Canada does not intend to build more thermal coal projects (IAAC 2021).

The second is the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change, which was triggered under a different act, but since completion is considered to be a strategic assessment under the Impact Assessment Act. The Strategic Assessment of Climate Change provides technical guidance on how project proponents should account for and share their project’s greenhouse gas emissions and other climate information when undergoing federal impact assessment. This includes recommendations on how to identify a project’s net and upstream emissions, its climate resilience, and a trajectory for reaching net zero emissions by 2050 (Government of Canada 2020).

During impact assessments, the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change recommends that the Impact Assessment Agency compares a project’s emissions performance with that of similar projects, considers a project’s ability to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, and examines whether a project is aligned with and included in Canada’s emissions targets and forecasts (Government of Canada 2020). The Strategic Assessment of Climate Change stops short, however, of providing detailed recommendations on how the Agency should do this in practice (Johnston et al. 2021). For instance, the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change directs the Agency to assess a project’s net zero plans by how it “seeks to minimize greenhouse gas emissions . . . as early as possible for the project lifetime” but it doesn’t provide hard cutoffs for determining when a project’s reductions come too late.

Further detail may come in subsequent technical guidance. So far the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change has delivered two draft technical guides, one on emissions data in 2021 and another on climate resilience in 2022.

Using strategic assessments to streamline regulatory review

Streamlining clean growth project approvals means making regulatory review faster without compromising on—and ideally improving—sustainability. Regulators can use strategic assessments to streamline the regulatory review process by harnessing their potential to regulate cumulative impacts and share regulatory burdens with impact assessments.

Strategic assessments can effectively address cumulative impacts from projects

Strategic assessments are a better instrument for addressing cumulative impacts than impact assessments, which are constrained to individual projects. Cumulative impacts are impacts that may be negligible from the perspective of an individual project and are of greater significance when all impacts of its kind are combined. Assessing cumulative impacts across projects is crucial for regulating complex problems like climate change, biodiversity loss, and threats to Indigenous rights and title. In a first for Canada, the British Columbia Supreme Court used the concept of cumulative impacts in 2021 to determine that the Crown had infringed upon Treaty rights (Buhler et al. 2023).

Globally, strategic assessments have been used to successfully address cumulative impacts, but mainly through influencing policies. The European Union has had a formalized process to assess policies since 2001 with its Strategic Environmental Assessment Directive, and some member states have processes that date back farther (EC 2001). In a study of 60 European strategic assessments of transport and land use policies, Fischer (2002) found that policies that followed a strategic assessment integrated significantly greater sustainability protections.

Under Canada’s Impact Assessment Act, strategic assessments can influence projects through more than just policies. The Act currently requires strategic assessments to be relevant to impact assessments. Even though they have no direct authority over project approval, conducting strategic assessments under the Act will therefore generate information that assessed projects can find relevant. By providing a broader framework for understanding a project’s cumulative impacts, strategic assessments can be used to provide a basis for collaborative action across industry. Collaboration may resemble efforts like the Canadian Automotive Partnership Council’s work on regulatory efficiency, which is strategic in nature and relates to the impacts of multiple projects (Task Force on Major Project Development and Regulatory Excellence 2023). Regulators can also use methodologies laid out in strategic assessments to conduct more effective impact assessments. The Strategic Assessment of Climate Change, for instance, created a methodology for assessing climate impacts that empowers impact assessments.

Strategic assessments can share regulatory burdens with impact assessments and make them more efficient

Regulators can use strategic assessments to make regulatory reviews more efficient by having them share the regulatory burden of conducting impact assessments (Bonnell 2019). They can be specifically targeted towards policies and issues that come up regularly during projects’ impact assessments and inform the execution of subsequent impact assessments. For example, by providing a methodology for assessing climate impacts, Canada’s Strategic Assessment of Climate Change could save future impact assessments from creating their own duplicative methodologies.

Strategic assessments are an efficient way to assess strategic subjects like plans to build hydropower and the resulting impacts on waterways, at least relative to the overall cost of making policy. Worldwide, strategic assessments rarely cost over $685,000, and they usually comprise less than 10 per cent of the cost of planning policy and less than 1 per cent of the cost of implementing policy (Thérivel and González 2020; Thérivel and González 2021b). The information they generate can make impact assessments more efficient in turn. Strategic assessment recommendations have guided impact assessments in Ireland, particularly in terms of scoping relevant impacts and identifying vulnerable areas (González and Therivel 2022).

Regulators have only recently started to value strategic assessments for their potential to streamline regulatory review processes. Historically, their main role has been to improve policies, with their implications for projects and impact assessments being of secondary importance (Thérivel and González 2021b). Evidence suggests that they can be used to achieve streamlining, though, if they are set up for it.

Leading practices for increasing strategic assessments’ streamlining potential

Regulators can use strategic assessments to streamline regulatory review for clean growth projects, but they are not certain to succeed in every case. In a study of strategic assessments of wind energy policies, British and German government stakeholders labelled 7 out of 18 strategic assessments as unsatisfactory, which suggests that they are frequently done poorly (Phylip-Jones and Fischer 2015).

If Canada is to do better, it should draw lessons from strategic assessment usage around the world and within the country. According to the survey of usage in this paper, regulators hoping to use strategic assessments should target them towards strategic priorities and validate them with public engagement. Strategic assessments should also produce timely and practical information, and the regulators conducting them should monitor outcomes post-assessment. Otherwise, strategic assessments are at risk of being abused for political ends, providing unhelpful information, or failing to provide lasting direction.

If Canada is to do better, it should draw lessons from strategic assessment usage around the world and within the country

Prioritize the most important strategic subjects

Strategic assessments should be designed around subjects with demonstrably important implications for clean growth projects, such as policies to build projects or systemic issues caused by projects. For instance, regulators might want to strategically assess a critical mineral strategy’s approach to hazardous waste, if critical mineral projects were known to frequently clash with hazardous waste regulations. Or regulators might be interested in strategically assessing how clean energy projects impact local species-at-risk, if impacts on species-at-risk were some of the most harmful impacts from clean energy projects.

The International Association for Impact Assessment is working on identifying prevalent issues for renewable energy projects. In its first report on the topic, the Association categorizes issues by project type. It distinguishes between environmental and social issues, with land development and waste management being recurring environmental issues and livelihoods and public well-being being recurring social ones (Dalal-Clayton and Scott-Brown 2022).

Table 1: Recurring international issues for regulatory review across renewable energy projects

Environmental issuesSocial issuesGeneral issues
-Air and water quality
-Pollutants, including greenhouse gas emissions
-Biodiversity and ecosystem services
-Climate adaptation and resilience
-Land development
Waste management
-Livelihoods and job opportunities for locals
Social acceptance
-Public well-being
-Cultural heritage
-Land ownership
-Upfront costs
-Associated infrastructure, including roads and transmission lines
-Baseline data availability
-Alternative project options
Source: Dalal-Clayton and Scott-Brown, 2022.

The European Union uses strategic foresighting to identify a range of important strategic subjects. Some identified subjects include the socio-political significance of migration, the influence of social media, and climate change and environmental degradation (EC 2023). Separately, the E.U. also uses formal triggers to aim strategic assessments towards important subjects. The E.U.’s triggers include policies being integral to sustainable development, policies setting frameworks for project approval, and policies pertaining to a predefined list of sectors. Additional triggers are when policies have transboundary impacts, cumulative impacts, widespread impacts, intense impacts, or impacts on special natural characteristics or cultural heritage (EC 2001).

Conduct early and ongoing engagement

Strategic assessments should be guided by early and ongoing public engagement (González and Thérivel 2022; Rega et al. 2018; Phylip-Jones and Fischer 2015; Noble et al. 2019). Canada’s Impact Assessment Act already reflects this by requiring strategic assessments to enable meaningful public participation and report on the inclusion of Indigenous knowledge (Impact Assessment Act 2019). Instances of both are available subnationally. Strategic assessments in Quebec suggest that meaningful public engagement requires collaborative dialogue early enough to shape policy design (Gautheir et al. 2011). Meanwhile a strategic assessment in Nunavut showcases methods for embedding Indigenous knowledge, including through joint report writing, Indigenous knowledge advisory committees, and information tours for Indigenous communities (Two Worlds Consulting 2020).

Make practical and timely information available for impact assessments

Strategic assessments should provide information that is specific enough for impact assessments to use but also generalized enough to be applicable across different contexts. Timing is equally important: strategic assessments should be conducted early enough to inform policy design but not so early that they become outdated for projects built under the policy (Phylip-Jones and Fischer 2015; Bonnell 2019; González and Thérivel 2022; Buse et al. 2020; Arnold et al. 2022).

The United States was the first country to formally recognize the practical value of tiering assessments. Tiering is the positioning of broad, high-level assessments so that they inform more specific, lower-level assessments. The U.S. has used tiering in instances like a strategic assessment of an entire high speed rail project followed by impact assessments of individual sections, and a strategic assessment of waterfront development with impact assessments of irregular projects. In essence, the U.S. shows that strategic assessments can be of practical use for identifying and evaluating ideal impact thresholds and template designs. Impact assessments are then able to focus on projects that exceed ideal thresholds or stray from ideal templates (Thérivel and González 2021a). Additionally, to improve timeliness, regulators could mandate regular updates to strategic assessments (Bonnell 2019).

Conduct comprehensive monitoring of outcomes

Regulators rarely go beyond monitoring whether strategic assessments are conducted in adherence with their legislated processes. The primary objective of strategic assessments, however, should be to contribute to sustainable outcomes, so regulators should also monitor how strategic assessments outwardly influence subsequent assessments, policies, and projects (Thérivel and González 2021a; Fischer and Retief 2021).

With this imperative in mind, the United Kingdom is exploring Environmental Outcomes Reports as a new type of instrument that could replace strategic and impact assessments (Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities 2023). Rather than assessing impacts on the existing environment, these reports are used to assess deviations from the ideal environment. For example, a strategic assessment might be used to assess whether transmission lines pose a significant risk for wildfires. With an Environmental Outcomes Report, meanwhile, the assessment would start with some low level of wildfire risk as the ideal outcome and evaluate whether transmission lines would stop that outcome from being met. It is too early to say whether these reports are superior to strategic and impact assessments, but they do show that regulatory instruments can be built around improving outcomes rather than just avoiding harm.

Regulators designing strategic assessments should adhere to the above leading practices, from selecting important subjects to prioritizing sustainable outcomes. Doing so could make building at the speed and scale required by the net zero transition more manageable.

Considerations for using strategic assessments to streamline clean growth projects in Canada

Strategic assessments have significant potential for streamlining clean growth project approvals, but only if they are done well. As the federal authority on assessments, the Impact Assessment Agency is the principal designer of strategic assessments in Canada. Here are several considerations that the Agency could incorporate into the instrument’s design and use.

Strategic assessments have significant potential for streamlining clean growth project approvals, but only if they are done well

Designing strategic assessments to have triggers

Strategic assessments under the Impact Assessment Act have an ambiguous triggering process, making them vulnerable to underuse or politicalization. The Impact Assessment Agency can recommend subjects for strategic assessment and the Minister ultimately decides when to conduct one, but neither has disclosed many details on their priorities for assessment. The Agency could share more elaborate criteria on the kinds of issues and policies that would trigger a strategic assessment, similar to the European Union’s more formal triggers.

Designing strategic assessments to have tiering

The Impact Assessment Act calls for tiering between different types of assessments, but that part of the Act has not been substantively implemented.  Canada lacks standards for how strategic assessments should inform impact assessments, with the Impact Assessment Agency providing no dedicated channels, tests for relevance, timelines, or procedures for sharing information. More fundamentally, the Act tasks both strategic and impact assessments with considering cumulative impacts, making the division of impacts between them ambiguous (Impact Assessment Act 2019; IAAC 2022). Without implementing formalized tiering, Canada may continue to default to assessing strategic-level subjects in project-level assessments (Leach 2021).

Newfoundland and Labrador offers a case study in the limitations of conducting strategic assessments without formalized tiering. The Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board has been conducting strategic assessments of offshore petroleum since 2002, which typically entails describing the environmental setting, identifying petroleum impacts and mitigation approaches, making policy recommendations, and consulting the public at various stages. The Board also reviews its strategic assessments every five years to maintain timeliness. Overall, in many ways, these strategic assessments reflect leading practices. However, they have failed to meaningfully influence impact assessments. The Board is too cautious about intervening with project-level recommendations in its strategic assessments, while also being too cautious about trusting information without repeating processes in its impact assessments (Bonnell 2019).

Designing strategic assessments to have outcome monitoring

Monitoring is critical to the improvement of any policy or program, but it is unclear how the Impact Assessment Agency intends to monitor strategic assessments. Practice in Canada so far suggests that basic monitoring might, at the very least, trigger better adherence to strategic assessment processes. The federal cabinet is mandated to conduct its version of a strategic assessment when receiving policy proposals with potentially significant environmental impacts. However, an audit found that the cabinet only assessed 6 per cent of such policy proposals between 2011 and 2014. After annual audits were imposed, the rate quickly rose to 93 per cent in 2017 (Noble et al. 2019).

Table 2: Compliance with the cabinet directive to strategically assess policy proposals improved after annual audits were imposed

 2015 audit2016 audit2017 audit2018 audit
Years audited2011 to 20142013 to 20152013 to 20162017
Policy proposals in need of assessment1,955506359283
Policy proposals assessed115 (6 per cent)98 (19 per cent)80 (22 per cent)263 (93 per cent)
Source: Noble et al. 2019

If the Agency does not have monitoring capacity, it can delegate the task to another body. For instance, the federal government provides up to $2 million annually for Indigenous-led monitoring of project development in the Alberta oil sands (Raderschall et al. 2020).

Using strategic assessments for clean growth subjects

In addition to design considerations, if Canada is to accelerate clean growth projects, strategic assessments should be used for relevant subjects. Two areas where impact assessments could greatly benefit from strategic guidance are assessing the positive impacts of clean growth projects and assessing cumulative negative impacts of such projects on Indigenous communities.

The Impact Assessment Act requires regulators to recognize both negative and positive impacts during assessments, but Canada does not have a well-defined approach for identifying or evaluating positive impacts (Hatfield Consultants LLP 2021). By ignoring such impacts, regulatory review is limited to only screening-out the worst projects and can’t do much to screen-in the best ones. Clean growth projects in particular have a number of significant positive benefits that are not formally accounted for in impact assessments, such as clean technology innovation, increased climate resilience, improved energy security, and decreased fossil fuel consumption.

Strategic assessments can recommend how regulators should consider the strategic importance of clean growth projects during impact assessments. They could shed light on positive climate impacts, for example, by providing methodologies for identifying and quantifying the value of climate action (SFAC 2022; Dasgupta 2021). They could also recommend benchmarks for positive climate impacts that would make a project eligible for fast-tracked regulatory review, similar to the tiered systems in the U.S. and Newfoundland and Labrador.

At the same time, projects on Indigenous territory are negatively impacting Indigenous communities beyond what impact assessments have identified. In September 2023, the British Columbia Supreme Court ruled that B.C.’s regulatory process for mining projects is in violation of the province’s duty to consult with Indigenous groups. The court specifically objected to mining project proponents being allowed to make mineral claims and surveil sites before consultations. The Supreme Court gave the provincial government an 18-month deadline to amend its process (Fionda 2023). How B.C. responds could have implications for Indigenous rights across the country, as the majority of provinces and territories similarly require few preconditions for making mineral claims—only in Alberta, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island does the provincial government allow itself discretion when approving initial claims (Manhas et al. 2021).

Strategic assessments can be used to identify and evaluate cumulative impacts on Indigenous communities, including impacts from clean growth projects. For instance, standards could be established for sharing project benefits with local Indigenous communities and consulting all relevant Indigenous rights holders (Raderschall et al. 2020; Tsuji 2022). Additionally, the Impact Assessment Agency has made progress on frameworks for including Indigenous knowledge in impact assessments, but major strategic barriers include assessments lacking capacity and the historical and ongoing effects of colonization and distrust (Eckert et al. 2020).

Conclusion

As far back as 2009, the Council of Canadian Environment Ministers called for more strategic assessments because they can help promote environmentally sustainable policies, direct and streamline impact assessments, and effectively assess cumulative impacts (CCME 2009). The same reasons are still relevant today, and not enough progress has been made to activate this instrument.

Global experiences show that regulators can use strategic assessments to streamline regulatory reviews by providing useful information and shortening processes. To maximize the instrument’s potential, regulators should aim strategic assessments towards the most contentious policies and issues for clean growth projects and deliver information that is both practical and timely. They should also monitor outcomes to determine whether and how much clean growth project timelines are being streamlined.

So far in Canada, the Strategic Assessment of Climate Change bears the most resemblance to a strategic assessment under the Impact Assessment Act. It identifies the climate impacts that should be considered during impact assessments, but it could go further by recommending how climate impacts should be evaluated in detail. Especially with the Supreme Court of Canada’s ruling that the Act is largely unconstitutional, any additional certainty that strategic assessments can add to regulatory reviews would be helpful. If Canada is to achieve a competitive clean economy, regulators should put more and better formalized strategic assessments to use.

References (click to expand)

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Permitting reform for clean energy projects in New York and California

Introduction

The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act in the United States is expected to channel at least US$370 billion in public funds to develop renewable energy, electric vehicles, clean fuels, advanced biofuels, and other clean technologies. It represents a generational investment in the clean energy transition—and one that is already paying dividends

But despite its potential to transform the US economy on the path to net zero, the Inflation Reduction Act does not automatically translate to “shovels in the ground.” 

Meeting the United States’ climate goal of net zero emissions by 2050 requires new clean electricity generation equivalent to constructing two 400-megawatt solar power stations every week for the next 30 years, according to one analysis. Yet it has historically taken four to five years to build this type of large-scale solar project in America.

The challenge is even greater for transmission infrastructure. Clean electricity will be the backbone of a net zero economy, but on average it takes over a decade to build new transmission lines. If the United States is unable to more than double the pace of transmission expansion, from 1 per cent a year to an average of 2.3 per cent a year from the present day until 2030, over 80 per cent of the potential emissions reductions created by the Inflation Reduction Act could go unrealized. 

There are two main reasons why it takes so long to build clean energy projects in the United States. The first relates to the complex and time-intensive permitting processes that project proponents 1 must complete, often involving multiple levels of government. Second, local opposition to projects and the politicization of clean energy development can cause significant delays. 

As this case study will explore, these two issues are related: permitting processes that lack sufficient community engagement can erode local support, trust, and buy-in for projects, adding delays to what are often already lengthy review processes. Consequently, lawmakers at the state and federal level have begun implementing reforms aimed at expediting permitting processes while strengthening community engagement to ensure that clean energy projects are built more quickly. 

While the challenges with reforming federal permitting tend to get the most attention, this case study focuses specifically on state-level reforms. The majority of clean energy projects in the United States must acquire state level permits and undergo state assessments before proceeding with construction, whereas federal permitting processes often exempt projects that are expected to have insignificant impacts, including many clean energy projects. As a result, reforms at the state level can have a large impact on getting clean energy projects built expeditiously, and also have clear parallels with how provinces review and approve projects in Canada. State-level reforms can also provide rich examples of policy experimentation, where the most effective reforms can be adopted by other governments that are experiencing similar challenges. 

Within this context, this case study examines permitting reforms implemented by New York and California, two of America’s most populous and economically powerful states, and also two climate policy leaders. Specifically, we look at whether these reforms are fully achieving the goal of getting projects built faster. It then concludes by exploring what lessons Canadian governments can glean from these experiences, particularly given the important jurisdictional and governance differences between the two countries. 

How the permitting process for clean energy projects works in the United States

Figure 1 contextualizes state-level reforms within the bigger permitting process in the United States. While the process for any given project ultimately depends on the jurisdiction where it is located and the nature of the project itself, permits and environmental reviews can be triggered at local, state, regional or interstate, federal, and/or Indigenous (or tribal) levels of government. This complexity reflects the fact that the United States—like Canada—has a federal structure of government. As a result, there are multiple permitting processes from various orders of government that clean energy project proponents must comply with before they can proceed with construction.

Figure 1: Summary of project permitting processes in the United States

This figure illustrates how regulatory processes operate at various government levels in the United States. It is important to note that project characteristics and/or size determine the dependency of environmental assessments, leading to certain exemptions from the permitting processes mentioned above. Furthermore, the power of local authorities to grant permits for clean energy projects may be limited depending on whether local governments have the freedom to make their own rules (home rule) and the extent to which state laws empower them to do so (state enabling).

At the local level, every project—including projects in both New York and California—must acquire a land-use permit in compliance with local by-laws and zoning ordinances. At the state level, most governments (with few exceptions) require project proponents to apply for numerous permits, including both New York and California. For example, depending on the size of the project and the state in question, project proponents might have to apply for state-level permits and comply with state regulations and assessment frameworks, such as demonstrating compliance with endangered species or migratory bird protection laws. Additionally, a select number of states, including New York and California, have environmental review laws that require an assessment of a project’s environmental impacts before permits are granted. 

The permitting process at other levels can overlap with the local and state-level processes. While outside of the scope of this case study, these warrant a few comments: 

  • Regional and interstate: Projects that cross state boundaries (e.g., renewable generation and transmission projects) are subject to additional approval from Independent System Operators which govern at either the state or interstate level. For example, renewable energy projects looking to connect to the electricity grid must apply for an interconnection request. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission also plays a role in permitting transmission projects in select cases.
  • Federal: Larger projects have to apply for federal permits and undergo a federal environmental assessment (e.g., under the National Environmental Policy Act). Similar to the state level, there are various federal laws and regulations governed by a vast array of federal agencies that grant permits for various projects. In cases where multiple federal permits are required, a lead federal agency coordinates all permitting. 
  • Indigenous: Native American tribes were granted authority in 2012 to establish their own regulations, in accordance with Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines2. However, granting long-term leases for clean energy projects on federally designated tribal lands still requires the approval of the Secretary of the Interior

State-level regulatory reforms 

New York and California have taken bold steps to expedite clean energy projects. This section provides an overview of the major changes underway.

New York

New York’s state legislature passed the Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act in 2020, the first comprehensive permitting reform at the state level.

The Act is multifaceted but centres around building out renewable energy generation capacity and significantly accelerating project approval timelines. It created the Office of Renewable Energy Siting to serve as a “one-stop shop” to address permitting challenges, conduct impact assessments, and to support project proponents to apply for state permits. It also established statutory time limits for issuing building permits, ranging from a maximum of six months for projects located on pre-approved brownfield sites to one year for all other projects. The Act also states that a permit will be automatically approved if the Office of Renewable Energy Siting does not make a determination within the required timeframe.

These reforms are primarily targeted at large-scale projects. Only projects with a capacity of 25 megawatts or greater will be administered through the Office of Renewable Energy Siting. However, projects with a capacity ranging from 20 to 25 megawatts are eligible to opt into the Office of Renewable Energy Siting process

In aggregate, these regulatory changes could dramatically shorten permitting process timelines. Prior to the passage of the Act, it took approximately five to ten years to get renewable energy projects to the construction stage—a clear impediment to achieving New York state’s legally-binding target of 70 per cent renewable electricity generation by 2030. Under the new process, renewable energy projects could conceivably get approved in as few as two years.

The Act also creates a Build-Ready program that allows the private sector to proactively identify and nominate brownfield sites for renewable energy development—sites that have, at some point in the past, received project approvals for economic development (for example, a retired industrial plant). If deemed viable, the New York State Energy and Research and Development Authority works closely with municipalities to advance the permitting and interconnection process. Once the site is fully permitted and approved, it is auctioned off to private renewable energy developers.

New York’s Accelerated Renewable Energy Growth and Community Benefit Act also includes provisions for community benefits and employment. All new renewable energy projects administered through the Office of Renewable Energy Siting and the New York State Energy and Research and Development Authority are required to provide a benefit package for the host community of the project in the form of utility bill credits and other community benefits. These benefit packages are intended to help get community buy-in early in the process to reduce the likelihood of opposition and future delays. Additionally, the Act provides funding for communities to intervene in the approval process to ensure that they’re receiving tangible benefits from proposed projects. 

Lastly, the Act authorizes an expedited permitting process for transmission projects in existing rights-of-way and creates a program to invest in distribution and local transmission capital plans to meet the state’s climate goals. 

California

Clean energy project construction in the state of California is notoriously difficult. California Governor Gavin Newsom recently stated in an interview that “people are losing trust and confidence in our ability to build big things.” And the data backs that up. Among all the western states, approvals for new clean energy projects take the longest in California

Climate change, and the need to dramatically cut state-wide emissions, have put these regulatory barriers in clearer focus. The increasing frequency of extreme weather events in the state, such as recent heat waves and wildfires, have repeatedly threatened the capacity, reliability, and financial viability of the electricity grid. Moreover, the state needs to dramatically increase its supply of clean energy to achieve its climate targets.

Consequently, in 2022 California started reforming its permitting process, starting with Assembly Bill 205

In many respects, the bill mirrors the reforms implemented in New York. It provides the California Energy Commission with the sole authority over permitting for wind and solar projects over 50 megawatts and storage projects over 200 megawatt-hours. Assembly Bill 205 also establishes statutory limits of 270 days for Environmental Impact Reviews.

The California reforms also include requirements for community and employment benefits, similar to those in New York. Assembly Bill 205 mandates the inclusion of community benefit plans in project approval to address or mitigate local opposition, and establishes labour and prevailing wage standards as a prerequisite for projects to enter into this newly established process under the California Energy Commission. Project proponents are required to partner with one or more community-based organizations to provide job training, community assets like parks, and investments in public infrastructure. The California Energy Commission can also place various other conditions for project approval as a means to address local concerns.   

Strengths of the regulatory reforms

Both the New York and California regulatory reforms have the potential to expedite clean energy projects and generate local economic benefits while upholding environmental protections. The reforms have several core strengths, including: 

1) Providing more certain timelines for project proponents can make a greater number of vital clean energy projects financially viable.

Lengthy permitting processes for clean energy projects do not just slow projects down; they also adversely affect the bankability and economic viability of a project. Project proponents need to invest in engagement efforts with local communities and Indigenous Peoples and hire lawyers to navigate the complex administrative processes. At the same time, project proponents need to continue paying their employees during the regulatory process, which is especially challenging given that projects are not generating revenue at this stage. Ultimately, repeated delays might force project proponents to seek additional financing—which becomes increasingly challenging over time—or abandon the project altogether 3.

The reformed system in New York has already proven to be faster and more predictable than the previous process. Publicly available data indicates that of the eight renewable projects entirely handled through the new Office of Renewable Energy Siting process, it has taken less than eight months on average to receive a permit. Only one project took a full year to issue a permit,  the maximum allowed by law. 

Initial data indicates that these reforms in New York have also helped cut the entire timeline for getting projects built, from start to finish. Before the Act, the entire process could take five to ten years; after its passing, seven of eight projects were approved within two years, and the eighth took two years and one month.

The California reform, by contrast, is too new to determine its effects on permitting timelines. But given that it implemented similar changes to the New York reform, it is positioned to drive similar results.

2) Mandating community benefit agreements can help reduce local opposition and expedite the permitting process. 

A recent U.S. study showed that concerns about decreasing land values were the most common concern expressed by locals opposed to clean energy projects. The analysis also indicated that project opponents believe that the site of a clean energy project could be put toward a more productive use for their local community. Lastly, the analysis found that feelings of not being heard or adequately integrated into the permitting process increased local opposition. Misinformation about the purported harms of renewables also poses challenges for renewable projects seeking local land-use permits. 

The reforms in both New York and California require community benefit agreements between the project proponents and the local community. They are designed to generate tangible benefits for host communities to offset the types of concerns that have historically delayed or cancelled project development. Benefit agreements can help address concerns over property values and land use by encouraging investments in community centres, schools, and other valuable community resources. For example, EDF Renewables’ Tracy Solar Energy Center project, permitted under New York State’s Office of Renewable Energy Siting, plans to dedicate US$20,000 annually to local and community-driven initiatives in the project area over a period of ten years once the site becomes operational in 2025.

New York even goes a step further by requiring project proponents to provide utility bill credits to affected communities and funding to facilitate community involvement in clean energy projects. The proposed Mill Point Solar I project, for example, commits to providing US$1.25 million over the first ten years to be distributed evenly across utility customers within the Town of Glen. These types of agreements help community members to participate in the permitting process and the energy transition more broadly. 

An additional strength of community benefit agreements is that they indirectly prioritize projects that are more financially stable. Developing such agreements takes a high degree of coordination, planning, and strong financials, all of which helps screen out weaker projects. 

Overall, embedding community benefit agreements can help set and formalize expectations for both communities and proponents, speeding up the process and getting the buy-in of the local community. Both states’ reforms operate from the assumption that well-designed benefit agreements are a necessary investment in sustaining local support for the project, and the earlier these agreements are established the better.

3) Eliminating all of the permitting costs for clean energy projects on brownfield sites helps to ensure that more get built. 

New York’s Build-Ready program flips the script on the permitting process for clean energy projects. By identifying, evaluating, and permitting brownfield sites for clean energy project development while simultaneously engaging with local communities to create a benefits package, the Program eliminates all of the costs and uncertainty for project proponents associated with the permitting process. Once the permits and interconnection requests have been approved and the site has been auctioned off to a project proponent, construction can begin right away without fear of the project being tied up in regulatory delays and with limited risk of litigation.   

The California reforms, by contrast, do not include any provisions to accelerate projects on brownfield sites.

4) Setting time limits on litigation and judicial reviews should reduce costs for project proponents.

Lawsuits against development projects in the United States, often filed by local citizens concerned about the social or environmental impacts to the community, occur frequently. These disputes create a substantial obstacle to speeding up the construction of clean energy projects, both on a local and national scale, even when efforts are made to simplify the process of selecting project sites. 

Legal actions are particularly pervasive in California, where, under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), “public projects” have been interpreted to include any private development. Court challenges stating that a CEQA review was incomplete or insufficient are cheap and simple to file, and can be done anonymously. Such filings can add significant delays to clean energy projects, or even scare away developers from making a proposal in the first place.

The reforms in California’s Assembly Bill 205 are attempting to address this issue by establishing a statutory limit on the timeline for judicial reviews. It aims to reduce litigation costs for project proponents and minimize the effectiveness of frivolous lawsuits.

It is still unclear, however, whether these reforms will have their intended effect. Statutory time limits could, for example, impede citizens from raising valid concerns with clean energy projects. Other tools, such as stronger anti-SLAPP legislation—which aims to reduce bad faith attempts to limit or compromise public processes—or ending the practice of anonymous filings could be considered to help address frivolous litigation. Moving forward, legal strategies to slow down or stop clean energy projects will likely remain a major source of resistance in the regulatory review process in both jurisdictions.

5) The ability to opt-in to accelerated permitting processes can give project developers added flexibility.

California’s reform creates an opt-in system, which allows project proponents to “forum shop.” For example, if the project site is in a jurisdiction that is heavily in favour of renewable development, they could choose not to opt-in to the California Energy Commission process. However, if proponents encounter local resistance, or if they are looking to build in a community that lacks experience with renewable projects, they can bypass the local level as the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over all permitting if a project opts-in. 

This added flexibility allows project developers to choose the smoothest path through the permitting process, reducing the time it takes to get projects built. 

However, similar to the time constraints on legal action, this provision in the Californian reform could have unintended consequences by minimizing or skirting legitimate concerns at the local level. The extent to which this becomes a problem depends largely on implementation by the state. Provisions within the new California Energy Commission process require the state to ensure projects are in the public interest, which could help address these potential impacts. 

6) Minimum thresholds for project size helps prioritize larger projects, which often face the biggest barriers.

The reforms in both states are designed to accelerate big projects. In New York, the new permitting and regulatory processes are only applicable for projects exceeding 20 megawatts. In California, renewable projects must produce over 50 megawatts in power and storage projects over 200 megawatt-hours to be eligible. 

Prioritizing larger clean energy projects in the regulatory reforms makes sense for a few reasons. Larger projects typically face a higher degree of scrutiny in the permitting process due to their larger environmental impacts. As a result, the permitting process for bigger projects often involve more decision points and overlapping layers of government, and are therefore more likely to face unnecessary delay and friction. At the same time, the stakes are higher for getting big projects built: they have the potential to generate economies of scale that can both close the states’ clean energy gap while generating significant local benefits.

It is worth noting, however, that smaller-scale projects can also run into similar challenges as larger projects but would be ineligible to access expedited permitting processes to address those challenges. Small-scale projects are likely to have even greater financial difficulties arising from regulatory delays suggesting that additional reforms targeting small-scale project proponents could be beneficial. In these circumstances, a framework to fast-track small- and medium-sized projects that meet minimum standards, in terms of environmental and social impacts, could be helpful. 

Limitations of the reforms 

Even though the permitting reforms in New York and California are still new and have yet to be fully implemented, limitations are already starting to emerge. If left unaddressed, these limitations could undermine the efficacy of the reforms and, in some cases, lead to unintended consequences. 

1) Vague language in the California reform risks jeopardizing its effectiveness.

Although the California reform sets ambitious statutory targets to expedite permitting processes, vague language throughout the law could impede those efforts. For instance, the 270-day time limit for Environmental Impact Reviews can be extended if there are “substantial changes . . . that may involve new significant impacts . . . ; new information of substantial importance . . . is submitted;” or if the California Department of Fish and Wildlife and/or the State Water Resources Control Board determine that they need more time to obtain information. In fact, the plain language of the law states that the California Energy Commission must certify an Impact Review and issue a decision on an application “no later than 270 days after the application is deemed complete, or as soon as practicable thereafter.” That qualifier, “or as soon as practicable thereafter” is particularly broad and could be abused.

2) Expediting the permitting process could compromise the rights of Indigenous Nations and people in both California and New York. 

Under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which the United States has not endorsed but announced in 2010 it supports, ensuring the free, prior, and informed consent of affected Indigenous people is an essential component of project development. Fulfilling these obligations under UNDRIP requires relationship building with affected Indigenous nations and communities, which takes time and effort. As Trent Fequet, the CEO of the Steel River Group, an Indigenous business management firm, has stated, “when building relationships, it can only be done at the speed of trust,” and that means engagement early, often, and in community.

Yet the push to expedite permitting processes could compromise the objective of free, prior, and informed consent as outlined in UNDRIP. 

California has made a stronger effort to integrate Indigenous rights and title within the permitting process. The state of California is required, for example, to provide the project application to California Native American tribes “that are culturally and traditionally associated with the geographic area of the site and initiate consultation with those tribes.” The state is also required to integrate traditional Indigenous knowledge within the permitting process, and project proponents must include affected tribes within community benefit agreements. 

Even with these commitments, however, the prescribed time limits for the permitting process in California could lead to inclusion of Indigenous Nations that falls short of the UNDRIP principles. Unlike in Canada, the United States does not have an established legalconstitutional obligation to engage or even consult Indigenous governments before taking permitting actions that would significantly impact them. The vague language around the permitting process timelines (highlighted above) may provide some room for accommodation; however, it is still too early to determine how these extensions could be applied in practice. 

It is noteworthy that the text of the New York reform bill, by comparison, includes no such commitments or language around Indigenous rights and title in the permitting process. 

3) Both reforms increase administrative efficiency, but it is unclear whether staffing capacity will be sufficient to match the expected increase in clean energy projects over the coming years.

At the national and state level in the United States, limited agency capacity is one of the primary causes of permitting and other regulatory delays. Sustained, long-term funding and workforce planning to recruit experienced and knowledgeable staff are vital to ensuring that projects are reviewed in a timely manner. Scaling up administrative capacity to match the sharp increase in clean energy projects is critical for their timely completion.

The reforms in New York and California are designed to streamline the project permitting process and, as a result, help address these gaps in administrative capacity. The new permitting office in New York, for example, is specifically designed to put the previously disparate administrative resources under one roof. 

It is unclear, however, whether the reforms in either state are sufficient to ensure the necessary administrative capacity to meet the significant increase in applications. California has proposed providing, but has not yet budgeted for, additional, long-term funding to the California Energy Commission.

4) Clean energy interconnections are not adequately addressed by either reform, which highlights the federal government’s important role.

The process for connecting clean energy projects to the grid is often lengthy in the United States. Interconnection requests are evaluated sequentially (in the order that they apply) by Independent System Operators or Regional System Operators, which has created a backlog that is, in many cases, years long. As of the end of 2021, 1.4 terawatts (1,400 gigawatts) of power generation and storage capacity was awaiting interconnection throughout the United States, triple the amount queued up in 2016. California’s Independent System Operators queue has more than quintupled since 2014; in New York, the queue has increased from approximately 10 gigawatts in 2014 to roughly 75 gigawatts in 2021.  

That has led numerous clean energy project proponents to abandon their projects, with only 23 per cent of all proposed projects reaching completion across the United States, a rate that is declining. In fact, across the country, California and New York’s Independent System Operators have the lowest rates of projects that reach commercial operation, at 13 and 17 per cent respectively.

Unfortunately, California’s reform does not adequately address these interconnection challenges. Assembly Bill 205 does not make any changes to CAISO, its Independent System Operator. Efforts by New York to expedite its permitting processes and invest in distribution and local transmission capital plans hold promise, but ultimately, such efforts may not be sufficient. Transmission across state boundaries exceeds state authority, falling within federal jurisdiction. 

Recent announcements suggest that the federal government is starting to fill this gap. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission recently had its backstop permitting authority expanded. If it were extended further, it could address even more of the interconnection challenges. Moreover, the Department of Energy released its proposed Coordinated Interagency Transmission Authorizations and Permits Program in August 2023, which would set a two-year limit on permitting reviews and would streamline the application process.

Lessons for Canada 

The permitting reforms in California and New York have great potential to speed up assessment and approval processes for clean energy projects. They are designed to not only shorten the timeframe for getting projects approved and built, but they include explicit provisions to share the benefits with local communities. This combination is designed to secure local buy-in earlier in the process and remove unnecessary friction, while still upholding the environmental and social standards that these processes were originally designed to protect. The strengths and limitations of these reforms are summarized in Table 1—the identified limitations serve to highlight areas for future improvement and additional research. 

Table 1: Strengths and limitations of New York and California’s permitting reforms for clean energy projects

StrengthsLimitations
1. Clear project timelines boost clean energy project financial viability.1. Vague language in the California reform puts its effectiveness at risk.
2. Mandatory community benefit agreements can reduce local opposition, increasing permitting speed.2. Expedited permitting may adversely impact Indigenous Nations and people’s rights.
3. Removing permitting costs on brownfield sites accelerates clean energy project development.3. Both reforms aim for administrative efficiency, but the state of required staffing capacities remain unclear.
4. Time limits on litigation can reduce project proponent costs.4. Neither reform addresses interstate electricity transmission, underlining the Federal government’s crucial role in this aspect.
5. Opting into accelerated permitting offers developers more flexibility.
6. Minimum project size thresholds prioritize larger, barrier-prone projects.

The reforms—both their strengths and limitations—offer some important insights for Canada, which faces similar challenges in rapidly scaling up clean energy projects to meet its climate commitments. And like the United States, frictions in regulatory review and permitting processes have been identified as a major barrier to getting these projects built quickly. The different structures of government between the United States and Canada—including the different division of powers between the federal government and states/provinces— mean that not all lessons are directly transferable. However, we identify a number of important insights that could help drive progress in Canada. 

First, the experience in New York (and, to a lesser extent, California) shows the value in establishing a “one-stop shop” for streamlining permitting processes. Second, the introduction of statutory time limits could provide developers in Canada with greater regulatory certainty and reduce unnecessary costs and delays. Third, New York’s program to proactively nominate and approve development on brownfield sites is another idea that could open up new possibilities for development in Canada, where environmental reviews on such sites can likely be shortened (particularly in cases where the new activity clearly has smaller environmental impacts than the activity originally commissioned on the site). Finally, the mandatory inclusion of benefit packages for host communities could reap similar gains in Canada and help secure local buy-in earlier in the permitting process. 

The shortfalls and limitations in each state also hold important lessons for Canadian governments. The California reforms highlight the dangers that accompany vague language when setting timelines for review processes, which may create loopholes that undermine the original intent of providing greater regulatory certainty for project developers. Secondly, the experience in both states emphasizes the importance of ensuring that any type of regulatory reform or shortening of timelines is consistent with the principles under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 

Here, the context is clearly different between countries. Canada has a constitutional responsibility to ensure meaningful consultation and engagement with Indigenous Nations and communities, whereas the United States has not formally endorsed UNDRIP. Canada’s federal government passed the UNDRIP Act in 2021; however, it is still unclear how this Act will be operationalized in project permitting processes. In fact, these commitments make any type of new time limits on the permitting process even more challenging within the Canadian context, suggesting that governments would need to proceed more carefully than in the United States. 

Another insight for Canada comes from the inadequate administrative capacity in each state, highlighting the importance of ensuring that any procedural reforms in Canada are matched with sufficient staffing to process a higher number of applications and environmental reviews. Finally, the inadequate focus of the United States reforms on transmission projects and interconnectivity across state boundaries should motivate Canadian governments to give the key issue of interprovincial transmission lines special attention and careful consideration in regulatory reforms.   

Canadian governments can and should learn from experiences in other jurisdictions as they attempt to address their own challenges with sluggish permitting processes. However, fully leveraging the lessons from other countries requires a more complete understanding of the sometimes unique barriers holding back project development in Canada. While it is clear that clean energy projects are not getting built at a pace consistent with the country’s climate objectives, it is not yet entirely clear where the biggest pinch points are within the Canadian system. Without an accurate and accepted diagnosis of current weaknesses, no amount of permitting reform can provide relief in the long term. Ongoing research at the Canadian Climate Institute is exploring these specific barriers in more detail, which can put governments in a better position to implement the lessons from other countries. 

The authors gratefully acknowledge the substantive contributions made by Jared Forman to drafts of this case study when he was a member of staff at the Institute in 2023.


References